Human factors on the ship's bridge by Moreton, M-BM
HUMAN FACTORS 
ON THE SHIP'S BRIDGE 
Mai-Britt Margareta Moreton 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of 
Liverpool John Moores University for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
February 2000 
ABSTRACT 
The shipping industry has long acknowledged that more than 80% of all accidents at sea are 
caused by 'human error'. Thus far the underlying causes have attracted less attention than in 
other industries. 
This research focuses on the role of the human element in preventing collisions and 
groundings. The intention is not to shift the blame from one cause to another, but to explore 
the underlying human factors which may induce an error on the ship's bridge. The 
navigating officer works within a unique environment which differs in many aspects from 
other industries. 
'Human error' in the marine environment is explored and the framework of the working 
environment of the ship's bridge is examined. The organisational framework is provided by 
the International Maritime Organization and implemented by the Member States. The 
physical environment of the ship's bridge encompasses the physical layout of the bridge and 
the exterior environment that the ship may encounter during its passage from one port to 
another. 
Traditionally, research in the marine environment has been based on causal classification 
systems that provide limited information related to the particular working environment. A 
review of published accident reports and voluntary incident reports suggested that additional 
useful detail could be extracted by focusing on problem/activity areas. 
This resulted in the development of a marine human factor's classification system. Problem 
areas were defined as 'Catalysts' and they provide an additional layer of information 
characteristics to the ship's bridge. These were selected in preference to 'errors' to move away 
from a blame seeking strategy for examining collisions and groundings. 
It is expected that a more detailed classification system will improve future analysis of 
collisions and groundings. The increased understanding of human factors on the ship's 
bridge can also, for example, be applied to examine 'human error' and improve the IMO rule 
making process. The principle of the marine human factors classification system can be 
adopted to analyse accidents in other working environments, e. g., personal injury. 
This study also provides a basic guide to human factors on the ship's bridge. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Objectives and scope 
Safe sailing is not something to wish for but something to plan for. Navigating officers are 
not born with an inherent aptitude for safety; recognising danger is a learned skill. Abell 
(1933) acknowledged that an increased understanding of danger would allow measures to be 
developed that would help to avoid it and reduce the probability of making mistakes. 
This thesis examines the need to understand human factors on the ship's bridge, their effect 
on navigation safety, and how such knowledge is necessary when developing technology or 
regulations to ensure that the outcome is as intended. 
Accidents at sea generally result in some form of loss, e. g., hull damage, loss of lives. There 
are two ways to reduce these losses, i. e., through preventing an accident and improving the 
survival rate. This research focuses on the prevention of accidents but does not aim to shift 
the blame from one cause to another. It considers the use and contribution of cognitive 
psychology and engineering as agents to examine accidents attributed to errors on the ship's 
bridge. 
The importance of human factors has long been recognised in other industries, resulting in 
many different definitions. This study adopts a broad definition and assumes the term 
human factors to include the perceptual, mental and physical capabilities of individuals, their 
interactions with their work and working environment and the influence of equipment and 
system design on human performance within the organisational characteristics that influence 
safe navigation (derived from Health and Safety Executive, 1989). 
Other industries have carried out extensive research into human factors within the working 
environment of their respective industry, e. g., the cockpit. The navigating officer, however, 
works within a unique environment which differs in many aspects from other industries (see 
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4). 
There are several excellent general human factors' textbooks (see e. g., Booth, 1989; 
Chapanis, 1996; Salvendy, 1995) and industry specific textbooks (see e. g., Hawkins, 1993; 
Beaty, 1995). At present, the shipping industry lacks specific textbooks focusing on human 
factors on the ship's bridge. This thesis should therefore be considered exploratory in nature. 
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The aim is to establish a basis for the collection of human factors' related data, its 
presentation, interpretation and practical utilisation in the marine environment. 
From the outset it became clear that existing studies and classification schemes (see further 
tables 2,3 (pages 20 and 21) and 17 (page 134) would not provide sufficient detail of 
human factors within the specific working environment of the ship's bridge. They provide 
broad categories such as Human Behaviour, Poor Planning or Negligent/Inappropriate 
handling (see further table 25, page 151) that do not afford sufficient detail to develop 
preventive measures to reduce collisions and groundings. 
Although safety at sea has attracted much attention from researchers, particularly in the 
wake of major accidents (e. g., the collision between the Andrea Doria and the Stockholm) few 
studies have centred specifically on the ship's bridge. The aim of this research was to explore 
whether systematic examination of readily available data sources could provide additional 
information. 
Besides the examination of a pre-classified database, data derived from official accident 
investigation reports and published voluntary incident reports will be explored. A brief 
review of published accident reports and voluntary incident reports suggested that additional 
useful detail could be extracted by focusing on problem/activity areas. In addition, it was 
decided to explore whether a survey using a questionnaire would increase the existing 
understanding of the working environment on the ship's bridge. 
This research focuses on collisions and groundings, i. e., accidents traditionally attributed to 
an error made by navigating officers engaged primarily on ships in the merchant navy. The 
symbol of the ship's bridge, shown in figure 1, and used throughout this thesis, is derived 
from the outline of an existing ship with a modern integrated bridge. It illustrates the 
working environment, and provides a mental aid to the core areas of human factors on the 
ship's bridge. 
The Swedish liner Stockholm struck the Italian passenger ship Andrea Doria broadside off Nantucket Island on July 
25,1956 resulting in the loss of 52 people 
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HUMAN PERFORMANCE 
ENGINEERING/DESIGN 
BRIDGE PROCEDURES 
SAFE MANNING 
NAVIGATION CONTROL 
Figure 1 Symbol for a mental aid to the core areas of human factors on the ship's bridge 
1.2 Human factors and accidents at sea 
1.2.1 What are human factors? 
Originally human factors were considered as a discipline focused on optimising the 
relationship between technology and the human (Kantowitz & Sorkin, 1983). As the general 
understanding of human factors increased this interpretation has progressively expanded. 
Dowell and Long (1989), for example, suggested three approaches to human factors: 
1) As a craft it evaluates design by comparing with the previous design. Practitioners apply 
their experience as rough 'rules-of-thumb'. This obviously represents a highly-skilled, 
but largely unstructured approach (both in content and methodology). 
2) As an applied science it draws on research from many interrelated subject areas, from 
psychology and physiology to computer science and engineering. It is concerned with 
the design of systems that can enhance human performance. 
3) As an engineering discipline it seeks to develop adequate design specifications and 
focuses on cost-benefit analysis. 
The above approaches, with Stanton's (1994) additional four approaches to human factors, 
are also applicable to safety at sea: 
1) a discipline that seeks to apply natural laws of human behaviour to the design of the 
working environment (e. g., to the design of the ship's bridge); 
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2) a multi-disciplinary approach to issues surrounding the operator (e. g., the navigating 
officers on the ship's bridge); 
3) a discipline that seeks to maximise safety, efficiency and comfort by developing the 
working environment to match the physical and psychological capabilities of the 
operator (e. g., the navigating officer); 
4) an idea - looking at the behaviour of operators in their working environment (e. g., the 
behaviour of the navigating officer on the ship's bridge). 
All the above definitions confirm that a multi-disciplinary approach to human factors' 
research should be adopted, including: 
0 Theories and models of human performance and behaviour 
" Methods for evaluating man-machine systems 
" Techniques and principles for the application of a human factor's methodology. 
1.2.2 Review ofAccidents at Sea 
More than 90% of international trade (by weight) is carried by ships (Goss, 1993). Statistics 
of shipping economics, e. g., value and types of cargo are readily available (see e. g., Singh, 
1995; UK P&I Club, 1992) and thus are not considered in detail within this study. Seaborne 
trade, nevertheless, is increasing steadily and it has been suggested that the shipping 
industry faces a severe shortage of skilled seafarers within the next 5-10 years (Grey, 1997). 
These factors are likely to have an impact on safety at sea. 
Accidents at sea are typically categorised according to accident type, i. e., collision/contact 
(allision), grounding, fire & explosion, mechanical breakdown, weather and misc. /unknown. 
Despite efforts to reduce accidents at sea, collisions and groundings continue to occur. For 
example the World Maritime News reported, on July 18,1997, the following accidents 
(Schultz, 1997) (table 1). 
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TYPE OF ACCIDENT 
Capsizing/Sinking 
................... 
Fire 
....................................... 
Collision/Allison 
..................... 
Grounding 
............................. 
NO OF ACCIDENTS 
..... ........... 10 
....... ...... ........... .. 
4 
....... ...... ........... 
2 
...... ....... .......... .5 
Table 1 Number and type of accidents reported for the week ending July 18,1997 (derived 
from Schultz, 1997) 
No readily available sources detail the total costs resulting from navigation related accidents. 
Figures published by the IJK P&I Club (1992) show that most claims are individually less 
than US$ 100,000. Nevertheless, 1444 major claims (over US$ 100,000) were paid out 
during the period from 1987 to 1991. Of these, 78 were individually more than 
IJS$1,600,000. PCL, the operators of Star Princess have estimated that the grounding of their 
ship resulted in a total cost of US$27.16 million (NTSB, 1997). It has also been reported 
that Exxon has paid out approximately IJS$1.2hn in fines and settlements after the 
grounding of Exxon Valdez (Jensen, 1998). 
Figures published by the UK P&I Club show that number of claims arising from collisions 
are about 8% of all risk types. The graph shown in figure 2 suggests that, apart from a 
sudden increase between 1989 and 1991, the overall trend has remained remarkably 
unchanged. These figures include claim investigations costing more than I JS$ 100,000. Club 
membership accounts for approximately 20% of the world's deep-water fleet (LIK P&I Club, 
1999 a/h). 
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25 
20 
15 
10 
5 
0 
1987 
COLREGS 72 enters into force 
GMDSS phased in 
Watch One Trials begin 
Figure 2 Collision frequency 1987-1996 (derived from UK P&I, 1999a) 
It has been suggested that the ratio of hidden to direct costs can be more than 4: 1 as 
illustrated in figure 3 (Heinrich, Petersen & Roos, 1980). 
Salvage Casts 
Damage to hull 
and cargo 
COSTS 
HIDDEN COSTS 
Delays caused by 
dry docking 
investigation time 
change of crew members 
pollution liability 
Figure 3 Hidden costs can be likened to the iceberg principle where 2/3 of the mass is 
invisible below the water line (adapted from Heinrich et al., 1980) 
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1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Collision Frequency 
Although the above figures are inexact, it can be argued that reducing the number of 
collisions and groundings would bring considerable tangible benefits, directly and indirectly. 
Thus, exploring new ways of preventing future accidents is prudent. 
1.2.3 Human factors and causes ofaccidents 
Most accidents result in some form of investigation into the causes. Traditionally post- 
accident analysis has focused on finding someone to blame. Reason (1990a) suggests that 
there is a need to differentiate between the two ways in which the human operator 
contributes to the accident: 
1) Active failures are errors and violations that have a direct adverse effect and are generally 
associated with the activities of 'front-line' operators, e. g., the Master and/or the 
navigating officer. 
2) Latent failures are decisions or actions, where the damaging effects may lie dormant for a 
long time. These only become apparent when they combine with local triggering factors 
(i. e., active failures, technical faults, atypical system conditions) to breach the system's 
defences. They can best be described as features that were present within the system well 
before the appearance of a recognisable accident sequence. They are most likely to be 
induced activities removed both in time and space from the direct man-machine interface: 
equipment designers and manufactures, shipbuilders, high-level decision makers, 
regulators and ship managers. 
To date most studies into the role of the human element in shipping accidents have focused 
primarily on establishing the cause of the accident. Several studies have concluded that some 
80% of all accidents at sea are caused by 'human error' (see e. g., Karlsen & Kristiansen, 
1981; Nagatsuka, 1993; Rother, 1980; Tuovinen, Kostilainen & Hämiiläinen, 1984). These 
studies imply that the nature of errors made by the human operator on the ship's bridge is 
perhaps somehow distinct from errors made elsewhere in the chain of events. 
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However, when an accident occurs, as noted by Reason (1990a), human involvement is 
evident on many other levels, including during the design and manufacturing of bridge 
equipment, training, inspections and the development of rules and regulations (shown in 
figure 4). 
INTERACTIONS 
WITH LOCAL EVENTS INADEQUATE 
DEFENCES 
Active & Latent failure 
Collision 
UNSAFE ACTS "roundiuli 
Alive failure by 
the navigating 
officer 
PSYCHOLOGICAL 
PRECURSORS OF 
UNSAFE ACTS 
Latent failures 
LINE 
MANAGEMENT 
DEFICIENCIES 
Latent failures 
FALLIBLE DECISIONS 
Latent failures 
Limited window of 
opportunity 
Traditions 
Culture 
Customs 
IMO 
Figure 4 The different human contributions to the breakdown of the navigational system as 
mapped on the basic elements of production (derived from Reason, 1990a). 
Figure 4 shows that an accident may be caused by a fallible decision made by top-level 
decision-makers, e. g., government departments, shipowners, shipbuilders and so on. The 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 9 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) has no enforcing powers and is therefore 
considered outside the ultimate decision making process. 
In illustration, the ferry the Woodside I, with some 20 passengers onboard, departed the 
Halifax Ferry terminal for Woodside in reduced visibility without first determining the 
position and intentions of other shipping. The OOW was unaware of the position of the tug 
the Tussle until the near collision. The Woodside I had not been informed of the presence of 
the other vessel by the VTS. Neither vessel attempted to communicate with the other and 
neither vessel made any significant reduction in speed. Thus the report into the dangerous 
occurrence between these two vessels shows the following latent and active failures 
(Transportation Safety Board of Canada, 1993a): 
1. The city of Dartmouth had no defined FALLIBLE DECISIONS 
policy for minimum operating BY TOP-LEVEL DECISION MAKERS 
standards for navigation equipment to 
help ferry masters in making informed 
decisions. 
2. Contrary to its operations manual 
Vessel Traffic Services advised only 
one vessel of the other vessel's 
departure. 
LINE MANAGEMENT DEFICIENCY 
3. Neither officer in charge had 
completed a radar observer's course. 
Together with a familiarity of the 
harbour area this may have resulted in 
a false sense of security. 
4. Did not report to the Vessel Traffic 
Services before leaving the port. 
Neither vessel attempted to establish 
timely contact with the other vessel 
PSYCHOLOGICAL PRECURSORS OF 
UNSAFE ACTS 
UNSAFE ACTS BY NAVIGATING 
OFFICERS 
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The nature of shipping today is such that accidents at sea rarely attract attention from the 
general media unless it results in a major loss of life (e. g., the Herald of Free Enterprise2, 
the Estonia3) or extensive pollution (e. g., the Exxon Valdez4). 
Technological advances or changes in regulations may not always have the intended effect for 
preventing accidents. For example, air-bags in cars were considered one of the greatest 
automotive safety devices in decades. Iacocca (Iacocca & Novak, 1985), the then Chairman of 
Chrysler, noted at an early stage that air-bags would only be effective when used with seat- 
belts. 
In 1996 air-bags were being blamed for nearly 50 deaths in the USA in the previous three 
years. This is in part because in the USA barely 60% habitually fasten their seat belts. In 
Canada, Britain, Germany and Scandinavia, where nearly everyone wears their seat-belts, 
fewer deaths have been associated with air-bags (Anon., 1996). This suggests that human 
behaviour may have a significant effect on whether a preventive measure will have the 
intended effect. 
1.3 Measuring safe navigation 
Although 'human error' has been generally accepted by the shipping industry as a major 
cause of collisions and groundings, there appears to be a lack of systematic research to 
identify the specific human factors that contribute to accidents at sea. Human factors in the 
marine environment have, in the past, attracted less attention from research workers. 
Research is generally carried out within the realms of individual nautical colleges or maritime 
organisations. 
Useful research into human factors has been carried out in other industries such as in the 
aviation, nuclear processing and the automobile industries (see e. g., Rosekind et al., 1994; 
Reason, 1990b; Davies, Parasuram & Toh, 1984). It appears that the majority of research 
2 The UK registered to-to passenger/car ferry the Herald of Free Enterprise capsized on March 6,1987 in Zeebrugge 
with the loss of 192 lives 
3 The Estonian registered to-ro passenger/car ferry the Estonia foundered on September 28,1994 resulting in the 
greatest loss of life in the Baltic Sea in times of peace 
4 The U. S. registered oil tanker Exxon Valdez grounded on Bligh Reef in Prince William Sound, near Valdez, Alaska 
on March 24,1989 rupturing eight cargo tanks resulting in catastrophic damage to the environment 
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effort into safety at sea has been spent in relatively few areas possibly exceeding their relative 
importance on the whole, e. g., researchers have focused on post-accident investigations and 
collision avoidance (see e. g., Karlsen & Kristiansen, 1981; Nagatsuka, 1993; Rother 1980; 
Tuovinen et al., 1984). 
Where does the human element fit into the concept of safe navigation? Some theories that 
have been put forward as measures of safe navigation are: (1) encounter rates based on the 
ship domain theory (see e. g., Goodwin, Lamb & Kemp, 1983), (2) collision risk indexes 
based on the assumption that some encountered situations are more dangerous than others 
(see e. g., Gonin, 1993) and (3) navigator work loads measured as potential encounters in a 
given area or accuracy of track keeping (see e. g., Schuffel, Boer & Breda van, 1989; 
Hammell & Puglisi, 1980). From a human factor's point of view, the above examples of ways 
to measure safe navigation are considered limited because of the complexity of the working 
environment which is affected by regulations, technology and human behaviour. 
1.3,1 The relationship between safety and danger 
Navigation is a learned skill the same way as driving a car. Thus the navigating officer must 
be taught how to avoid dangerous situations. Some learned skills become automatic with 
time, involving no conscious control. In contrast, controlled processes require conscious 
effort. They are performed sequentially and generally take much longer to execute than 
automatic processes (Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977). 
Norman (1976) has emphasised the importance of automatic processes for various safety 
practices especially in high-risk complex occupations, including navigation. For example, the 
navigating officer of the River Embley, on the request of the pilot, sounded the whistle 
automatically, when they realised that the HMAS Freemantle was bearing down on an 
immediate collision course. It should be noted, that after the event, the officer could not 
recollect whether or not he had managed to complete the whistle signal (Marine Incident 
Investigation Unit, 1997). 
However, in some situations automated behaviour may also increase the risk of an accident. 
The role of the cockpit checklists is to ensure that all required pre-flight checks are carried 
out. Unintentionally this standard operation may, with time, 
become automated to the 
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extent that, if distracted, the pilot may routinely mark off the list without checking visually 
or physically the indicated controls. Barley (1991) cites several aviation accidents where a 
contributory factor was the failure of the crew to complete the checklist. Thus man's ability 
to acquire automatic behaviour is both a weakness and a strength. 
To avoid a dangerous situation the navigating officer must know what the danger is, (e. g., 
the draft of the ship and minimum underkeel clearance) and where the danger is, (e. g., 
shallow waters). The basic concept of draft and underkeel clearance is the same for all ships. 
However, in practical terms there is a vast difference between the manoeuverability of, for 
example, a car ferry with a draft of 5m (16 ft) and a fully laden VLCC with a draft of more 
than 15 m (49 ft). 
The knowledge required to avoid dangerous situations and navigate safely is extensive and 
stretches from basic seamanship and pure navigation skills to awareness of human behaviour, 
limitations of technology and communication skills. 
1.4 Basis for this study 
The number of collisions and groundings occurring each week is relatively small in 
comparison with the worldwide number of ship movements. Nevertheless, as discussed 
above, they continue to occur and the costS of such accidents are significant. Research into 
safety at sea has generally concentrated on the results of the weaknesses of the navigating 
officer by focusing on WHAT went wrong. Consequently, changes in regulations or new 
technology have been introduced with the aim of preventing him from committing unsafe 
acts. 
Andersen and Fredriksson (1995) examined whether collisions make you smarter, i. e., 
whether the maritime community overall learns from collisions at sea. They suggest that the 
lack of benefits from collision investigations are mainly due to the difficulty of measuring the 
effect of safety improvements. 
The working environment of the ship's bridge has changed because of recent advances in 
electronics. The development of bridge aids appears to have moved the navigating officer 
almost imperceptibly from a controlling to a monitoring position. Generally, navigating 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 13 
officers are trained to a certain standard according to the International Maritime 
Organization regulations. In theory, they operate similar bridge equipment under similar 
oceanographic and atmospheric conditions and according to specific rules and regulations. 
However, in practice this is not the case (see further Chapter 3). 
1.5 Value of this study 
Considering the lack of recorded basic human factors data in the marine environment, the 
next logical step was to consider data sources that would individually or collectively provide 
additional knowledge of human factors specifically on the ship's bridge. Readily available 
sources are: 
1. Pre-classified databases of collisions and groundings. Such databases could provide the 
basis for a simple analysis of factors that may have contributed to the accident. 
2. Officially published accident reports of groundings and collisions. Examining such reports 
in detail employing a non-blame seeking strategy could provide additional detail that 
would add to the existing human factors knowledge in the marine environment. 
3. Voluntary Incident Reports could provide similar situational data as accident reports. If 
they could be examined using the same method, they could provide a useful complement 
to the above data. 
4. A survey using a questionnaire could provide supplementary data. Such a method could, 
e. g., confirm whether navigating officers would be willing to participate in more 
comprehensive human factors research and ascertain the diversity of ship types and 
trading patterns. 
It was anticipated that the systematic examination of each data source individually would 
provide enhanced knowledge of specific human factors on the ship's bridge. In addition, it 
was anticipated that some form of collective examination of the selected data sources could 
be carried out, thus improving the existing human factors' knowledge base in the marine 
environment. 
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The enhanced knowledge would also assist the maritime community at large by providing 
information that: 
" Would ensure that relevant human factors could be considered when developing new 
technology or rules/regulations. 
" Assists in focusing on specific human factors which can be used to improve the design of 
ships' bridges and user-interfaces of navigation aids. 
1.6 Guide to this study 
Chapter 2 will examine briefly the concept of 'human error' and its past, present and future 
role in accidents at sea. In the absence of industry specific research it will draw heavily on 
human factors research carried out in other industries. 
Chapter 3 will outline the framework of the working environment on the ship's bridge, how 
the human element is affected by the organisational framework provided by the IMO, and 
the physical environment of the ship's bridge. 
Chapter 4 will explore the SHELL concept (Edwards, 1972) where Software, Hardware, 
Environment and Liveware represent the components with which human factors on the 
aircraft flight deck can be addressed. Human factors in general will be examined focusing on 
those affecting the navigating officer on the ship's bridge in particular. These include the 
design of hardware and related information processing, learning processes and training, 
communication in the marine environment and a brief overview of health and safety at sea. It 
is intended that this Chapter could provide practical guidelines to human factors on the 
ship's bridge. 
Chapter 5 will examine data collection techniques and describe the data sources used in this 
study in detail. The limitations of the current coding systems in the analysis of accidents will 
be discussed. A marine human factor's classification scheme based on the idea of 'Catalysts' 
will be presented and discussed. 
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Chapter 6 will examine data processing and presentation. Chapter 5 introduced a marine 
human factor's classification system and the associated data will be presented in table format 
followed by a brief examination of the data. The four sources provide comparable and 
supporting information which is presented in a tabular form. It is intended to be viewed as 
descriptive, rather than analytical, i. e., to show patterns of 'catalysis'. 
Chapter 7 will discuss the application of the marine human factors classification system 
presented in this research. It will be shown that the classification system can provide a 
recording technique that describes human factors in a more functional manner thus 
presenting information that can be used to test theories of accident causation. To illustrate 
the advantages of the marine human factors' classification system the groundings of the 
Exxon Valdez and the Sea Empress will be examined as case studies. 
Chapter 8 will review the outcome of the previous chapters, suggest recommendations and 
show how objectives have been achieved. 
Appendix A provides a general classification scheme or taxonomy of different human factors' 
methodologies. Appendix B provides a selection of human factors studies applicable to the 
marine environment and appendix C provides a selection of studies related to auditory 
warnings. These have been arranged in table format which are cross referenced to the source 
of the study arranged at the end of the table. Appendix D includes a copy of the 
questionnaire into human factors relating to navigation. 
A glossary of more frequently used acronyms, abbreviations and terminology is included to 
assist in the examination of this study. In addition a brief list of useful Web Sites is provided. 
Bibliographic references to the work cited are given in parentheses in the text. The references 
are provided in a list at the end of the thesis, set out in alphabetical order. References to 
court cases and similar documents are shown throughout the thesis as footnotes. 
It is recognised that many seafarers today are female but, in the interest of brevity the 
convention of third person masculine will be used to refer to navigating officers throughout 
this work. 
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2.1 Introduction 
Whenever an accident at sea has occurred, seafarers worldwide sigh in despair "no doubt it 
will be attributed to 'human error''. To a certain degree this has become the norm in the 
shipping industry, if all else fails attributing the cause to the actions of an unknown 
individual is an easy option. 
This chapter considers the evolution and role of 'human error' in accidents at sea. The IMO 
has acknowledged the role of 'human error' in shipping accidents and as a result has 
proposed a working definition (IMO, 1996a): 
"A departure from acceptable or desirable practice on the part of an individual or 
group of individuals that can result in unacceptable or undesirable results. " 
The concept of human error is outlined and a current study is explored in this Chapter. 
Human error identification techniques and relevant human factors' studies in the marine 
environment are examined. 
2.2 The evolution of `human error' in accidents at sea 
Statistics of accidents at sea have been collected since the last century. Some of these led to a 
growing concern over the number of collisions that seemed to have resulted from the lack of 
common rules for overtaking, crossing and meeting end-on (Gray, 1867). 
The origin of the statement "80% of all accidents at sea are caused by 'human error' can be 
traced back to the late 1970's (Gray, 1978) and has been discussed elsewhere in detail 
(Barnett, 1989). These early studies suggest that researchers tried to find solutions to human 
factors' problems by employing the same methodology utilised for problems resulting from 
situational factors. Consequently the human element in casualty reports was examined in 
detail. The most significant group was labelled 'human error' and in the beginning little 
further analysis, other than stating this all-encompassing category, was carried out. It soon 
became apparent that to prevent future accidents required a deeper analysis of the factors 
that induced 'human error'. Throughout the 80's and early 90's statistics of accidents at sea 
were compiled and analysed resulting in the publication of several studies utilising different 
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definitions for the causes of the accidents. A few studies illustrating this diversity are shown 
in Table 2 and Table 3. The researchers used various sources of data attempting to identify 
causal factors. 
Tables 2 and 3 are intended as an illustration and should not be viewed as especially 
authoritative because of the miscellany of terms used in grouping the accidents. The tables 
show clearly that the lack of uniform classification of the data renders it difficult to compare 
the studies. It should also be noted that although it has become generally accepted that 
'human error' causes more than 80% of all accidents at sea (see e. g., Department of 
Transportation, 1995) the figures shown in the tables range from 15.3% to more than 92%. 
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Another major disadvantage is the lack of worldwide annual statistics of the number of 
collisions and groundings. The main source of worldwide statistics accessible to the public 
are published by Lloyd's Register of Shipping. These, however, include only ships that are 
declared a Total Loss or a Total Constructive Loss'. Figures derived from different sources for 
the number of collisions and groundings can vary significantly as shown in table 4. 
No of ships involved in ! No of Ships Grounded Source Collisions or Wrecked/Stranded 
Lloyd's Register of Shipping(') 36 45 
Danish Maritime 32 35 
Administration(") 
Swedish Maritime 39 
Administration°"'1 
(i) Lloyd's Register of Shipping Casualty Return 1991 
(ii) Dansk Soulykkesstatistikk for 1991 og 1992, Sofartsstyrelsen, December 1993 
(iii) Extracted from data provided by the Swedish Maritime Administration 
Table 4 No of ships involved in collisions and groundings in 1991 
57 
The figures were obtained from published sources and have not been cross-referenced. 
Therefore it is possible that the same ship is represented in more than one source. This is 
particularly likely for the data published by the Swedish and Danish authorities because of 
the geographical proximity of the two countries. Thus because of a possible overlap these 
figures cannot be aggregated to provide an accurate figure for the total number of collisions 
or groundings in 1991. 
2.3 The role cif `human error' in accidents at sea 
A significant weakness of the studies shown in tables 2 and 3 and other similar studies is that 
they do not provide sufficient detail to provide clear or specific action. For example, 
inattention may be remedied by increased vigilance laut the question remains how. This 
general categorisation of the causes has perhaps led to sonic, largely, unsubstantiated 
5 Costs of repairs are higher than the value of the ship 
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presumptions. Over the years these have been discussed informally in nautical journals and 
the maritime press (see e. g., Lloyd's List, Seaways). They can be summarised broadly as 
follows: 
2.3.1 Competence and Certification of Seafarers 
The competence of seafarers depends on many factors, notably the quality of their initial 
training, length of sea-time and experience. There is a general belief that the competence of 
seafarers has declined in the last decades (see e. g., letters to the editor in Seaways, Lloyd's 
List). This is attributed in part, to the decreasing employment of seafarers from so called 
'traditional maritime countries' and subsequent increasing employment of crew members 
from so called 'developing maritime countries'. There is a general belief that navigating 
officers from 'developing maritime countries' are less competent but there appears to be no 
published studies confirming these assumptions. 
2.3.2 Fatigue 
The role of fatigue as a direct or primary cause is, as yet, not clear from published studies. 
There is a strong feeling among many active seafarers that fatigue is a major problem. The 
purpose of IMO's Safe Manning certificate is to provide guidelines to ensure that ships carry 
sufficient numbers of crew members to navigate safely, e. g., preventing them from suffering 
from fatigue. 
2.3.3 Lack of common language 
Communication is typically assumed to involve a common language but, as will be explained 
in Chapter 4, this is a simplistic view of communication at sea. The employment of mixed 
crews onboard ships is not a new concept. Nevertheless, ships increasingly carry mixed 
departments, i. e., a complement of Master and deck officers with no common native 
language. Existing research does not clearly show the role of a common native language in 
preventing accidents. 
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2.3.4 Bridge Resource Management 
During the last few years it has emerged that many accidents resulted from poor interaction 
between the bridge team members (Transportation Safety Board of Canada, 1995). In the 
aviation industry most commercial planes are piloted by two persons, a pilot and a copilot. 
On the ship's bridge the navigation team may include members from outside the ship, i. e., a 
marine pilot. Conversely, there may at times be only one person on the bridge. Additionally 
the bridge team may need to coordinate with members outside the physical environment of 
the bridge, e. g., with mooring parties or tug Masters. 
2.3.5 User-Interfaces 
As navigation aids have become more computer based, it has been suggested that poor 
design of user-interfaces and inadequate attention to the ergonomics of the ship's bridge may 
result in errors that cause accidents (Merenkulkulaitos, 1997). 
For example, the passenger ferry the Sally Albatross went aground due to the navigating 
officer failing to fully understand the operation of a new radar system equipped with 
superimposed charts and connected to a Differential Global Positioning System (DGPS) 
(Oikeusministeriö, 1994). Concerns over such problems have also been expressed by active 
seafarers in nautical publications such as Seaways, Sjömannen, Schiff und Hafen and 
Merimies. 
2.4 The concept of `human error' 
The concept of 'human error' has been researched in depth employing different Human 
Error Identification Techniques (HEI), see further e. g., Rasmussen (1990), Reason (1990b) 
Zapf & Reason, (1994), Wagenaar & Groeneweg, (1987), Pedrali & Cojazzi (1995), Stanton 
(1997), Leplat (1987) and Kirwan (1992a/b). 
As a result of the above and other studies several HEI techniques have been proposed and a 
selection is shown in table 5. Notwithstanding the attention the HEI techniques have 
attracted, Kirwan (1995) suggests that there is no single 'best' technique available. The HEI 
techniques can be used: 
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9 to evaluate interface design, workload or other human factors 
0 for Human Reliability Assessment 
The basis for HEI techniques is to examine tasks and identify possible errors that may occur, 
perhaps as it result of poor interface design, inadequate training or other human factors. HEI 
techniques can be model based (e. g., Skill-Rule-Knowledge (SKR), Generic Error Modelling 
Systems (GEMS)) or non model based (resulting in simple error taxonomies). A selection of 
Human Error Identification Techniques are shown in table 5. 
It appears that the SRK model proposed by Rasmussen (1983) has become a dominant HEI 
model. There has been a trend towards modifications of this model, e. g., GEMS (Reason, 
1990b). This model focuses on different types of 'human error' and the factors that promote 
errors. It shows that different types of errors occur in different parts of the system and thus 
require different remedies. In this model errors have thus been categorised into slips, lapses, 
mistakes and violations as illustrated in figure 5. 
Basic error types 
Attentional Failures 
Intrusion 
SLIPS 
Omission 
Reversal 
Misordering 
Mistimin 
Actions not as 
planned Memory Failures 
LAPSES 
Omitting planned items 
Place-losing 
forgetting intentions 
DANGEROUS 
OCCURRENCES I Rule-based mistakes 
MISTAKES Wripplirrition of good nýln Application of bad rule 
Kg owIed ge-based t mi s e es 
Man v i bl f 
Actions as 
y ar a e orms 
planned 
Routine violations 
VIOLATIONS Exceptional violations 
Acts of sabotage 
Figure 5 Summary of error types (derived from Reason, 1990b) 
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Accident Dynamic Sequence Analysis (ADSA)° 
Cognitive Environment Simulation (CES)b 
Confusion Matrix Analysis (CMA)` 
CREW PROblem solving simulation (CREWPRO)d 
Critical Action and Decision Approach (CADA)e 
Error of Commission Analysis (EOCA)f 
Generic Error Modelling System (GEMS)9 
HAZard and Operability Study Technique (HAZOP)h 
Human Reliability Management System (HRMS)' 
a Hsueh K-S., Soth L. & Mosleh A., (1994), A 
simulation study of errors of commission in nuclear 
power accidents, in PSAM-II Proceedings, pp 066-1 
- 066-6, San Diego, 
CA, March 20-25 
b Woods DD., Pople H. E. & Roth E. M., (1990), The 
cognitive environment simulation as a tool for 
modelling human performance and reliability, 
Nureg/CR-5213, USNRC, Washington DC 
c Potash L., et al., (1981), Experience in integrating 
the operator contribution in the PRA of actual 
operating plants, Proceedings of ANS/ENS Topical 
Meeting on PRA, New York, American Nuclear 
Society 
d Shen S-H., Smidts C. & Mosleh A., (1994), Elements 
of a model for operator problem solving and 
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1992 a/b) 
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Grouping errors within taxonomies and determining underlying psychological mechanisms has 
resulted in the following classification of 'human error' (Stanton, 1997): 
" Different error forms, e. g., capture error, description error, data driven errors, association 
and activation errors and loss of activation errors. 
" Psychological mechanisms, e. g., failure of memory retrieval in lapses, poor perception and 
decision making in mistakes and motor execution problems in slips. 
2.5 `Human error' in the marine environment 
Traditional approaches to investigating 'human error' in accidents at sea have typically 
followed general 'human error' research, frequently concluding that an individual, i. e., 
generally the Master, was ultimately responsible for the accident. 
The approach of focusing on 'human error' is highlighted by a recent a study carried out by the 
Maritime Administration of Finland (Merenkulkulaitos, 1997). The value of examining this 
study closer here is that: (1) it focuses on shipping accidents and is based on accident 
investigation reports, (2) it is detailed and the methodology is based on an accepted 'human 
error' model, and (3) it is current. 
2.5.1 The Merenkulkulaitos Study 
The Merenkulkulaitos study examined 8 major accidents involving Finnish ships 
(Merenkulkulaitos, 1997) and is based on Reason's model (Reason, 1990b) referred to 
previously in this Chapter. 
The methodology of the study is summarised in tables 6 to 8. Error types are defined as slips, 
mistakes and violations as shown in table 6. The researchers considered that errors may occur 
within three different operational categories, i. e., 
during the planning of the operation, 
assessment of the situation and 
decision making or when performing an activity as defined in 
table 7. The task/category was then related to the operational environment of ships (shown in 
table 8). 
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Type Definition of Type 
Slip Actions-not-as planned. Typical errors made by 
experienced people. Slips occur to all humans on a 
daily basis. For instance a person realises that he is 
doing something else than intended or realises that 
he has forgotten what he intended to do. 
Mistake 
Violation 
Planned actions do not achieve their desired result 
In this case the objective or the actions have been 
incorrectly chosen or performed. Mistakes can be 
either rule or skill-based. 
Violations are deliberate deviations against the 
rules, although bad consequences are not. 
Violations are closely related to risk taking. 
Violations are not caused by of lack of knowledge 
or experience but the problems relate to the safety 
culture encouraged by management and company 
structure. Violations may be directly or indirectly 
sanctioned, e. g. discouraging the use of safety 
equipment or a tacit acceptance of rule violation or 
assessing the outcome of an activity purely based 
how effective it is, etc. 
Examples 
Slips of the tongue and gestures 
Memory lapses 
Incorrect performance of activity 
Learning a new activity 
Wrong decision. An error made when trying to 
solve a familiar problem 
Mistake in decision making. A mistake relating to 
solving a problem in a new or unknown 
environment. 
When assessing the familiarity of the situation 
experience must be regarded from all aspects, e. g. 
experience in ship handling, ship management, ship 
in general, operation of the equipment, weather 
and sea conditions and geographical area. 
Routine Violations. A typical routine violation is 
taking a short cut or sloppy radio traffic which is based on minimum effort and a indifferent 
environment where violations are not reprimanded. 
Exceptional Violations. Exceptional violations are 
situational so their spectrum is relatively wide (e. g. 
bypassing safety devises, unsafe speed). Typical 
factors influencing are an immediate gain of a less 
safe situation, over estimating ones own experience, 
enjoying taking risks viewing a risk of danger as 
theoretical, minimal or remote. 
Table 6 Definition of error types (derived from Merenkulkulaitos, 1997) 
TYPE OF ERROR 
Task/Category Slip (SI) Mistake (Mi) 
Planning of Operation (PI) PISI PIMi 
Assessment of situation and decision making (As) AsSI AsMi 
Performance (Pe) PeSI PeMi 
Table 7 Classification of type of errors (derived from Merenkulkulaitos, 1997) 
Violation (Vi) 
PIVi 
AsVi 
PeVi 
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Category Description of Category 
Planning 
Assessment of 
the situation 
Performance 
Planning includes all pre-voyage 
rtanning occurring before the task 
as begun, for instance before 
departure. 
The planner may be for example a 
member of the crew, land based staff, 
person acting on behalf of a maritime 
administration or a pilot 
A person's or group's assessment of a 
situation resulting in a decision to 
solve the situation. Assessment is 
based on a person's experience and 
understanding of the developing 
situation. 
To make a decision the assessment is 
based on predicting the outcome of 
the situation in the near future (next 
few minutes/few seconds). 
At this time the situation is 
'developing' and thus time for 
assessment and decision making is 
limited (compare with pre-planning) - but not all situations demand a rash 
decision 
Performance involves any orders 
relating directly to ship handling or 
orders given to another person who 
carries out the command 
Examples of Planning 
Passage Planning 
* Course changes made during the 
voyage 
Organisation of Watchkeeping 
* Coordination of activities 
* Installation of equipment 
Maintenance of equipment 
* Planning needs for future training 
and education 
A person's assessment of a situation is 
affected by his appreciation of factors 
such as: 
ship characteristics (type, draught, 
speed) 
external conditions that influences 
the ship manoeuvring (channel 
width/depth, other traffic, weather 
and sea conditions) 
Reliability of the information 
How well each person manages 
the situation 
Table 8 Description of categories (derived from Merenkulkulaitos, 1997) 
The researchers developed a form to facilitate a systematic examination of the 8 accidents 
included in this study (a sample is shown in figure 6). 
Figure 6 relates to the grounding of the passenger ferry the Tallink near Kustaanmiekka 
outside Helsinki. It illustrates the operational characteristics and the type of tasks that resulted 
in specific errors. The sample form confirms that an accident is unlikely to be caused by one 
single error made by one single person. Several different types of errors were made by the 
bridge team, individually and collectively. 
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'HUMAN ERROR' ON THE SHIP'S BRIDGE 
Error Analysis - Passenger ship Tallink, 1995 Date of Analysis: 27.2.1996 
Error TE Operational Operational 
la The pilot chose to wait too As Mi There is no designated safe waiting Channels 
close to Kustaanmiekka area 
causing the ship to drift into There are no designated waiting 
unfamiliar waters. area from where the ship safely 
progress onwards when it is her 
turn to do so. 
Dense 
2a The pilot did not inform the Pe Vi 
Master about the situation, 
e. g. We are a little bit too 
much to the left so I'll turn... " 
3a The Master realised that the Pe SI 
ship was drifting too close to 
Vallisaari and 
3b 
3c 
* Resumed control of the 
helm (OK) 
* Gave orders in Estonian 
* Dismissed the Pilot 
without informing him. 
The Pilot was perplexed 
when the ship did not 
respond to his 
commands 
4 The Pilot did not monitor 
how his orders were carried 
out on the ship's bridge 
T= Task E= Error 
A stressful situation where the Pilot 
concentrated on his performance by 
ignoring any 'superfluous' actions 
A quickly developing situation that the 
Master knew too little about because 
the Pilot did not inform him of his 
actions (see previous). 
The Master's actions were normal and 
understandable in an emergency 
situation 
The Master had relatively little 
experience of the area surrounding 
Kustaanmiekka. He had never sailed 
through the sound before. 
The Pilot did not present a passage 
plan, nor did he communicate his 
intentions aloud which would have 
allowed the Master to monitor his 
actions. 
Pe SI The Pilot concentrated on his own 
actions and was puzzled why the ship 
did not respond as expected. 
Pilotage 
Pilots lack team work skills. Pilots 
for instance do not routinely 
undertake BRM training together 
with their regular customers. 
Pilots are not routinely 
monitored to ascertain possible 
weaknesses and there are no 
definite procedures available to 
counteract deficiencies (compare 
with aviation) 
The Pilot's operational methods 
to overcome the problem were 
not clear or routine. 
Bridge Routines in an Emergency 
situation 
The Master had developed no 
routine operational methods for 
emergency situations (for 
instance resuming command by 
saying 'My Command'). 
Maritime Language 
It has been accepted 
internationally level that English 
should be used as a common 
language at sea. In practice 
domestic languages are used 
commonly without challenTo' . Maritime administrations not 
promote the use of English as a 
common language at sea? 
Pilotage 
Compulsory pilotage decreases 
the navigation skills of Masters 
sailing in regular traffic. The 
Master was allowed to navigate 
through Särkkä which he was 
accustomed to. Sailing through 
Kustaanmiekka pilotage was 
always conducted by an 
authorised pilot resulting in the 
Master not gaining experience of 
this route. 
Pilotage 
See 2a 
Pilotage 
See 2a 
Figure 6 Sample form used in the Merenkulkulaitos study (Merenkulkulaitos, 1997) 
The analysis of this accident suggests that there is no designated area around Kustaanmiekka 
where ships can wait safely before proceeding to their berth. It is therefore not sufficient to 
focus on the human element directly involved in the accident but the surrounding 
operational environment must also be considered. This analysis shows that both active errors 
and latent errors (discussed in Chapter 1 and outlined in figure 4) were present in this 
accident scenario. An active error is, for example, when the pilot chose to wait too close to 
Kustaanmiekka and a latent error is the lack of a designated safe waiting area. The lack of a 
safe waiting area could potentially increase the risk of future accidents due to increasing 
traffic and the introduction of larger ships. 
The conclusions of the Merenkulkulaitos study relating directly to the ship's bridge are 
summarised below: 
1. The layout of each ship's bridge is different. Recommendations and guidelines produced 
by the IMO and classification societies are out-of-date and only suggest minimum 
requirements. The integration of different navigation aids is insufficient. 
2. A navigating officer often has to learn to operate new equipment 'on-the-job'. He has to 
learn to operate even very complex systems without the benefit of systematic training. 
3. The design of automation is technology rather than user-driven. Individual components 
may not be compatible with the requirements of the integrated bridge system. 
4. Bridge control systems have not been standardised. They are complex and may be 
difficult to operate correctly. 
5. There are no common standards or requirements for user-interfaces on the ship's bridge. 
Screens on integrated bridge systems tend to be saturated with numeric information 
resulting in a diminished ability to assess the navigational situation. Furthermore, the 
number of different alarms is confusing - often even irritating. 
6. Generally documentation and manuals tend to relate to individual components of the 
system and focus on the technology of the equipment. It is difficult for the navigating 
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officer to familiarise himself with the equipment and he may have to operate integrated 
bridge systems without access to relevant manuals and training documentation. 
7. Bridge teamwork is driven primarily by personal motivations and experience rather than 
standard practices. The lack of standard practices is especially evident in emergency 
situations. The key to successful bridge teamwork is that the actions of each team 
member can be monitored effectively. 
8. Inadequate use of check lists. 
9. Bridge Resource Management training is available but has not influenced the 
shipowners' operational requirements. The benefit of the training is not fully understood 
because standard practices have not been developed across the entire industry. 
10. The decision making process is impeded because tasks have not been clearly defined. 
This is particularly conspicuous during pilotage when it may become unclear who is 
really in command. 
11. When an officer is promoted to assume command, he often has had inadequate 
instruction in ship handling and leadership training. 
12. The internal communication between bridge team members on the ship's bridge suffers 
from a lack of standardisation. Communication with external sources also suffers from 
lack of standardisation. Existing standards are not complied with. 
13. Automation on ships' bridges has increased mental work levels. 
14. Fatigue is not considered a major problem in the Finnish merchant fleet at present. 
Automation enables situations to develop where crew members become bored resulting 
in a deterioration of the monitoring of the systems. 
The Merenkulkulaitos study shows that 'Reason's Model' can be applied to examine accidents 
at sea, i. e., that errors can be classified according to type and related to a task onboard the 
ship. This analysis stresses the impact of changes in the environment of the ship's bridge. 
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These relate particularly to technological changes concluding that the weakest link is the 
lack of standardisation of user interfaces. Equipment installed on ship's bridges and 
operational practices vary considerably between different ships. 
The study suggests that the present working environment on the ship's bridge may lead to 
serious consequences: tasks are difficult to learn, monitoring suffers, cooperation is ineffective 
and breaks in communication common. Most of the conclusions in the study focus on 
standardisation of equipment. 
2.6 Evaluation of human factors 
Human factors, as a concept, have evolved over the years to embrace different definitions 
and approaches depending on by whom the results are interpreted (e. g., practitioners, 
researchers). What one researcher or practitioner finds an invaluable aid to his work, others 
may consider vague or insubstantial in concept, difficult to use or variable in outcome. 
Wilson and Corlett (1990) provide a table of a general classification scheme or taxonomy of 
different human factors' methodologies which recognises the differences in approach, method 
(or method group), technique or measure. This table provides a frame of reference for all the 
methods used in the evaluation of research into human factors. The table has been included 
in Appendix A primarily as a convenient reference to these methodologies in the marine 
environment. It should be noted that the validity, reliability, sensitivity, etc. of any method 
is specific to the application. 
2.7 Review of human factors' studies relevant to the marine environment 
Following the examination of 'human error', a literature review was undertaken of 
approaches to research that may affect the examination of safety at sea and, more 
importantly, the human factors within the concept of safe navigation. 
In reviewing the available literature a useful way of summarising the data is to collect it in a 
table as shown in Appendix B. Entries refer in one direction to the aim of the study and in 
the other direction to the methods used (adapted from Michon & Fairbank, 1973). Thus the 
rows represent the aims and the columns the methods of the various studies. The numbers in 
the cells refer to the list of references. 
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This is not intended to be an exhaustive list, but rather representative of the type of work 
considered relevant to the working environment of the ship's bridge. It therefore includes 
research carried out in other industries. The classification of the various studies and the 
choice of classifying them under the headings of fifteen aims and ten methods must be 
considered arbitrary since they are based on the author's discretion. The studies that seemed 
to overlap more than one area are listed in all applicable cells of the table. The table in 
Appendix B shows a wide diversity of both the ends and means of investigation. Finally, 
some applicable references may be missing because they have been unobtainable. 
The objective of a method/aims analysis is to outline an overview of relevant studies. This 
allows examination of different methods used to study specific objectives and their relative 
ratio. It can be concluded that the literature does not provide a generally accepted procedure 
for determining what human factors affect the navigating officer inducing him to cause an 
accident. 
Many variables affecting the navigational system have been measured, evaluated or 
predicted. In sampling the literature related to human factors, the task for those interested 
in the human element on the ship's bridge must obviously be to determine how (or even if) 
each of the available studies relate to human factors. 
To this end the references shown in Appendix B have been divided roughly into three 
categories: 
1. Research carried out predominantly in the shipping industry 
2. Research into human factors in the aviation industry 
3. General research into human factors 
Only studies considered applicable to the shipping industry have been included in 
Appendix B. 
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2.8 Research carried out in the shipping industry 
Current research in the marine environment relating to safe navigation focuses largely on 
development of 'technological fixes' and rules/regulations, possibly overlooking the long- 
term effects of human behaviour, e. g., social or psychological consequences of reducing the 
number of crew members. 
2.8.1 Collision Avoidance 
The value of the radar/ARPA as a tool for avoiding collisions is generally regarded highly by 
practicing navigating officers. Much of the research focuses on the radar/ARPA and collision 
avoidance. These studies have been mainly carried out through developing simulator 
experiments and/or surveys/interviews. 
From a human factor's point of view this research is limited because collision avoidance is in 
theory rule based but is in practice based on interpreting a situation before the appropriate 
rule can be applied. Thus a collision between two ships is based on the interpretation of two 
people, not necessarily applying the same rule. Human factors therefore provide a 
fundamental underlying basis for understanding the role of the collision regulations in 
accidents at sea. 
For example, in the events leading to the collision between the Manuel Compos and the 
Auriga6 the two watchkeepers assessed the developing situation differently and therefore 
interpreted the situation differently. Both vessels were proceeding in southerly direction 
when the watchkeeper on the Manuel Compos observed the Auriga beating about 10 degrees 
on starboard quarters and therefore assumed that she was overtaking the Manuel Compos. 
The Auriga altered course soon thereafter and by the time of the alteration the vessels were 
converging at an angle of 24 degrees with a risk of collision if the courses were maintained. 
The watchkeeper on the Manuel Compos asserted that since the Auriga had been originally 
bearing more than two points abaft the beam and was proceeding faster than her, she was an 
overtaking vessel under rule 24 of the COLREGS. The watchkeeper on the Auriga argued 
6 The Auriga [1977] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 384 
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that rule 24 only applied when the risk of collision existed. Such risk only arose when the 
Auriga had altered course by which time she was bearing less than two points abaft the beam 
of the Manuel Compos and the two vessels were now crossing. In this case rule 19 applied and 
it was the duty of the Manuel Compos to keep out of the way of the Auriga. It should be 
stressed that these arguments were made by the watchkeepers after the event and they may 
therefore not necessarily reflect the actual events. 
Such differing assessments and interpretations invariably increases the possibility of 'human 
error'. The human element on the ship's bridge is in itself complex and a better 
understanding of human behaviour on the ship's bridge is required to ensure that the correct 
conclusions are drawn from research into collision avoidance. 
2.8.2 Mathematical Modelling 
Some researchers have focused on reducing collision avoidance to numbers which allows 
development of mathematical models. The chief aim of these studies have been to provide 
data to develop technological solutions to accident prevention at sea. Human behaviour, 
however, is difficult to reduce to simple figures and these studies add less to the 
understanding of human factors on the ship's bridge. Nevertheless, mathematical modelling 
can provide valuable information on human behaviour. For example, the ship's domain has 
been defined as the effective area around the ship that the watchkeeper would like to keep 
free with respect to other ships and stationary objects (Goodwin, 1975). This is a 
mathematical representation of the almost intuitive behaviour of the navigating officer. 
2.8.3 Simulator Studies 
The value of existing simulator studies for understanding collision avoidance as part of safe 
navigation is not self-explanatory. Firstly, there may be more than one 'correct' manoeuvre 
that can be carried out, e. g., (a) the give-way vessel may reduce or increase her speed or, (b) 
change course. Secondly, collision avoidance is an ongoing process engaging two persons. 
Research subjects, however, are likely to encounter ships manoeuvred according to a 
preprogrammed plan, rather than by other humans. The on-going assessment and 
interpretation of the developing situation has thus been reduced to only one side. 
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A disadvantage of conducting simulator studies in the marine environment is that the 
watchkeeper may act differently because he knows that he is not in command of an actual 
ship (e. g., the study may not induce operational pressures or fatigue). These conditions may 
not be easy to include and are costly additions to a simulator study. As the watchkeeper's 
actions are monitored he may also strive to carry out 'text book' manoeuvres. However, these 
disadvantages do not necessarily lessen the usefulness of simulator studies, especially when 
these factors are acknowledged in the final analysis. 
The main weakness of simulator studies carried out so far, is that they cannot be compared 
because so many 'human' parameters have not been defined. There is a need to include 
background information, e. g., watchkeeping experience, type and trading patterns of ship 
that the navigating officer is working on at the time of the study. 
2.8.4 Post Accident Analysis 
Post accident analyses have been carried out since the last century, mainly examining the 
causes of the accidents. It is a popular method because, if the reports can be broken down 
into a sufficient number of causes, the data can be analysed relatively easily. Such studies are 
generally quite detailed and have mostly concluded that 'human error' was a major cause of 
the accidents (see e. g., tables 2 (page 20) and 3( page 21)). 
The lack of standardised terminology and definitions contributes to the difficulty in 
replicating and comparing the studies. This has been noted by previous researchers, most 
recently by Andersen & Fredriksson (1995); Singh (1995); Smeaton, Moreton & Dinely, 
(1996). 
2.9 Human factors research in the aviation industry 
Shipping is a mode of transport and comparing it with, and learning from, the aviation 
industry is thus reasonable. The ship's bridge, however, is a unique working environment and 
the following distinctive factors must be considered when examining research carried out in 
the aviation industry: 
CHAPTER 2: 'HUMAN ERROR IN THE 
MARINE ENVIRONMENT 37 
1. During navigation the ship may be moving 24 hours a day. Her position must be fixed 
regularly to ensure that she follows a predetermined passage plan. 
2. A voyage between two ports may include several changes of the navigational watch. The 
navigation of the ship is the collective responsibility of all navigating officers. The 
navigating officer may also spend many days beyond the sight of any land and 
weeks/months unable to go ashore. 
3. One or more additional expert navigators, i. e., ships' pilots, may be introduced during a 
part of the voyage. 
4. A ship has physical limitations such as draught and beam. Weather, wind and tides affect 
individual ships differently depending on type and geographical area, e. g., a fully laden oil 
tanker is affected differently to a car carrier by the same wind strengths or currents. 
5. Different classes of ships, e. g., fishing or recreational vessels, compete for the same 
domain but may operate under different rules. 
6. The legal framework of the operation of the ship depends on the port of registry. 
Human factors' research has been well established in the aviation industry. The relevance of 
the conclusions to safety at sea may at times be less obvious. The studies shown in 
Appendix B are primarily included as a convenient reference for further research into human 
factors in the marine environment. 
2.9.1 Aviation versus the shipping industry 
Great care must be taken before using results gained from research carried out in other 
industries. Such results should mainly be used as a basis for carrying out further research 
within the specific working environment of the ship's bridge. For example, early 
recommendations for the redesign of ships' bridge equipment and bridge layout seem to 
originate in the aviation industry (Mara, 1969). This appears to have led to the development 
of the modern 'cockpit' bridge design. From a human factor's point of view there are, 
however, notable physical differences between an aeroplane cockpit and a ship's bridge. 
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The space in an aeroplane is limited due to the physical construction of the aeroplane. 
Therefore the ergonomics of the layout of instruments has to fit into the available space 
around the pilot. He must be able to reach all instruments from a fixed position. Additionally 
an aeroplane operates at much greater speeds, in three dimensions and the pilot is usually 
present continuously from take off to landing. An aeroplane pilot's working hours are also 
more strictly regulated than in the marine environment. 
Conversely, a ship's bridge is generally spacious and the watchkeeper should be encouraged 
to move around on the bridge when looking out to avoid 'blind' spots caused by obstructions, 
e. g., the funnel. Although the top speed of a modern ship has increased, it is still relatively 
modest compared with an aeroplane. 
The requirement of the navigating officers on this new type of bridge lay-out seems to have 
been reached without carrying out behavioural mapping studies. These have practical 
relevance for planning the location of technology and people's movement. Behavioural 
mapping is concerned specifically with people's behaviour in their environments. It involves 
an actual chart or plan of the area on which people's locations and activities are shown 
(Sommer & Sommer, 1986). The use of behavioural mapping is particularly important on a 
ship's bridge and should include both hours of daylight and darkness. For instance, due to the 
high number of equipments emitting light on the ship's bridge and the present layout of 
equipment, maintaining a proper look-out by sight during darkness (as required by Rule 5 of 
the COLREGS 72) may be difficult. As a result the watchkeeper may have to behave in an 
unexpected manner, e. g., lean over some of the equipment to look out beyond the light 
(personal observation by the author). 
2.10 General human factors research 
It is likely that navigating officers, like most people, are affected by common physiological or 
psychological factors such as stress, boredom or fatigue. Thus a navigating officer can be 
expected to react to the lack of sleep the same way as a worker in a land-based job. Sleeping 
at sea, however, can be difficult due to excessive motion or noise. Even when the period of 
sleep is long enough, it may not be of high enough quality to ensure that the required 
minimum of'core' sleep has been reached (Horne, 1992). Additional disruptions may be 
caused by (frequent) port calls or false fire alarms. 
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Studies and accident reports show (see e. g., Dickens, 1994; Haapio, 1991 and Transportation 
Safety Board of Canada, 1995) that navigating officers are often exposed to poor and non- 
standardised design of user-interfaces. The effect of this has so far not been considered in 
specific detail in the marine environment. In isolation this would not be a problem but as the 
number of individual pieces of equipment on the ship's bridge increases, the navigating 
officer has to manage an increasing number of different interfaces. 
Extensive human factors' research has been carried out within general or specific populations, 
usually including a control and a study group. Although the research has not been carried out 
within the specific environment on the ship's bridge some of the conclusions are likely to be 
applicable. For example, studies that illustrate general human behaviour, e. g., failure to 
follow safety instructions (Wright, 1981). Accident and voluntary incident reports appear to 
confirm such characteristics where the navigator has failed to follow instructions, e. g., the 
Master's Orders has not been followed. 
2.11 A look beyond `human error' 
This Chapter shows that the relationship between human factors, 'human errors' and causes 
of accidents at sea is complex and often difficult to appreciate. 'Human error' is likely to be 
present in the working environment on the ship's bridge, even if assuming that regulations 
may be introduced in the future that would allow a ship to be legally operated unmanned. 
The 'human error' would in that case shift completely to originate outside the bridge (e. g., 
design of equipment). 
To reduce future accidents the shipping industry must move away from focusing 
predominantly on active errors caused by one or several of the bridge team members. By 
employing recognised human factor's techniques to design the working environment of the 
ship's bridge latent failures in the system can be reduced preventing the potentiality for 
future active errors. 
The Merenkulkulaitos study suggests that 'human error' on the ship's bridge is influenced by 
technology, rules/regulations and human factors. The relationship between the components is 
shown schematically in figure 7. 
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Figure 7 Factors affecting 'human error' on the ship's bridge 
Figure 7 shows that human factors on the ship's bridge should not be viewed in isolation. In 
the past the marine environment has focused on 'human error' and what has been seen as the 
applicable technology or rules and regulations. To complete the picture eßt the bridge system 
human factors must he considered in the same detail. 
2.12 Conclusion 
This Chapter shows that the importance of'human error' is increasingly acknowledged in the 
marine environment. However, the lack of worldwide annual statistics on collisions and 
groundings renders it difficult to compare studies, determine trends and assess the 
effectiveness of preventive measures. A summary of human factors studies relevant to the 
marine environment was discussed and presented in Appendix B. It was concluded here, that 
the existing literature does not provide an acceptable procedure for determining human 
factors on the ship's bridge. 
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The summary in Appendix B also shows that the aviation industry provides the most relevant 
human factors' research. However, care must be taken in applying research carried out in 
other industries to the marine working environments. This Chapter has highlighted the 
significant differences between the marine environment and other industries. 
A recent study (Merenkulkulaitos, 1997), focusing on accidents at sea, was explored to 
illustrate the value of classifying 'human errors' into error types. This study strengthens the 
current belief that 'human error' is a major cause of accidents at sea but does not suggest 
specific measures that should be adopted to reduce future accidents. 
HEI techniques were outlined and it was suggested that several 'human error' models have 
been proposed. It was concluded that the available HEI techniques, when employed in 
isolation, have at present limited practical value for exploring 'human error' on the ship's 
bridge. It was accepted that there was a need to obtain a better understanding of the 
working environment to improve the effect of current and future research techniques. 
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3.1 Introduction 
The human element operating in a complex system such as the ship's bridge interacts with 
the working environment. On the ship's bridge this can broadly be divided into two 
components, (1) the organisational framework and (2) the physical environment including 
associated situational/navigational activities. These components are illustrated in Figure 8 
and outlined in this Chapter. 
IMO 
FLAG STATES 
COLREGS 
STCW 
SOLAS 
NAVIGATIONAL SYSTEM 
Human Behaviour 
Bridge Manning & Shipboard Operations 
Navigation & Collision avoidance 
INSURANCE 
P&I CLUBS 
MEDIA 
Figure 8 Major factors influencing the human element on the ship's bridge 
3.2 Organisational Framework 
3.2.1 The International Maritime Organization 
COMPETITION 
TRADITIONS 
CUSTOMS 
ATMOSPHERIC & 
OCEANOGRAPHIC 
CONDITIONS 
The navigating officer works within an environment that is directly influenced by 
international conventions or resolutions adopted by the International Maritime Organization 
(IMO)7. Its primary role is to develop and adopt regulations to improve safety of 
international shipping and prevent pollution from ships. 
Until 1982 called the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO). 
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IMO was established through a conference by the United Nations in 1948, as the first ever 
international body devoted exclusively to maritime affairs. Since then, it has adopted more 
than 40 conventions, protocols and other treaties and developed several hundred codes and 
recommendations (IMO, 1994a). Unless defined specifically the words rules and regulations 
will be used interchangeably throughout this thesis, to include IMO Conventions, 
Guidelines, Resolutions and Recommendations. 
The IMO provides the regulatory framework affecting safe navigation, notably through the 
adoption of international conventions and resolutions e. g., the International Convention for 
the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 (SOLAS 74), International Regulations for the Prevention of 
Collisions at Sea, 1972 (COLREGS 72), Standards for Training, Certification and 
Watchkeeping, 1978 (STCW 78, amended STCW '95), the International Management Code 
for the Safe Operation of Ships and for Pollution Prevention (International Safety 
Management (ISM) Code - the ISM Code), the Global Maritime Distress and Safety System 
(GMDSS) and Provisional Guidelines on the Conduct of Trials in Which the Officer of the 
Navigational watch acts as the Sole Look-Out in Periods of Darkness. 
IMO as an organisation has no authority to enforce or implement any conventions or 
resolutions against any individual Flag State, ship or crew member. The compliance and 
verification mechanisms are therefore confined to those operated by the Administrations that 
have ratified the Conventions or by provisions in the Conventions requiring or permitting 
other Flag States to enforce the requirements (O'Neil, 1997). It should further be noted that 
the IMO does not generally commission research but results of independent studies may be 
submitted by the Flag States. These are then reviewed and discussed by the appropriate 
Committee or Working Group, e. g., developing provisions for allowing the officer of the 
watch POW) to act as the sole look-out during the hours of darkness. 
The IMO is primarily engaged in developing conventions, resolutions and guidelines through 
different committees and working groups attended by representatives of the Member States 
and many independent maritime organisations. It has committees dealing with pollution 
prevention, technical cooperation, the facilitation of maritime traffic and legal matters and 
maritime safety (Kohn, 1997). In recent years the human element has attracted more 
attention and a list of Common Human Element Terms has been produced by a Working 
Group (IMO, 1996a). 
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In common with all treaties, IMO conventions are kept up to date by means of amendments. 
Previously the usual method was to hold a conference at which amendments could be 
formally adopted. These would then enter into force after being explicitly accepted by most 
of the 155 Member States (typically two-thirds). In practice this method was slow and some 
amendments never entered into force. The IMO has therefore more recently developed an 
alternative system known as tacit acceptance. Under this system the amendments enter into 
force on a selected date unless it is rejected by a specified number of Member States (typically 
one-third, or by Parties whose merchant fleets represent at least 50% of world merchant 
tonnage) (IMO, 1994b). The main advantage of tacit acceptance is that amendments can 
enter into force sooner allowing for urgent international matters to be dealt with faster. 
A summary of the general provisions affecting the human element on the ship's bridge is 
provided below. Other relevant sections of IMO Regulations and Conventions are discussed 
later when applicable. 
3.2.1.1 The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 
The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 (SOLAS 74) is perhaps the 
most important treaty dealing with the safety of international shipping (IMO, 1994c). The 
first SOLAS convention was the result of the 13 representatives attending an International 
Conference in 1913, following the report of the Court of Formal Investigation into the loss of 
the Titanic. The first convention was adopted in 1914 but never entered into force due to the 
outbreak of World War I (Cowley, 1989). 
Historically, the first convention focused on technical matters such as lifesaving appliances 
and navigation in ice infested waters. The legacy of the first convention has resulted in the 
present regulations including such technical matters as Construction - Subdivision and 
stability, machinery and electrical installations (Chapter II-1) and Lifesaving appliances and 
arrangements (Chapter III). 
Navigation is mainly covered in Chapter V consisting of 23 Regulations, e. g., type of 
equipment that must be fitted to certain types or classes of ships and the responsibilities of 
the maritime administrations. These must, for example, establish Meteorological Services 
(Regulation 4) and Aids to Navigation (Regulation 14). 
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Chapter V specifies in particular the type of navigational equipment that must be fitted 
onboard ships (Regulation 12), minimum number of crew members to provide safe manning 
(Regulation 13), use of Automatic Pilot (Regulation 19), Nautical Publications (Regulation 
20) and Navigation bridge visibility (Regulation 22). 
3.2.1.2 Accidents at Sea and Casualty Investigation 
SOLAS 1974 requires Flag States to investigate accidents occurring to any of its ships when 
such an investigation may help in determining possible future changes in regulations (IMO, 
1997). Many maritime administrations also investigate maritime accidents that occur within 
their territorial waters. 
The IMO recognised the importance of maritime casualty investigation in promoting 
maritime safety and pollution prevention by adopting Resolution A. 637(16) (IMO, 1989). 
The aim of the Resolution is to encourage greater consistency and cooperation relating to 
official investigations and reports of casualties. 
3.2.2 Standards for Training, Certification and Watchkeeping, 1978 
The International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for 
Seafarers, 1978 (STCW 78) is generally considered as second only in importance to SOLAS 
1974 regarding safety at sea. It is the only international treaty dealing with the training, 
certification and watchkeeping of seafarers and forms the basis for national standards 
worldwide. 
The STCW 78 was adopted by the International Conference on Training and Certification of 
Seafarers on 7 July 1978 and entered into force on 28 April 1984. The latest amendments 
were adopted in 1995 (STCW '95). Notably the original text has been provided in the 
Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish languages. The purpose of the 
Convention is to: 
"Promote safety of life and property at sea and the protection of the marine 
environment by establishing in common agreement international standards of 
training, certification and watchkeeping of seafarers. " 
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Briefly it can be noted that the Convention is comprehensive and covers all aspects of 
training, etc., of navigating and engine officers. Training facilities are provided through 
national nautical schools. The navigating officer generally receives his primary training at 
schools available in the country where he resides. 
The provisions contained within STCW '95 include regulations for the training and 
assessment of seafarers. The regulations are minimum requirements for certification of officers 
depending on the size of the ship measured in gross tonnage. Further provisions provide for 
special training requirements for crews on certain types of ships, such as tankers or ro-ro 
vessels (V/1 and V/2). 
The Convention additionally affords minimum requirements for emergency, occupational 
safety, medical care and survival functions. The regulations provide for the minimum 
requirements for certification of any person in charge of or carrying out radio duties on a ship 
required to participate in the Global Maritime Distress Safety System (GMDSS see below) 
(IV/2). 
3.2 .3 The International 
Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972 
The aim of the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972 (COLREGS 
72) is to provide the navigator with a set of rules that allows him to navigate his vessel safely 
in all traffic situations, i. e., when vessels are crossing, meeting end-on or overtaking. The 
legal aspects of the COLREGS 72 have been discussed extensively elsewhere (see e. g., Cahill, 
1983 and Cockcroft, 1990) and are therefore not examined in detail here. Other aspects of 
the COLREGS 72 are explored below in the section covering the Navigational System (see 
page 71) . 
3.2. E Provisional Guidelines on the Conduct of Trials in Which the Officer of the 
Navigational Watch acts as the Sole Look-Out in Periods of Darkness 
Rule 5 of COLREGS 72 provides a basis for safe navigation through requiring that a proper 
look-out is maintained appropriate to prevailing conditions. This is further clarified in 
STCW '95 (Section A-VIII, Part 3-1,3.13-3.15). The STCW '95 does not state directly that 
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a look-out must be posted during the hours of darkness but implies it through stating that 
the OOW may act as the sole look-out in daylight provided specific conditions are met. 
Toward the end of the 1980's several maritime administrations began to investigate the 
possibility of reducing the bridge watch to a single person during the hours of darkness. The 
implied changes to reduce crew levels generated a profusion of arguments for and against the 
concept in the shipping industry (see e. g., James, 1989; Lister, 1988; Lloyd, 1988; Thwaite, 
1988). The IMO Maritime Safety Committee eventually approved provisional guidelines to 
conduct trials in which the officer of the navigational watch would act as the sole look-out 
during periods of darkness (IMO, 1991). These trials have become known as Watch One 
(W1) or One-Man-Bridge-Operations (OMBO). 
Regulation 1/13 of SOLAS 74 permits ships to participate in trials that may involve the use of 
automated or integrated systems to evaluate alternative methods of carrying out specific 
duties or satisfying specific arrangements. These must provide at least the same degree of 
safety and pollution prevention as provided by the STCW '95 (IMO, 1997). 
3.2.4.1 The Watch One Concept 
The Watch One concept focuses on four essential factors regulating the system configuration 
for bridge operations (Larsen, 1990): 
1. Workload - the organisation of manual and automated operations must ensure that the 
total workload required for safe and efficient navigation, including traffic surveillance and 
other functions allocated to the bridge, must never exceed the capacity of one person 
under normal operating conditions. 
2. The OOW must have a sufficient field of vision from the work stations on the bridge to 
maintain proper look-out including when he has other duties to attend, e. g., chart work, 
communication. 
3. The OOW must be competent to perform the duties for which he is responsible. This 
includes the ability to take over an automated navigation function at any stage of the 
operation. 
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4. Procedures and necessary technical devices for safe operation under irregular and 
abnormal conditions must be established. This includes systems to safeguard that the 
technical system and the one person in charge are functioning within safety limits during 
daytime and periods of darkness. 
Additionally, to safeguard the performance of primary bridge functions and ensure that the 
sudden disability of the officer of the watch does not endanger own or other ships, the 
following two principles must be maintained: 
5. The OOW must be able to stop any secondary function during its operation by an 
instantaneous single action without impeding the safety of the ship. 
6. Danger to navigation that may be caused by an unattended bridge, traffic or improper 
course-keeping must be monitored and warning of irregularities transferred to a back-up 
officer. 
3.2.4.2 IMO Watch One Trials 
The purpose of the Watch One trials was to collect information that would allow the IMO to 
debate the practice of allowing the officer of the navigational watch to act as sole look-out in 
periods of darkness. Since their start, the trials have been suspended (IMO, 1996b) and later 
resumed (Shuker, 1996). 
Additionally the intention of the trials was to evaluate acceptable bridge layouts, appropriate 
levels of control equipment and instrumentation and safe and healthy operational procedures 
(IMO, 1991). 
The guidelines suggest detailed conditions for bridge layout and instrumentation, bridge 
safety systems (e. g., 'Dead-Man's Alarm'), grounding and off-track systems, qualifications 
and additional responsibilities of the navigating officer and responsibilities of ship operators 
and masters. The guidelines also included a reporting form for the trials. 
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Five countries, Denmark, Germany, Norway, the United Kingdom and Vanuatu took part in 
the initial trials (IMO, 1994d). Although the trial guidelines are relatively detailed, no 
instructions were provided to ensure standardisation of methodology. 
Several different methods were used, either singly or in combination, i. e., only personal 
observation or a combination of self documentation and post-trial interviews. A total number 
of 51 ships completed the initial trials as shown in table 9. 
The trial results were incorporated into a report prepared by the Sub-Committee on Safety of 
Navigation (IMO, 1994e). The consolidated report concluded that for most parts human 
factors had not been assessed in any detail by the participating respondents. 
The small number of participating ships and the lack of standard methodology renders it 
difficult to compare the results and determine the safety aspects of the concept. 
DENMARK GERMANY NORWAY 
UNITED 
VANUATU 
KINGDOM 
Total Number of 19 25 1 5 1 
ships 
Method Independent Independent Independent Self 
observer (2 observer (8 observer (all 5 documentation 
ships) ships) ships) 
Self Self 
documentation documentation 
Limited post trial 
interview Post trial 
interviews 
Additional training Not required One day Require No special No special 
for OOW seminar minimum 12 training training 
months 
independent 
navigation watch 
Table 9 Summary of IMO Watch One Trials (derived from IMO, 1994e) 
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3.2.4.3 Additional Watch One studies 
Since the Watch One concept was proposed it has been widely discussed and debated in 
nautical publications and the maritime press. Nyland (1993) conducted a small-scale survey 
focusing on seafarers in the Finnish Merchant Navy. 
Most of the respondents considered that the availability of some type of additional assistance 
during the hours of darkness is necessary. Only 17% felt that the conventional lookout is 
essential, but 80% would like to have access to the assistance of an additional navigating 
officer or OOW. This suggests that the assistance required is not only a 'pair of eyes' but full 
navigational support. 
Increased fatigue was identified as a major problem if the officer acts as the sole look-out 
during the hours of darkness. 70% of the respondents in the above study suggested that the 
best way to prevent fatigue would he to have a watch system that is either the traditional 3- 
watch system or a 1: 1 relief. The results of the above are likely to reflect not only national 
traditions but also ship types and trading patterns. 
Swedish navigating officers appear positive to the current development of Watch One 
operations (Olofsson, 1995). Not surprisingly those already operating on Watch One ships 
are more positive, perhaps because they can relate the concept to their on experience 
(shown in table 10). 
Traditional Watch Ships Watch One Ships 
Position 
YES NO YES NO 
Master 50 16 13 0 
Chief Officer 42 18 13 1 
Other navigational officer 59 46 15 5 
Total 151 (65%) 80 (35%) 41 (87%) 6 (13%) 
Table 10 The opinion of Swedish navigating officers as to whether Watch One operations are 
safe (derived from Olofsson, 1995) 
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3.2.4.4 Watch One Discussion and Conclusions 
The IMO Watch One guidelines were expected, during the trials, to provide the same degree 
of safety as the traditional look-out. Verifying the safety of the concept has proven to be 
more difficult due to the varying definitions of 'safety of the concept'. For example, 
Habberley and Taylor (1990) approached it mathematically, defining a 'guarded' ship as 
'Either the officer or the look-out (if present) looks out at least once during 21/s minutes' (see 
also IMO, 19940. Schuffel et al. (1989) and Pourzanjani (1996) focus on increased efficiency 
provided by automated position fixing and subsequent track keeping. Larsen (1990) suggests 
that a way to assess the capability of the OOW to maintain proper lookout is the frequency 
and duration of look-out and the length of time he is distracted from the visual look-out. 
Although the official trial reports submitted to the IMO concluded overall that the Watch 
One concept provided safe navigation, it has not been universally accepted by the Member 
States. It is suggested that the results from these and other studies are inconclusive as to the 
'safety of the concept'. 
3.2.5 The International Management Code for the Safe Operation of Ships and for 
Pollution Prevention (International Safety Management (ISM) Code) 
The purpose of the ISM Code (IMO, 1993) is to provide an international standard for the safe 
management and operation of ships and pollution prevention. The objectives of the Code are 
to ensure safety at sea, prevention of human injury or loss of life and avoidance of damage in 
particular to the marine environment. This Code is primarily intended as an instrument for 
management to enable it to respond to the needs of those on board the ship to achieve and 
maintain high standards of safety and environmental protection. It outlines Company 
responsibilities and authorities as well as the Master's responsibilities and authority. This 
Code, when fully implemented is expected to raise the standards of ships overall. 
The guidelines are intended to give ship operators directions on how to develop, implement 
and assess safety and pollution prevention according to good practice. It defines 
responsibilities and authorities within the company, including the designation of a person 
with direct access to the highest level of management to act as a link between the company 
and the ship's crew. 
CHAPTER 3: FRAMEWORK OF THE WORKING 
ENVIRONMENT ON THE SHIP'S BRIDGE 53 
The Code covers the operation of the entire ship as part of a company. The aim is to integrate 
the technical and operational sides into a coherent system which is expected to be safer than 
operating an isolated safety system. Unless the integrity of the whole system is managed, an 
undetected error may result in an accident (Chauvel, 1997). 
The ISM Code came into force on July 1,1998 for all passenger vessels, including high speed 
vessels regardless of tonnage, oil tankers, chemical tankers, gas carriers, bulk carriers and 
high speed cargo vessels of 500 GRT and over. The Code is still in its infancy and thus far 
there are few instruments that can be used to determine its effectiveness on an international 
scale. As the Code matures indicators, such as the number of detained ships by Port States, 
may allow continual monitoring of its development and justify changes when necessary 
(DesVergers, 1999). 
3.2.6 The Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS) 
The basic concept of the GMDSS is that search and rescue authorities ashore, and shipping 
close to a ship in distress, can rapidly be alerted to a distress incident in order to provide 
assistance in a coordinated Search and Rescue Operation with minimum delay. The system 
additionally provides for urgency and safety communications and the promulgation of 
maritime safety information (MSI) -navigational and meteorological warnings and forecasts 
and other urgent safety information to ships (IMO, 1992). 
The introduction of GMDSS has slowly resulted in the loss of a dedicated radio operator. 
Consequently the navigating officer is now increasingly responsible for operating the GMDSS 
equipment and all other communications (e. g., by VHF ship-to-ship or ship-to-shore). The 
SOLAS Convention (as amended in 1988) require all ships subject to it, to fit all GMDSS 
equipment by 1 February 1999 (IMO, 1999; USCG, 1998). 
3.2.7 IMO and the Human Element 
The IMO is increasingly acknowledging the role of human failure in accidents at sea (IMO, 
1998). The organization accepts that the human element cannot be solely managed through 
regulations and acknowledges that no single group or organisation can address this matter 
independently (IMO, 1995). 
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CULTURE I ABILITY/SITUATION AWARNESS 
HEALTH 
Strengths 
Fatigue 
Job content/Stress 
Food 
Accomodation 
Manning Lewels 
Employer's policies 
Nationalities 
Recruitment 
Loyalty 
Trust 
Communications 
Informaton processing 
Knowledge 
Training 
Education 
Skills 
SOCIAL 
Working conditions 
Interaction 
Morale 
Leadership/Support 
Team work 
Confidence 
HUMAN PERFORMANCE 
IMO 
ILO 
Design Build/QA Part States 
Verification Flag States 
Maintenance Classification Societies 
Technology Unions 
SHIP CONDITIONS I LEGISLATION 
Figure 9 Factors affecting the human element In the marine environment (adapted from IMO, 
1995) 
IMO has consequently published a list of factors influencing human decision making for 
illustration and further development (Figure 9). 
This list shows the various factors affecting the human element in the marine environment. 
The interaction between the components shown in figure 9 and the human element within 
the navigational system are explored further in this Chapter and Chapter 4. IMO was 
explored previously as the basis of the organisational framework on the ship's bridge. The 
legislative components examined in this research include primarily maritime administrations, 
port state control and classification societies, examined below. Collision avoidance and 
passage planning are also explored as part of the navigational system within this Chapter. 
Appropriate ship conditions are explored within section 3.5 the Ship's bridge and situational 
activities. 
Ability/situational awareness and health issues are examined further in Chapter 4. 
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3.2.8 Maritime Administrations and Port State Control 
3.2.8.1 Maritime Administrations and Flag Stater 
A Flag State (Maritime Administration) indicates the government of the State whose flag the 
ship is entitled to fly. Traditionally a shipowner would register his ship in the country where 
his head office was based, recruit crew members from the same country and class and insure 
the ships with companies also of the same nationality. Initially a handful of countries were 
directly involved in the safety of international merchant shipping (e. g., Great Britain, France, 
Germany, etc. ) and today these countries have more than a century of experience in shipping 
and generally assume a leading role in managing safety at sea. 
Governments ratifying IMO Conventions must ensure the following: 
1. That ships flying its flag meet the standards of the appropriate IMO Conventions and that 
it carries out certain duties in respect of safe manning. It must investigate accidents at sea 
and report to IMO accordingly. These obligations apply to all ships entitled to `fly the flag 
of the Flag State'. 
2. That foreign ships visiting its ports are safe to proceed to sea and not likely to cause severe 
pollution. 
When a Flag State accepts an IMO convention, it must ensure that the convention becomes 
part of its national law. It also agrees to enforce it completely, including providing a properly 
trained Administration. It must employ an appropriately trained team of surveyors and 
inspectors to ensure that its ships comply with national and international requirements 
(IMO, 1994a). 
Some duties of marine administrations are shown in Figure 10. Discretion must be used when 
interpreting this figure because of the inevitable overlap between the boxes. Not all 
Conventions can be applied equally. 
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MARITIME 
ADMINISTRATION 
FLAG STATE PORT STATE 
(own ships trading internationally) (foreign ships) 
Issue of Pollution Convention Port State clean up Fixed duties under various Certificates to Control by own Conventions by either own foreign ships surveyors 
or Classification Society when requested 
appointed sureveyors 
Other discretionary work 
Non mandatory 
inspections 
normally by own 
surveyors or 
private firms 
Ships below 
convention size 
or classes not 
covered by 
conventions 
Domestic ships 
'LOASTAL'STATE 
SAR 
o ships in 
port 
Figure 10 Some duties of Marine Administrations Influencing safety of navigation 
The law governing ships is derived partly from ordinary territorial jurisdiction and partly 
from registration. Generally when a ship, flying any flag, is within the territorial sea of any 
state it can expect to be governed by the laws of that state. This is subject to certain 
recognised limitations derived from public international law, e. g., the right to 'pass 
innocently' through territorial waters without interruption. Additionally a ship will be 
subject to the laws of the country of its registration which means that it is adopted into that 
state's legal system (Grime, 1991). 
Some countries regulate their registered ships very closely including enforcing the applicable 
safety rules and laws governing the employment of seafarers. Above all, taxation may inflict a 
severe burden on the shipowner. Different states have different rules as to whether the ship is 
allowed to, or must be, registered in that particular state. Some countries adopt very strict 
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rules, e. g., accept only ships built in the country's shipyards and owned by resident nationals, 
e. g., the United States. Others are extremely liberal and accept any vessel and thus enjoy the 
revenues that may be derived from that policy, e. g., Liberia (Grime, 1991). 
3.2.8.2 Safe Manning 
Safe manning is a function of the number of qualified or experienced seafarers necessary to 
prevent accidents at sea. To ensure that ships carry a minimum number of crew members 
IMO has passed Resolution A. 481(XII) Principles of Safe Manning (IMO, 1981). The 
Resolution offers general guidelines for applying basic principles of safe manning to ensure 
the safe operation of ships. It acknowledges that the application may differ depending on 
factors such as size of ship and trading patterns, type of main and auxiliary propulsion units, 
and construction and technical equipment of the ship. Additionally it stresses the need for a 
sufficient number of qualified crew members available to meet peak workload situations. 
Maritime Administrations may retain or adopt arrangements that differ from the guidelines 
especially if adapted to technical developments or special types of ships and trading patterns. 
3.2.8.3 Port State Control 
Many treaties such as the amended STCW '95 and SOLAS 74 provide provisions allowing 
Flag States to inspect both domestic and foreign ships visiting their ports to ensure that they 
meet IMO requirements. The first regional Port State control agreement was the Paris 
Memorandum of Understanding of 1982. This has served as a model for other regions and 
there are now regional agreements covering Latin America, Asia and the Pacific and the 
Caribbean (IMO, 1996c). 
The aim of Port State Control is to act as a second tier of enforcement by allowing Port States 
to inspect foreign ships in the interest of safety and pollution prevention. Consequently Flag 
States can impose their own laws within their territorial waters if they comply with the 
international conventions to which they are party (Bond, 1995). 
The Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control (MOU) is an agreement between 
the maritime authorities of fourteen European countries, aimed at establishing a harmonised 
and efficient system of port state control. The text of the MOU was adopted in January 1982 
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committing each authority to maintain an effective system of port state control. The aim is to 
ensure that foreign merchant ships visiting their ports comply with the standards laid down 
in the specified IMO Conventions, e. g., SOLAS 74, STCW '95, and so on (MOU, 1996). 
The Convention allows inspectors in port States party to the Convention to verify that 
persons serving on national or foreign flag ships hold the appropriate certificates (Article X), 
that proper watchkeeping arrangements are maintained, and that watchkeepers are 
adequately rested (Regulation 1/4). 
The advantage of the Port State Control is their powers to detain substandard ships arriving 
in their ports. This is intended to encourage shipowners throughout the world to comply 
with IMO minimum standards. 
3.2.9 Flags of Convenience and Second Registers 
3.2.9.1 Flags of Convenience 
A Flag of Convenience (FOC) is used to describe the registration of ships under the flag of 
certain States when they are in fact beneficially owned and controlled by nationals of other 
countries. FOC ships are often manned by foreign crews and they rarely, if ever, enter the 
jurisdiction or ports of their country of registry. After World War II, because of high 
operating costs, unsubsidised United States shipowners transferred their ships to FOC. This 
provided for tax immunity and allowed them to gain economic advantages over European 
competitors. The Greeks similarly transferred ships to avoid heavy taxation but also to avoid 
inconvenient government regulations (Hill, 1989). 
According to the International Transport Workers Federation (ITF) criteria ships are defined 
as FOC when (ITF, 1998a): 
" the country allows aliens to own and control vessels 
" access to and easy transfer from the registry 
" the country of registration does not need the shipping tonnage for its own purposes but is 
eager to earn tonnage fees 
" manning by non-nationals is freely permitted 
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" the country lacks the power (or willingness) to impose national or international 
regulations on its shipowners 
FOC registrations allow ship operators to select crews from any nationality provided they are 
trained according to the conventions adopted by that nation. This has led to an increase of 
multinational crews. It should be noted that ships have traditionally carried mixed crews. 
Thus a multinational crew is defined for this research as a crew where the deck and/or engine 
department is made up of members from more than one nationality, e. g., if the deck 
department consisting of three to four people are of more than one nationality. 
IMO conventions require maritime administrations to provide the legal framework to enforce 
conventions that the countries have ratified. The standards of the maritime administrations of 
FOC countries vary widely. Some countries are unable to provide proper survey staff of their 
own. They may delegate the task of enforcement and surveys to any classification society, 
private surveyor or individual who is willing to carry out the tasks on their behalf (Cowley, 
1989). 
The status of nationally owned ships is dependent on a satisfactory union agreement with 
local ITF affiliates. Non-national ships are automatically classed as FOC (ITF, 1998b). 
Although a FOC ship may operate at a lower standard this should not be assumed 
automatically. The standard of each ship operation must be evaluated on its own merits. 
3.2.10 Second Registers 
Many Flag States discovered during the shipping crisis in the 1980's that shipowners 
increasingly chose to re-register their ships abroad, i. e., with FOC. Freight rates were low and 
taxes and social costs of domestic crews were high. At the same time there was a decline in 
international trade and an increased supply of tonnage throughout the world. This led to the 
development of so called second registers that would provide the benefits of flying the 
national flag but with lower costs (Torpmann-Hagen, 1997). 
Norway, for example, established a second register, the Norwegian International Shipping 
Register (NIS) in 1986. This differs from the national register as follows: 
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" It allows registration of foreign owned ships 
" It excludes ships trading in Norwegian coastal waters 
" The limit of the number of foreign crew members on board, to one third, does not apply 
to NIS ships 
" Social benefits for foreign crews are different from those of Norwegian crews 
The standards of Second Registries vary widely but generally they emulate the national 
registers, particularly regarding safety issues. The aim of the second registry is primarily to 
provide more equal competition with FOC ships and encourage ship owners to provide work 
for their own nationality seafarers. 
3.2.11 Classification societies and marine insurance 
3.2.11.1 Classification societies 
The need to assess the risk of insuring ships brought together London Underwriters in 1760 
to form Lloyd's Register of Shipping whose main function was to classify ships according to 
their condition (Grime, 1991). Today the classification of a ship is at the core of maritime 
safety embodying the technical rules, regulations, standards, guidelines and associated 
surveys and inspections covering the design, construction and through-life compliance of a 
ship's construction. Classification societies contribute further through technical support, 
compliance verification and research and development (IACS, 1998). 
Many classification societies are also authorised to act for national maritime administrations. 
This is because no maritime administration has sufficient resources to deal with all statutory 
surveys required under the various conventions (Cowley, 1989). 
Research carried out by the classification societies is primarily directed toward technical 
matters. Det Norske Veritas (DNV) has carried out research into 'human error' (Karlsen & 
Kristiansen, 1981) and developed the concept of Watch One (W 1) in response to the IMO 
guidelines (DNV, 1991). 
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3.2.11.2 Marine Insurance 
The aim of marine insurance is to encourage merchants and shipowners to trade to the full 
extent of their capacity. They should have no fear of loss by 'perils of the seas' which they are 
unable to avoid by the exercise of judgement and foresight (Dover, 1975). 
Theoretically marine insurance is a contract of indemnity, i. e., commonly the indemnity is 
agreed upon in advance. These values may be greater or lesser than the values actually at 
risk. The insurance typically covers loss or damage caused by 'perils of the seas' which include 
collisions, groundings and pollution. The purpose of an insurance policy is to secure and 
indemnify against accidents which may happen, not against events which must happen. It 
should be noted that marine insurance typically covers negligence of masters, officers, crew or 
pilots (Templeman, 1986). 
It was recognised at an early stage that the system of marine insurance afforded means of 
protecting individual shipowners by transferring the pecuniary responsibility of any loss to 
the underwriters who insured them. This encouraged less care in the construction of ships, 
less efficiency in their equipment, less security for their adequate management at sea, 
inasmuch as the risk of such loss could be covered by a fixed premium of insurance. This cost 
could then be charged on the freight and the re-charged on the goods conveyed (House of 
Commons, 1836). Thus the shipowner had little incentive to ensure the safety of his ships. 
3.2.11.3 Protection and Indemnity Clubs 
Protection and Indemnity Clubs (P&I Clubs) began as mutual insurance associations in the 
late 18th century when groups of shipowners formed mutual nonprofit making clubs to share 
their hull claims. 
Today the Clubs protect shipowners and charterers against third party claims made against 
them. When unsuccessful in protecting them, they indemnify the shipowners against losses 
they may incur by way of those liabilities (Newcastle P&I Club, 1998). P&I Clubs have a 
strong interest in loss prevention and have developed publications to assist in reducing the 
risk of accidents, e. g., "The Master's Role in Collecting Evidence, " and "Loss Prevention 
Calendars" published by the North of England P&I Club. 
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In recent years the Clubs have also carried out research and published studies relating to 
safety at sea. For example, the UK P&I Club (1996) published the "Human Factor -A 
Report on Manning" which examines manning and management policies, service and 
experience, training and endorsements and language and nationality. Their publication 
"Analysis of Major Claims" (1992, updated 1999) examines loss prevention and various 
claims, including collision claims. 
3.2.12 Other organisations involved in the marine environment 
Many other maritime organisations have important roles in assisting the navigating officer 
through regular meetings and publication of nautical journals that assist in providing the 
officers with timely information. Such organisations include the Nautical Institute, the 
International Federation of Ship's Masters' Association and the Honourable Company of 
Master Mariners. These are international organisations and are based in London, UK. 
Local (e. g., Numast in Britain) and international (e. g., the International Transport Worker's 
Federation (ITF) and the International Labour Organization (ILO) trade unions focus on 
developing and enforcing international standards for improving working conditions onboard 
ships (ITF, 1998b; ILO, 1998). Charitable organisations, e. g., various 'Seamen's Churches' 
(e. g., Missions to Seamen) operate in ports throughout the world providing practical 
assistance during port visits (Missions to Seamen, 1998). 
3.3 Safety at sea and the organisational framework 
The outline of the organisational framework shows that many institutions are involved in 
maritime safety and their interrelated functions are often complex. The shipping industry also 
relies on a widespread use of insurance for ships and cargoes. Ship operators are, overall, 
legally allowed to limit their liabilities to others. 
International shipping is characterised by free competition meaning that ships carrying 
cargoes between different countries are readily substituted for others and they are readily 
transferable geographically and between flags. This means, in practice, that the beneficial 
ownership, nationality, operational management and crew of a ship can be, and frequently 
are, different (Goss, 1993). 
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Consequently, accidents occurring outside a nation's territorial waters may only be 
investigated by the Flag States. For example, the collision between the Bahamanian 
registered passenger vessel the Norwegian Dream and the Panamanian registered container 
vessel the Ever Decent occurred in the English Channel approximately 5 nautical miles beyond 
British territorial waters. Notwithstanding, that this particular accident resulted only in 
physical damage to the ships and minor injuries to passengers, there is a valid demand for a 
detailed investigation, including examining the role of human factors. Had the Norwegian 
Dream collided broadside with a fully laden tanker carrying volatile hydrocarbons the 
outcome could have been catastrophic, see e. g., the collision between the Western Winner and 
the British Trent (MAIB, 1993). However, although the Norwegian Dream was on course to 
Dover, the accident will be investigated only by the Bahamanian and Panamanian 
authorities. They are, however, expected to submit full reports to the IMO (Porter & Smith, 
1999). 
Traditionally, multilateral enforcement of multilateral agreements, i. e., flag state control 
supplemented by international agreements through IMO and ILO has prevailed because 
ships have an historic right to 'innocent passage' through a nation's territorial waters. In 
principle any ship, flying any flag, of any country, may enter any port and carry any cargo 
anywhere. Despite the long history of 'innocent passage', increasingly, the international 
shipping community is adopting unilateral enforcement of multilateral rules (e. g., Port State 
Control) thus allowing more control over safety matters (Goss, 1994). 
3.4 The navigating officer and the organisational framework 
The navigating officer has little direct control over his working environment as illustrated in 
Figure 11. For example, the physical environment of the ship's bridge, including navigation 
aids, is generally designed, manufactured and classified before he actually steps onboard. 
He 
may be trained only to the minimum requirements provided by the STCW '95 and 
SOLAS 
74. He may also be required to work with crew members of other nationalities with whom he 
may not have a mutual language. 
The Master of a ship traditionally had full authority to make whatever decision he felt 
appropriate to ensure the safety of the ship. In fact he was known as 'Master under 
God'. 
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Today's navigating officers strongly believe that the Master has less and less authority but 
ever more responsibilities and duties. Instant communication with the various players, e. g., 
ship owner, has changed the working environment. 
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Figure 11 The influence of the organisational framework on the human element on the ship's 
bridge which may provide a pathway for breaking defences and resulting in a 
collision or grounding 
Today the Master is expected to consult with the Owners/managers before taking any action, 
thereby removing his traditional authority for decision making. Thus many critical decisions 
may be made ashore by shipowners, managers, cargo planners, charterers, agents and 
government departments. In theory, according to the ISM Code, the Master has the right tu 
countermand any decision, but it is a brave man who will interfere with the slick world of" 
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commerce today (Sahu, 1999). There is widespread belief that if the Master refuses to sail he 
is likely to be advised that he will be replaced by a different Master who is willing to sail 
(Schmeisser, 1997). 
Some regulations may themselves increase the risk for an accident, e. g., the implementation 
of the ISM Code may increase the clerical workload of the navigating officers. On one 
occasion, it is claimed, each ship of an old fleet of chemical tankers carried 54 files containing 
ISM Code Instructions (Woinin, 1997). Throughout the development of GMDSS technical 
and legal standards were produced. However, it appears that inadequate attention was given 
to how it would affect the human element on the ship's bridge and as a result the number of 
false distress alarms has increased alarmingly (Anon., 1997a; Jensen, 1997). This strains the 
emergency response teams and increases the risk of distractions on the ships bridge. 
3.5 The ship's bridge and situational activities 
3.5.1 The physical environment of the ship's bridge 
The aviation industry has acknowledged the seriousness of problems encountered when a 
cockpit is not designed specifically for the user population. Such problems may seem 
inconsequential, but aircraft and crews may be lost because of what appear to be minor or 
unimportant anthropometric design considerations (Kennedy, 1972). 
Similar problems exist in the marine environment, e. g., care must be taken to ensure that 
there is an unrestricted view from the bridge. The basic functional requirements for bridge 
configuration, bridge arrangement, bridge equipment and bridge environment have been 
specified by the European Standard EN ISO 8468: 1994. Its aim is to ensure that the designs 
of ships' bridges adequately provide for the requirements for safe navigation. 
The physical environment can broadly be divided into (1) localities inside and (2) outside the 
ship's bridge. The interior includes the physical layout of the bridge, design of hardware and 
related information processing. The exterior environment includes the atmospheric and 
oceanographic conditions and natural hazards that the ship may encounter during its passage. 
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3.5.1.1 The internal environment 
3.5.1.1.1 Bridge Layout and Space 
Each ship is generally designed as a prototype resulting in different bridge layouts even on 
sister ships (Goss, 1993). There are two general types of layouts of ships' bridges as shown in 
figure 12. 
The most obvious difference between the two types of bridge layouts is the use of space and 
general location of the navigation aids. Modern bridges have become increasingly 'cockpit' 
style where the displays and controls surround the positions of two, sometimes more, persons, 
e. g., navigating officer, master and pilot. 
3.5.1.1.2 Integrated Bridge Systems 
Traditional design of a ship's bridge is such that the navigating officer may have to spend 
considerable time collecting sufficient information to make the correct decision. During 
normal navigational operations, at any given time, one person is generally responsible for the 
navigational decisions. The role of any additional person is to assist in collecting information 
needed by the navigating officer to help him make the correct decision (e. g., the look-out). 
On a traditional bridge the officer may also be unable to make his decision from the place 
where he collects the information (e. g., his position at the chart table may not allow him to 
observe other traffic). 
The basic principle of minimum manning and automation is to reduce high labour costs of 
seafarers by installing electronic navigation aids to reduce workload. The common 
denominator among the systems being developed is automatic guidance, i. e., the automation 
of the navigation process is integrated with automatic ship control (Dove, 1992/93). 
Integrated bridge systems were developed with the aim to reduce operational costs through 
redeveloping the ship's bridge as an operational centre for performing both navigational and 
supervisory tasks. The design of integrated bridge systems is based on function allocation, 
i. e., determination of which functions can be performed by man and which by automated 
equipment (Schuffel et al., 1989). 
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size (not to scale) 
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3.5.1.2 The External Environment 
Oceanographic and atmospheric conditions are never static at sea, ships are influenced by 
tides, currents, waves, fog and so on. Additionally ships may regularly or occasionally 
encounter other physical hazards such as conditions resulting from freezing temperature, i. e., 
sea ice, glacial ice or superstructure icing (Anon., 1981; Varsta, 1985; DeAngelis 1974). 
Underwater hazards may pose unexpected problems in poorly surveyed waters (Richards, 
1994) or because some underwater structures are not stationary (e. g., sand banks) (Caston & 
Stride, 1979). 
Unlike land-based organisations the ship moves through the natural environment during its 
voyage from port to port. The navigating officer must therefore constantly be aware of the 
external environment. Services such as the International Ice Patrol (IIP) and Weather 
Forecasting and Routeing were developed to provide assistance in planning a safe passage. 
The IIP, formed because of the sinking of the Titanic, monitors the position of icebergs in the 
North Atlantic (Anon., 1981; Beattie 1978). National weather forecasting services provide 
short range forecasts for shipping (Evans, 1968) and weather routeing services can assist in 
predicting the most favourable voyage for the ship (Couper, 1989) 
3.5.2 Navigation and the navigating officer 
A detailed historical account of navigation and the associated instruments has been covered 
elsewhere (see e. g., May, 1973; Kemp, 1988). 
The definition of a navigating officer, for the purpose of this research, is any person who is 
directly involved in navigation as part of the navigation team on the ship's bridge, i. e., the 
Master's or Pilot's role is primarily regarded from a navigating officer's point of view, rather 
than from their respective other roles. 
Pilotage is defined as the act of navigating a ship near land under the advice of a pilot who is 
a qualified navigator and an expert on local harbour and channel conditions (Kemp, 1988). 
The pilot is an expert who uses his local knowledge of the nature of channels and shoals, 
land- and sea-marks, tides, currents and other local factors that influence safe navigation. 
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3.5.3 Bridge manning and shipboard organisation 
Merchant shipping is characterised by longer than average working periods (often weeks or 
months), unconventional working hours and days and regular and extensive night operations. 
During navigation, periods of intense activity may be interspersed by periods of relative 
inactivity. 
Traditionally manning of a ship's bridge was organised according to a nominally fixed 
schedule of four watches based on local time. This allowed for a work schedule of four hours 
on and eight hours off. In recent years manning of the bridge has changed and watch systems 
of 5 on 5 off or 6 on 6 off are now employed widely. 
The crew complement has traditionally been divided into three departments, i. e. deck, 
engine and catering/steward. This study focuses on the activities of the deck department and 
includes the Master, generally 2 or more navigating officers and a complement of ratings 
and/or Able Seamen. The Master has at all times overall responsibility for the safe navigation 
and operation of the entire ship. 
The responsibility of the deck department can broadly be divided into navigation, 
communication and loading and unloading of cargo. Typically the navigating officers share 
the round-the clock watches. The Master should not engage in regular watchkeeping but be 
available to assist during periods of increased risk of danger, e. g. deteriorating weather 
conditions or visibility. 
3.6 Collision Avoidance 
3.6.1 Radar/ARPA 
It is likely that the radar has had a greater impact on safety of navigation than any other 
navigation aid used on commercial ships since the early 1950's. The radar was developed 
in 
the early 1940's and it allows objects to be detected by sending out pulses of radio waves. 
Originally the radar was used on warships during WW II for shadowing the enemy and 
providing ranges for gunnery (Kemp, 1988). Conventional radars and later developments 
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e. g., ARPAs (Automatic Radar Plotting Aids) can be used as two separate aids to navigation, 
namely as: (1) an aid to determine risk of collision, or (2) for position fixing. 
It is essential to understand that neither a conventional radar nor an ARPA can determine 
how to avoid a collision on their own. They provide the navigator with the necessary 
information to enable him to make the correct decisions (Bole, Dinely & Nicholls , 1992). 
The major difference between a conventional radar and an ARPA is that the latter can carry 
out tasks and calculations automatically which otherwise would have to be carried out 
manually. In this research the words radar and ARPA are used interchangeably unless 
otherwise specified. 
3.62 Collisions and the Rules of the Road at Sea 
During the events leading to a collision the pilot acts primarily as an expert navigator and 
therefore his presence on the bridge, in itself, should not have a significant bearing on the 
outcome of the events. The risk of collision may occur at any stage of the passage and cannot 
generally be anticipated. The risk is, nevertheless, expected to be higher in areas of high 
density of traffic (e. g., the English Channel, the Malacca Straits). Any action or procedure to 
avoid a collision must be based on the compliance with the COLREGS 72 (Bole et al., 1992). 
3.6.2.1 The Early Days of the Rules of the Road at Sea 
It must be noted that at the time of the introduction of the first international collision 
regulations, work was also being carried out to introduce uniform side lights and some type 
of formal examination of deck officers. 
The early Rules of the Road at Sea were developed as a response to an increasing number of 
accidents between steamships. Some set of common rules was apparently needed to ensure 
that ships would be able to avoid each other in all traffic situations (House of Commons, 
1843 a/b). 
The first set of truly international rules, the Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea were 
adopted by 31 countries and came into force in 1863. The extract of the Sailing and Steering 
Rules of 1863 as shown in figure 13 suggests that the present COLREGS 72 originate 
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directly from these initial rules. Some general observations of their historical impact should 
be considered due to their probable influence on the present COLREGS 72. 
Two Ships under Steam Art. 13 If Two Ships under Steam are meeting End on or 
meeting nearly End on so as to involve the Risk of Collision, the 
Helms of both shall be put to Port, so that each may pass 
on the Port Side of each other. 
Two Ships under Steam Art. 14 If Two Ships under Steam are crossing so as to 
Crossing involve Risk of Collision, the Ship which has the other on 
her own Starboard Side shall keep out of the Way of the 
other. 
Sailing Ship and Ship under Art. 15 If Two Ships, one of which is a Sailing Ship, and 
Steam the other a Steam Ship, are proceeding in such Directions 
as to involve Risk of Collision, the Steam Ship shall keep 
out of the Way of the Sailing Ship. 
Ships under Steam to Art. 16 Every Steam Ship, when approaching another 
Slacken Speed Ship so as to involve a Risk of Collision, shall slacken her 
Speed, or, if necessary, stop and reverse; and every 
Steam Ship shall, when in Fog, go at a moderate 
Speed. 
Vessels overtaking other Art. 17 Every Vessel overtaking any other Vessel shall 
Vessels keep out of the Way of the said last-mentioned Vessel. 
Construction of Articles 12, Art. 18 Where by the above Rules One of Two Ships is to 
14,15 and 17 keep out of the Way, the other shall keep her Course, 
subject to the Qualifications contained in the following 
Article. 
Provision to save special Art. 19 In obeying and construing these Rules, due 
Cases regard must be had to all Dangers of Navigation; and 
due regard must also be had to any special 
Circumstances which may exist in any particular Case 
rendering a Departure from the above Rules necessary in 
order to avoid immediate Danger. 
No Ship, under any Art. 20 Nothing in these Rules shall exonerate any Ship, 
Circumstances, to neglect or the Owner, or Master, or Crew thereof, from the 
proper Precautions Consequences of any Neglect to carry Lights or Signals, 
or of any Neglect to keep a proper Look-out, or the 
Neglect of any Precaution which may be required by the 
ordinary Practice of Seamen, or by the special 
Circumstances of the Case. 
Figure 13 Extract from the 1863 Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 
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For instance, Gray (1867) concluded that most of the collisions were caused by poor look-out 
and neglecting to show lights and that no rule of the road could meet such cases. 
Gray stated further: 
"The Legislative have made plain, simple, effective rules. The seaman must 
now do his part in carrying out these rules into practice in the manner and 
spirit intended by the framers and the advocate and jurist must do their part 
by investigating and understanding them. " 
Interpretation of the rules was recognised as a problem from the very beginning. Apparently 
few students sitting examinations seemed to fully understand the new Steering and Sailing 
Rules. It was further noted that "so as to involve Risk of Collision" can be interpreted very 
differently, "in fact according to the state of their nerves" (House of Commons, 1868-69) 
The rules have changed extensively since then, primarily in response to difficulties in 
interpretation and changes in technology. For example, the original rules stated "every ship 
drawing near another ship should port her helm" (known as the Port-Helm Rule). This was 
later changed to "each steamship shall alter her course to starboard" providing an important 
alteration in wording, but not in substance (Gray 1878). The current COLREGS 72 Rule 14 
(a) states ... "each shall alter 
her course to starboard so that each shall pass on the port side of 
the other". 
The early rules evidently did not consider the effect of human behaviour on the interpretation 
of the rules. Colomb voiced his concerns in 1867: 
"The law at sea should merely deal with enabling ships to avoid all dangerous 
proximity; but when the dangerous proximity has arisen, either from accident 
or necessity, law should cease and seamanship must do the best it can". 
Steam ships introduced the concept of speed into the Rules, especially with respect of course 
and speed of the stand on vessel (then holding vessel). The 1884 Rules stated "where by the 
above Rules one of two ships is to keep out of the way, the other shall keep her course". This 
resulted in misunderstandings as some mariners automatically slowed down confusing the 
give way vessel. The wording was therefore amended to "the other shall keep her course and 
speed". 
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Mr William Walton expressed his views that the word speed was fraught with great danger 
as it would mean that the stand-on vessel would almost typically keep her speed, not only 
until she has run into position involving risk of collision, but into such extreme danger that 
would almost certainly result in disaster (Board of Trade, 1891). 
3.6.2.2 The Collision Regulations today 
The International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972 has been ratified by 
67% of the IMO Member States. Notably the Philippines, which supplies about 20% of 
worldwide seafarers (Anon., 1998a), has not ratified the Convention (IMO, 1996d). 
Examining the original Rules of the Road at Sea shows that they generally focused on legal 
aspects, as much as, on providing the mariner with a practical tool to avoid collisions. After a 
collision has occurred an action may be brought to recover damages. The course of action 
which arises as a result of a collision is based on negligence and this inherently includes a 
personal element. Such negligence is based on the failure of skill and care which should 
ordinarily be expected of a competent and prudent seaman. The Admiralty Court in the UK 
recognises that negligence charged in a collision case may not necessarily be negligence in 
navigation. It could be negligence in management of the ship, e. g., failure to adequately care 
for equipment or breakdown of steering gear due to neglect or carelessness. Any successful 
defence to such an allegation would likely be that the defect was latent, i. e., it could not have 
been discovered even by the exercise of due diligence (Hill, 1989). 
In most cases, Masters of ships involved in collisions will be charged with negligence or 
contributory negligence. The only argument that forms a basis for a good legal defence in 
Britain is when the act of negligence was committed solely in the 'agony of the moment'. For 
this to succeed, it must be shown that the Master had no time to think of imminent danger, 
no time to form a deliberate and properly calculated alternative form of action to avoid the 
critical situation with which he was suddenly confronted, see e. g., the collision between the 
Princess Alice and the Bywell Castle 8 (see also Padfield, 1966) summarised here: 
S The Bywell Castle (1879) 4 P. D. 219; [1874-80] All E. R 819; 41 L. T. 747; 28 W. R. 293; 4 Lloyd's Rep. 
207, C. A. 
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The Bywell Castle, a merchant ship was navigating down the River Thames and 
about to pass the Princess Alice, a passenger-carrying paddle-steamer proceeding 
along the south bank up the river. When close to each other the Princess Alice 
suddenly starboarded9 the wheel and unaccountably turned sharply to port and 
under the bows of the other vessel. The Master of the Bywell Castle equally 
hastily, but incorrectly, put her wheel hard-a-starboard and struck the Princess 
Alice on her starboard bow. The Princess Alice sank with the loss of nearly 500 
lives. 
The Court of Appeal held the Princess Alice solely at blame. The Master of the Bywell Castle 
was considered entirely excusable despite taking the wrong action. 
3.7 Passage Planning and Position Fixing 
When navigating a ship from one port to another, a passage plan reduces the risk of straying 
off course and going aground. The aim is to prepare a plan for the navigation of the ship so 
that the intended passage can be undertaken safely from berth to berth. Without planning, 
the time to process essential information may not be available at critical times, when the 
navigating officer is occupied confirming landmarks, altering course, avoiding traffic or 
carrying out other bridge duties such as communications (Holder, 1994). 
The course should be laid out on the relevant charts. The ship does not proceed at constant 
speed and is affected by currents and waves that may carry her off course. The position must 
thus be fixed regularly and marked on the chart. Traditionally the position would be fixed 
with the aid of, e. g., limiting danger lines, leading lights in port areas, parallel indexing, 
buoys and light houses. 
3.7.1 GPS and ECDIS 
Modern technology has introduced electronic versions of traditional tools in the form of the 
Global Positioning Systems (GPS) and Electronic Chart Display and Information Systems 
(ECDIS) which can be used independently, or as an part of an integrated bridge system. 
9 Until 1931, in the UK, starboarding the wheel turned the ship's head to port and vice versa 
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The GPS consists of three operational segments (Evans, 1999): 
" Ground station tracking/processing network, controlled and operated by the U. S. 
Department of Defence (USDOD). 
9 27 operational satellites which allows the user receiver normally to see at least four. 
" User segment consisting of GPS navigation receivers typically mounted on the vessel 
bridge. The receiver is designed to track, continuously and simultaneously all the satellites 
which are visible to it. 
The GPS system is available free to all users but it should be noted that the USDOD 
deliberately degrades the GPS stand alone positioning performance to an accuracy of 
± loom for 95% of the time (known as selective availability (SA)). 
The GPS computes the position in latitude/longitude with respect to a specific coordinate 
reference system based on the WGS-84 datum and spheroid. In many cases this will not 
match the datum/spheroid on the charts used on the bridge. Thus, a position plotted from 
the GPS system directly on to a chart without correction may result in position errors of 
several hundred metres. 
Solar sunspot activity, which occurs on average over an eleven-year cycle, can during peak 
periods create high levels of electromagnetic noise in the ionosphere. GPS signals have to pass 
through the earth's atmosphere and the additional background noise may affect the GPS 
performance particularly during the next two years culminating in a peak around 2001. It is 
unknown how badly the GPS may be affected. Users may experience short periods of 
instability and/or reduced number of satellites which may result in a drop of service over a 
few tens of minutes to at worst, several hours. The effects are likely to vary with time of day 
and geographical locations and seasonally. Developed in the former SovietUnion, GLONASS 
is equivalent to the GPS system, and it operates in a very similar manner. 
The paper chart has been a fundamental navigation tool for centuries. It is basically a 
pictorial model of the real world based on data obtained through hydrographic and other 
surveys. All ships must carry paper charts incurring a fixed cost, when purchasing the initial 
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portfolio, and an annual upkeep cost. Additionally paper charts must regularly be corrected 
manually (Almond & Aldridge, 1996). 
Falling prices, increased performance of computer and display technology and expected 
improvements in navigation safety led to the development of electronic charts (Smeaton, 
Dinely & Tucker, 1995). These, together with information from other integrated 
components, e. g., GPS, gyro, provide the basis for the Electronic Chart Display and 
Information Systems (ECDIS). This permits continuous display of the ship's position and can 
be used for all routine chart work, e. g., passage planning. 
3.8 The human element in the navigational system 
The concept of navigation has remained largely the same since the introduction of 
steamships. The navigating officer's main responsibility is still to follow a safe passage plan 
and avoid collisions. 
The IMO provides the regulatory framework of the working environment. This framework 
has changed both through revisions of existing Conventions (e. g., STCW '95) and the 
introduction of completely new regulations (e. g., GMDSS). Although required to comply 
with the new regulations, information on changes is not always readily accessible to the 
navigating officer since he may spend several months at sea. 
The physical working environment has changed extensively during the last few decades. The 
introduction of container and other specialised ships has reduced port turnaround time. They, 
and many other ship types, e. g., chemical tankers sail according to 'fixed routes' along 
relatively fixed sea lanes and according to relatively established time tables. This may result 
in more pressure from the company for the Master to 'cut corners' and ignore safety issues. 
Shipping is also a competitive industry that operates within a traditional environment of 
freedom of the high seas. The increasing number of electronic navigation aids has resulted in 
a higher mental work load. Officers may not always have access to the necessary training for 
the new equipment. 
The above outline confirms that the organisational framework of the working environment 
on the ship's bridge is complex. Failings of the individual navigating officer therefore 
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stretches far beyond the ship's bridge. An error made by an individual officer resulting in an 
accident, should thus not be regarded in isolation, but in relation to other factors influencing 
the navigational system. 
3.9 Conclusion 
This Chapter has recognised that there is an interaction between distinct components within 
the working environment. Consequently, the organisational framework and the navigational 
system, as parts of an integrated working environment of the ship's bridge, were explored. 
The organisational framework is based primarily on conventions and resolutions adopted by 
the IMO but it has no enforcing powers. Consequently, the Member States shoulder the 
main responsibility for implementing and managing legislation. The navigational system 
focuses on components of safe navigation and the physical environment. 
Collision avoidance is considered a central part of safe navigation. The Rules of the Road at 
Sea were therefore examined and the influence of the original rules was discussed. It was 
shown that the early rules focused on the legal aspects, perhaps lessening their practical value 
as a tool for avoiding collisions, i. e., the interpretation of the rules was left to a court of law 
after the event. The historical review suggested that this legacy may have affected the current 
COLREGS 72 potentially resulting in navigating officers interpreting the rules differently 
during the time leading to a collision. 
The Watch One concept has attracted much attention in the past two decades. The concept 
and subsequent IMO trials and studies were discussed. Additionally a selection of other 
Watch One studies were reviewed. The IMO Member States have not, as yet, universally 
accepted the safety of the concept. It was therefore suggested that, at present, the available 
studies provide inconclusive evidence of the safety of the Watch One concept. 
This Chapter also showed that the navigating officer has little direct influence on the working 
environment of the ship's bridge. It is suggested that research into human factors must 
acknowledge and consider the effect of the various components, individually and in 
combination, within this environment. It is envisaged that this Chapter can be used as a 
practical guide to the working environment on the ship's bridge. 
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4.1 Introduction 
This Chapter focuses on the ship's bridge and relevant human factors are explored in sections: 
(4.4) Design of hardware and related information processing, (4.5) Communications, (4.6) 
Documentation and manuals and, (4.7) Learning processes and training. Health and safety is 
considered briefly in section 4.9 as it envelops the activities of the navigating officer thus 
affecting his behaviour on the ship's bridge. 
This Chapter also reviews a descriptive memory aid for exploring human factors and confirms 
its usefulness for examining human factors on the ship's bridge. Task analysis is examined as 
a useful method for designing and evaluating system design and specific man-machine 
performance problems in the marine environment. 
4.2 A descriptive aid for human factors 
The significance of human factors gained increasing recognition in the aviation industry in 
the mid-70s. The US Airline Pilot's Association for instance, campaigned for many years for 
the development and installation of a Head-Up Display (HUD) to improve safety. Having 
succeeded, commercial airlines, who ultimately absorbed the costs, demanded a reduction in 
weather operating limits to obtain a financial return for their investment in the new 
equipment. There appears to be no studies showing whether the safety level at lower weather 
limits with an HUD is much better than operating with less critical weather limits without 
one (Hawkins, 1990). 
The marine environment experienced similar changes with the introduction of radar and 
other electronic navigation aids. The radar was held as little short of a miracle as it enabled 
the navigating officer to 'see' in poor visibility. It may have provided the mariner with 'eyes' 
in poor visibility but obtaining an accurate aspect of the other ship required time-consuming 
manual plotting. The newly installed equipment may have resulted in an inclination to 
maintain speed, thus reducing the time available to work out the course and speed of the 
other vessel and consequently execute the correct manouevre. Such characteristic behaviour 
may thus have counteracted some of the benefits of the radar. 
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4.2.1 Human factors and the SHELL concept 
The traditional sequence of system design in the aviation industry is shown in figure 14. The 
components, E for the environment surrounding the pilot, H for hardware, S for software and 
L for Liveware suggested a system which was 'hardware dominated' and largely neglected the 
human component (Edwards 1972) . 
To clarify the scope of human factors in aviation safety the block diagram shown in figure 15 
was proposed. This represents the components with which human factors on the flight deck 
could be addressed. It also provided for a convenient acronym to be used - the SHELL model 
representing the Software, Hardware, Environment and Liveware (Hawkins, 1990). 
Model EH5 -_ L 
Example React to Design Formulate Select & 
competitive new operating train 
situation aircraft procedures crews 
Figure 14 Traditional sequence of system design (Edwards, 1972) 
H 
SLE 
L 
Figure 15 SHELL diagram representing human factors' components on the ship's bridge 
(Hawkins, 1990) 
On the ship's bridge Liveware, i. e., the navigating officer, is in the centre of the system and is 
the key to system safety. There is a need to understand the capabilities and limitations of the 
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officer so that he can operate safely in a highly complex system. The human component in 
the centre of the system must additionally interface effectively with the other components, 
including other Liveware, e. g., additional bridge team members or VTS operators. The 
SHELL interfaces are described briefly as follows. 
4.2.1.1 Liveware/Software 
The interface between the human operator and the Software, i. e., the navigating officer and 
operating manuals or display concepts have attracted attention in the aviation and other 
industries. There have been calls from the end users in both the airline industry and the 
marine industry for better operating manuals (e. g., see Dolby, 1989; Seaman, 1992; 
Willerton, 1989). 
4.2.1.2 Liveware/Hardware 
The first interface to be concerned about is that between the human and the hardware, or the 
machine. On the ship's bridge the navigating officer interacts with both traditional and 
electronic navigation aids. 
Specialised automated systems have become the norm, introducing another area where the 
interface between man and machine must be optimised. Hawkins (1990) suggests that 
automation has not eliminated 'human error' but has changed its nature and has often made 
its consequences more catastrophic. 
The introduction of technology at sea has resulted in officers some times placing unlimited 
trust in equipment. For example, the Royal Majesty (NTSB, 1997) which was fitted with an 
integrated bridge system (IBS) ran aground after the watch officers failed to realise that the 
ship, steered by autopilot, was 17 miles off course. The National Transportation Safety Board 
(NTSB) concluded that one probable cause of the grounding was the watch officers' over 
reliance on the automated features of the IBS. Additionally rapidly developing equipment 
may not work as well under difficult shipboard conditions as under test conditions (Wachtel, 
1993). 
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4.2.1.3 Liveware/Environment 
The interface between the navigating officer and his immediate physical environment has 
changed both in the aviation industry and the marine industry. For example, in modern 
aircraft wearing a thick leather jacket against cold or goggles against the wind is no longer 
necessary. 
Ships are increasingly designed with closed bridge wings to protect sensitive electronic 
equipment. Closed bridge wings may protect the navigating officer from the elements of 
weather but they can also make it more difficult to observe the exact position of the ship 
when manoeuvring in constricted areas. The officer may therefore have to lean out of the 
window while operating the bridge controls (personal observation by the author). As well, the 
marine environment is becoming increasingly inhospitable due to higher traffic density, 
shorter port turnaround times, smaller crews and faster and larger ships. 
The interface between Liveware and the Environment was discussed in Chapter 3. 
4.2.1.4 Liveware/Liveware 
The last interface in the SHELL model is that between people both at sea and land-based 
organisations, e. g., between the navigating officers and other bridge team members or shore 
management, depending on the focus of the system analysis being performed. 
4.2.1.5 The SHELL model and the . chip's 
bridge 
The SHELL concept provides a descriptive aid for understanding how the various components 
affecting safety interact on the ship's bridge. When applying this to the marine environment, 
the interaction between the navigating officer and Hardware/Environment is considered part 
of the physical environment of the ship's bridge. Interaction between Software/Liveware is 
considered part of the navigational environment on the ship's bridge illustrated in figure 16. 
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Physical Environment 
of the Ship's Bridge 
H 
S \L E 
The Novigotionc/System 
of the Ships Bridge \ 
Figure 16 The SHELL diagram and the ship's bridge 
4.3 Exploring human factors in the marine environment 
The table included in Appendix A shows that a range of techniques can be used by 
practitioners and researchers to identify and evaluate human factors in a given system. 
Kirwan & Ainsworth (1992) suggest that task analysis provides a basic method which helps 
to focus on specific issues. Such concerns can arise in the marine environment when: 
" Overall safety is especially important (e. g., when evaluating the Watch One concept) 
" Technology is vulnerable to `human error' (e. g., GMDSS equipment) 
" System changes may create uncertainty about the system integrity (e. g., introducing new 
components into integrated bridge systems) 
"A particularly high quality product is required which depends on human performance 
(e. g., introduction of state-of-the-art electronic navigation aids). 
Task analysis is a useful method when designing a system, evaluating a system design or if a 
particular man-machine system performance problem has been 'targeted' to be analysed and 
resolved. It is the study of what operators, e. g., navigating officers (or bridge teams) must 
do 
in terms of actions and/or cognitive processes to achieve a system goal, e. g., safe navigation. 
These methods can further 
be used to document the information and control of facilities used 
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to carry out the task. The application of task analysis provides a detailed picture of human 
involvement in a given system. 
4.3.1 Hierarchical Task Analysis (HTA) 
Hierarchical task analysis (HTA) is a broad approach to task analysis which establishes the 
conditions when various sub tasks should be carried out to meet the system's goal. HTA 
produces a hierarchy of operations and plans. Operations are basically different activities that 
operators carry out within the system and plans are statements of the conditions which are 
necessary to undertake these operations. 
HTA provides an effective means of stating how work should be organised to meet a system's 
goal. It can be used flexibly by the analyst as a framework for: (1) employing other task 
analysis methods, or (2) human factors' expertise to gain information or suggest system 
modifications. HTA can be used to deal with specific issues, such as interface design, work 
organisation, the development of operator manuals and job aids, training and 'human error' 
analysis. 
An example of a hierarchical diagram for collision avoidance is shown in Figure 17. It should 
be noted that collision avoidance is a sub task of navigation and manoeuvring which may 
have other sub tasks such as communication, picking up a pilot, changing course, etc. 
The main advantages of applying HTA in the marine environment are: 
" It is an economical method of collecting andorganising information in parts of the 
hierarchy where it is justified or required; 
" It assists in focusing on crucial aspects of the task within the context of the overall task; 
" It provides a context in which other specific approaches to task analysis (e. g., data 
collection for modelling design possibilities) may be applied to a greater effect; 
" It forms the basis for many other assessments, e. g., communications analysis; and, 
" It provides a convenient check to verify that no task elements have been omitted at any 
stage. This is because each task element is only broken down into a few sub-elements,. 
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To achieve optimum value from task analysis Ainsworth (1999a) suggests that the following 
points should be addressed: 
I. A detailed definition of the purpose at the outset of the study. 
2. At least one member of the task analysis team must have a background in psychology or 
human factors. Vice versa, at least one member must have a good understanding of the 
task being analysed. 
3. Undertake, when possible, some form of trials using subjects with operational experience 
of the system or generically similar system (e. g., simulator trial). 
MANOEUVRING & NAVIGATION SITUATION 
Oscillate Attention 
Monitor Radar II Watch Horizon 
Delect Targets I Detect Targets 
Adjust Vs bill yIIII Adjust Visibility 
Observe Targets Ohserve Targets 
stimafe position on Estimate IocnGon 
odor relative to ship 
Establish coherent 
target IC)CC 
Identify TargetType 
CPA-plotting procedure 
Select Targets for 
Initial marking of 
selected targets 
Figure 17 HTA for collision avoidance (derived from May, 1999) 
Other possible 
simultaneous tasks 
Communication (VHF, other 
bridge team members) 
Execute Course Changes 
Prepare to pick up pilot 
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4.4 Design of hardware and related information processing 
The interface between Liveware and Hardware in the SHELL model focuses on the 
interaction between the operator and the machine. Hopkin (1993) suggests that human 
factors' problems may occur when an operator cannot be trained successfully to perform a 
planned task, cannot understand the instructions, cannot follow procedures, cannot do the 
tasks at the required pace or to required standard or cannot cope with the job as designed. 
Such problems may originate from general management or safety policies, the objective and 
plan of operations or the specification or designs of equipment. 
4.4 1 Development ofbridge aids 
The development of electronic equipment, whether consumer goods or specialist navigation 
aids, tend to be driven by cost and technology. Increasingly, however, users have been 
involved in the development of the user-interface (Cushman & Rosenberg, 1991). By 
introducing electronic navigation aids the shipowner expects to lower long-term cost, e. g., by 
reducing the number of crew members. Additionally manufacturers may wish to secure or 
increase their share of the market or enter new markets. 
As an example of the diversity of equipment that may cause problems it can be noted that 
the evolution of radar displays has produced a collection of mixed user-interfaces. Thus a non 
exhaustive review of modern radar systems reveals operation philosophies based upon a 
touch-sensitive screen, tracker ball system control, combined keyboard and tracker ball 
system, part keyboard, and part menu system operated with a joystick. Clearly, at present, 
manufacturers can do almost what they want, providing the system passes the relevant 
technical specifications and type approvals. From the operator's point of view, this can be a 
major dilemma. Type approval standards may 
be high, but not necessarily up to date and 
may vary in different countries. Often manufacturers take the opportunity, whenever they 
produce a new product, to change the system, including not only cosmetic changes, 
but 
perhaps layout of controls, terminology and sometimes the symbols (Hughes, 1992). Such 
changes may result in navigating officers confusing one control with another or 
failing to 
identify a control when it is needed. Fitts & Jones (1947b) concluded it would be possible to 
reduce the number of accidents attributed to these types of errors 
by designing equipment in 
accordance with human requirements. 
CHAPTER 4: HUMAN FACTORS 
ON THE SHIP'S BRIDGE 87 
4 4.2 Design of Controls, Symbols and Displays 
Research into human engineering focusing on the design of equipment for human use has 
concentrated on such factors as design for ease of operation, presentation of information, 
equipment control, etc. This has resulted in an acceptance that people going against 
established habits are likely to make errors (Holding, 1969). For instance, a man trained to 
drive a vehicle with controls laid out in one way is likely to make mistakes if he transfers to 
another vehicle where the layout is different (Kletz, 1990). 
Schiffrin and Schneider (1977) suggest that man can acquire two types of habits, those 
expressed through 'instinctive' actions and typical to mankind, and those formed by 
experience operating specific equipment. Marine accident investigators rarely acknowledge 
directly these types of factors. Consequently it is difficult to determine how common or 
significant errors caused by such habits are and to determine the appropriate preventive 
measures to reduce such accidents in the future. 
'Instinctive' actions are generally more easily recognised. For instance, the Transportation 
Safety Board of Canada (1991) suggested that the physical layout of the bridge on the 
Canadian registered ferry the Howe Sound Queen contributed, at least in part, to the striking of 
a dock. The Howe Sound Queen is a double-ended ferry with only one wheelhouse amidships. 
The two conning positions are on alternate sides of the control console. To obtain an 
unrestricted view of the vessels bow, some masters preferred to position themselves in front 
of the manoeuvring console. As a result the master would have to turn his head and body 
back and forth while manoeuvring. The ferry was under the conduct of a trainee Master (with 
approximately 26 years of sea service on various types of vessels). During the 
final approach 
he realised that the vessel was not slowing sufficiently. His instinctive reaction was to pull the 
control toward himself to obtain astern thrust 
but this action engaged the forward propeller 
and provided forward thrust instead. 
Lord Donaldson (1991) suggested, in the report following the inquiry into the engine failure 
and subsequent grounding of the oil tanker 
Braer', that any recommendations for further 
See also MAIB, (1993), Report of the 
Chief Inspector of Marine Accidents into the engine failure and 
subsequent grounding of the 
Motor Tanker Braer at Garths Ness, Shetland on 5 January 1993 
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measures to prevent accidents at sea must take into account human nature rather than 
seeking to change it. 
As part of a larger study carried out in Finland marine pilots were asked whether they 
required more specific knowledge about new navigation aids on modern ships' bridges 
(Haapio, 1991). 82% of the pilots answered yes and 18% answered no. When they were 
invited to comment further on the type of problems they encounter, the consensus was that 
there is a lack of common symbols and terminology, particularly for radar/ARPAs. 
In a more recent study (Dickens, 1994) navigators at British and Greek nautical colleges also 
requested more cooperation between manufacturers and standardisation of controls and 
terminology. The study was not specifically designed to examine standardisation of symbols 
and terminology and does not provide explanations whether the respondents' concerns were 
related to any specific aspects of safety or mainly related to the frustration the officers 
experience when they encounter unfamiliar equipment (see also Hughes, 1992; Wachtel, 
1993; Transportation Safety Board of Canada 1990). 
4.3 Information Processing 
The navigating officer analyses and interprets information that he collects from various 
bridge aids ultimately to make decisions that affect directly the safety of the ship. The 
average navigating officer is not employed because he is familiar with specific electronic 
bridge aids but because he is trained to a minimum level of competence (e. g., STCW '95). 
In many land based industries the difficulty of operating different systems has been 
recognised. For example, people using software systems generally specialise in only a few 
manufacturers' products, e. g., Lotus®, Excel®, WordPerfect®, etc. The operators are likely to 
find it difficult to use alternative products to best effect at short notice without extensive 
cross training. Thus operators may 
have to adapt to the system rather than the system to the 
operator. 
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4.4.3.1 Automation & feedback 
Research carried out in the airline industry shows that increased automation has not 
appreciably reduced the workload of airline pilots, instead it has increased the operational 
effectiveness of the system. Air planes can fly faster leaving less time for navigation, 
communications with ground control and system management (Perrow, 1984). 
Shipping is facing a similar situation where technology is constantly developed with the aim 
to decrease workload (and ultimately reduce manning). Rather than reducing the number of 
accidents, there is a considerable risk that the rate of loss will remain unchanged. 
For example, the grounding of the Royal Majesty (NTSB, 1997) highlighted the fact that 
automation cannot substitute inadequate primary training and poor user interfaces. 
Automated features require additional specific training. The Royal Majesty grounded on the 
Rose and Crown Shoal near Nantucket Island (US) about 17 miles from where the 
watchkeepers thought she was. A significant contributing cause was that the watchkeepers 
plotted the hourly fixes on the chart using position 
data from the GPS. Unbeknown to them 
the GPS had automatically defaulted to Dead Reckoning (DR) mode when the antenna cable 
to the receiver had disconnected. In this mode the 
GPS did not correct for the effect of wind, 
currents, or waves. 
Feedback is a well-known concept in the science of control and information theory. It sends 
back information to the user about the actions carried out. Feedback can be tactile, sound, 
visual, etc. (Norman, 1990). For example, the whistle of a 
boiling tea kettle may have 
prevented some watchkeepers 
from assuming that the ship has moved into sudden fog 
(caused by steamed-up windows). 
Modern navigation aids have an increasing number of features and provide less feedback, 
e. g., most ships are today steered regularly 
by autopilot which may not provide sufficient 
feedback to ensure that it has been engaged correctly. 
For example, the Canadian stern trawler the 
Zagreb grounded on Grey River Rocks 
approaching from the north 
into Ramea, Newfoundland. The vessel was fitted with an 
autopilot. The change over 
between manual and autopilot was provided by an external 
switch located at the console. 
When in 'Auto' mode the course setting and/or course 
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alteration could be carried out by depressing the demand-activated course-setting knob on 
the control panel and setting it to the desired heading. This feature eliminates the possibility 
of accidental course alterations. In this mode the gyro pilot computer converts the heading 
error or rudder order into control signals which are then transmitted to the power unit by 
means of a single floating port/starboard relay and a cut-out relay. When the new course has 
been reached, the relay is broken and the electrical signal neutralised. Thus the accuracy and 
performance of the autopilot are dependent upon the precision of the input to its (compass) 
repeater from the master gyro (Transportation Safety Board of. Canada, 1993b). 
Alternatively, the 'Follow-up' mode could be used for course alteration. Once the ship has 
settled on the new heading, the 'heading pointer' on the autopilot must be reset to the new 
course and the steering switched back to 'Auto'. Failure to reset the course would result in 
the ship in effect continuing on the previous course. 
It was reported that during the latter part of the voyage the mate altered course on the 
autopilot without closely monitoring the manoeuvre to ensure it had the desired effect. The 
lack of appropriate feedback in this situation resulted in a failure mode on skill-based level, 
i. e., inattention by omitting to perform the necessary attentional monitoring at a critical 
moment (see further Reason, 1990b). 
4.4.3.2 Urer confidence and technology 
Increasing automation, together with reduced feedback, may lead to increased confidence in 
the infallibility of technology. Simultaneously poor performance or, performance not as 
expected, and false alarms 
have induced less confidence in technology. 
When Commander Love116 performed his first night flight from an aircraft carrier off the 
California coast, he expected to be guided back to the ship by an automatic radio direction 
finder (ADF) receiving on 518 kHz (Lovell & Kluger, 1994). When he turned back and 
reached the spot where the ship and other planes were supposed to 
be, he was unable to 
locate them. He was absolutely certain that the ADF could not be wrong. However, he did 
not know that a tracking station on the 
Japanese coast was also broadcasting a homing signal 
6 Later Commander of Apollo 13 
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at 518 kHz. In hindsight, had he known that the power of the shipboard ADF was low for 
security reasons, and that other homing devices might operate on the same frequency at 
higher power levels, he might have appreciated sooner that he was flying away from the ship 
(Lovell, 1996). 
Alternatively, if technology fails regularly to perform as expected, e. g., due to false alarms, 
the operator may in the end not trust the equipment. Some time before the passenger ferry 
the Estonia sank off the Finnish coast in September 1994 the master and crew on the 
passenger ferry the Mariella had been monitoring her progress on the radar. When the 
Estonia suddenly disappeared from the Mariella'. r radar screen, the initial reaction of the 
master was that the radar had failed (Alberius, 1995). This was due to the unreliability of the 
newly installed radar and the poor quality of the radar picture caused by severe sea clutter on 
this stormy night (Törnroos, 1997). Additionally, it can be presumed that it would have been 
unthinkable for the master that the ship 
he was monitoring on the radar screen could simply 
disappear. 
Navigating officers, as all humans, are occasionally prone to forgetfulness, confusion, making 
mistakes and not following instructions as 
intended. This may be due to either lack of 
understanding or lack of commitment. Shorter port turn-around-times (Osler, 1996) mostly 
forced by tighter schedules may result in operating ships at increasing speeds perhaps 
affording less time to make critical decisions. These 
factors may also increase fatigue or 
boredom. This is likely to have an even greater effect as both passenger and cargo ships 
capable of increasingly higher speeds are 
brought into service. 
4 4.4 Design of user-interfaces 
The purpose of the display of an electronic 
bridge aid is to transmit a message to the 
watchkeeper to enable 
him to make a correct decision, e. g., using information provided by 
the GPS to follow a safe course. 
Traditionally communication between technology and the 
operator on the ship's 
bridge is presented either by text or a symbolic message. 
Information is now presented at an ever increasing speed to the navigating officer but 
understanding of the 
information is still acquired relatively slowly. Additionally software and 
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hardware developers do not always appreciate that human operators may use the equipment 
differently from that intended. For example a computer software that translated 'Out of 
sight, out of mind' into Russian did it reasonably well. When it was then translated back into 
English it became the 'invisible maniac' (Tingstad, 1996). The intention of the programmer 
of the translation software was presumably for the program to be used for one-way 
translations only. Unfortunately human operators are innovative and likely to explore the use 
of any technology beyond the immediate intentions of the programmer. 
4.4.4.1 Text and Symbols 
The text of information is the plain content of the message which is communicated to the 
user. A sub text is the subconscious message which is communicated via a medium (i. e., hard 
copy or online), through navigation (i. e., paths to move around the information) and 
presentation (i. e., layout and fonts used to communicate the text) (Coe, 1996). 
Baber and Wankling (1992) suggest that an effective information display must provide 
correct information, in the correct format and at the correct time. Symbols are frequently 
assumed to allow better 'glance legibility' than text. Text and pictures access different 
processing mechanisms in the human cognitive system. There appears to be an assumption 
that symbols represent some form of 'universal language' that can be understood by people 
from different language groups and cultures. The researchers found that a number of studies 
suggested that a combination of text and symbols produces significantly enhanced 
recognition compared with symbols or text alone. This implies that redundant information 
may be beneficial in aiding comprehension. The inclusion of redundant information on 
displays can therefore reduce uncertainty. 
4.5 Communication 
The interface between Liwevare/Liveware in the SHELL model focuses on communication 
between people. There is perhaps an assumption that safe communication at sea is embodied 
primarily in a common mother tongue 
between crew members. Linguistic knowledge alone, 
however, is not enough to ensure effective communication between people of the same or of 
other cultures. 
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In times of extreme stress it is said that people revert to their mother tongue and may 
therefore not understand or be able to express their intentions clearly. This notion is aptly 
illustrated in the film "The Fifth Element7, ' where the character Korben Dallas (acted by Bruce 
Willis), remarks "I only speak two languages, English and Panic. " 
The term communication refers to the exchange of messages and the creation of a meaning, 
whether between two or more persons, an operator and a machine or documentation. 
Communication on the ship's bridge therefore refers to exchanges of messages between the 
navigating officer and any of the following: 
" Other persons, e. g., crew members 
" Relevant rules, e. g., COLREGS 72. 
A significant aspect of communication on a ship's bridge focuses on communication between 
persons on the ship and persons that may be indirectly involved in shipping, e. g., designers of 
user-interfaces, etc. 
4.5.1 Message and meaning 
A prevailing theory of communication is that only a message is transmitted and the person 
who receives the message, attaches his or her own meaning to it. Communication is therefore 
considered effective when the person attaches a meaning to the message similar to the 
intended. Messages are created by using a medium translated into a channel of 
communication using symbols which are things used to represent something else. Virtually 
anything can be a symbol, words-non-verbal displays, flags, etc. Referents for symbols can 
include objects, ideas or behaviours (Gudykunst, 1991). 
The word 'vessel' for example, illustrates how as a symbol it means a ship to a mariner or a 
bottle/beaker to a scientist. The relationship between a symbol and its referent is arbitrary 
and varies from culture to culture, as well as within cultures. There are, nevertheless, direct 
connections between our thoughts and a symbol and a thought and our symbol's referent 
(Gudykunst, 1991). 
7 Directed by Luc Besson, produced by Gaumont/France 1997 
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The word 'ship' can have many different definitions. Corbet (1986) provides at least 21 
different sources of definitions. These range from the Concise Oxford Dictionary through 
various legal definitions, e. g., The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution 
from Ships, 1973/79, Article 2 and The International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil 
Pollution Damage, 1969/76 (CLC). The former includes fixed or floating platforms, whereas 
the latter only includes any seagoing vessel actually carrying oil in bulk as cargo. 
4.5.2 Language and aviation safety 
Cushing (1997) examined problems arising from using spoken language as the medium of 
air-ground communication. He suggests that the complexity and flexibility of the natural 
language may cause confusions and misunderstandings arising from linguistic phenomena. 
He demonstrates that language-related misunderstandings have been a significant 
contributing factor in aviation accidents and incidents. 
He suggests that problems related to communication in aviation safety can arise from: 
" Characteristics of the language itself, e. g., ambiguity arising from a word or phrase which 
may have more than one meaning; 
" Ways the language can refer to the world, e. g., problems arising from determining who is 
being addressed in a particular communication; 
Inferences that are drawn in the course of communication, e. g., inferences drawn by a 
listener being confronted with unfamiliar terminology; 
" Repetitions which can fail or succeed in preventing or repairing a communication error, 
e. g., problems arising from repetition across more than one 
language; 
" Use of numbers serving as an interface with technical equipment, e. g., 
digit confusions and 
reversals; 
Misuse and use of radio, e. g., when a radio is installed 
but the crew declines or forgets to 
use it; 
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" Circumstances unrelated to communication, e. g., distractions, fatigue, impatience, 
obstinacy; 
" General problems arising when attempting to convey a meaningful message, e. g., when a 
message is not sent or when it is sent but not heard. 
The work carried out by Cushing is not directly applicable to the marine environment 
because of the differences in the two industries. The main difference between the two 
industries is the working environment itself. This directs the terminology used in a given 
situation, e. g., in the aviation industry an aircraft would be cleared to a given height, e. g., 
'cleared to eleven thousand' which is understood to mean 11,000 feet. It is suggested that 
communication problems in marine accidents should be examined adopting a similar 
methodology. 
4.5.3 Communication on the ship's bridge 
Communication problems at sea are rarely deliberate, i. e., incorrect orders are not given with 
the intent to cause an accident. Errors resulting in accidents or incidents generally follow 
from a misinterpretation of the message. 
The increasing use of technology available to assist in navigation combined with smaller 
crews and an increase in new or revised regulations, e. g., ISM, has changed the process of 
communication on the ships' bridges today. Messages can be transmitted directly between 
two persons or between an operator and a user-interface. Messages may involve three or more 
pathways, e. g., a message transmitted from a radar display must have a meaning attached to 
it; this meaning is then used to associate it with, for example, a correct rule of the 
COLREGS 72. Finally the officer may take direct action or make a verbal order, e. g., to a 
helmsman, to resolve the situation. 
5.4 Communication between persons on the ship's bridge 4 
Messages on the ship's bridge are generally transmitted verbally between two or more 
persons who may, or may not, speak 
fluently the same language. The working language of a 
ship was traditionally the mother tongue of the crew members of specific ranks. For example, 
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a British ship may have employed British officers (both deck and engineer) and the remaining 
crew members of another nationality, e. g., Chinese or Indian. 
The increase in mixed nationality departments in the preceding decades has resulted in more 
ships carrying crew members with different mother tongues. The resulting belief that this 
may cause problems have led many ships to adopt a common working language, generally 
English (UK P&I Club, 1996). One study found that inadequate knowledge of the operating 
language was a contributing factor in approximately 10% of the incidents or accidents 
examined (Transportation Safety Board of Canada, 1995). 
All watchkeepers should be trained to a common standard, i. e., according to STCW'95. 
These standards may differ depending on the requirements of the national maritime 
administrations (referred to in Chapter 3). The common level of training should ensure that 
the watchkeeper assigns the intended meaning to the message he receives even when is 
unable to speak fluently in the language used. 
1.5.5 Bridge Resource Management 
4.5.5.1 Cockpit Resource Management in the aviation industry 
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB, 1994) found in a study that procedural, 
tactical decision and monitoring/challenging errors were the most common types identified. 
As a result of this study the NTSB recommended that the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) should apply the results to the design and use of check lists to improve error-tolerance. 
FAA should also demand that U. S. air carriers provide a comprehensive crew resource 
management programme. 
Many airlines, e. g., the Scandinavian Airlines (SAS) have implemented successful cockpit 
resource management courses (CRM) 
for their flight crews. The SAS programme has been 
subsequently adapted to the marine environment as a Bridge Resource Management (BRM) 
course (Scandinavian Airlines, 1994). The main objective of the course is to initiate a change 
of attitudes. Additionally it provides increased 
knowledge about managing human and 
technical resources on the ship's bridge. 
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4.5.6 The bridge team 
The shipping industry has historically been quite hierarchical, i. e., divisions between the 
ranks and different departments were marked. Such cultural traditions may cause additional 
communication problems even when all crew members are of the same nationality. Larger 
crew complements may have had some 'redundancy' built, in but present day smaller crew 
complements provide less scope for casual conversations or helpful interpretations by other 
persons that may clarify the intended meaning of a message. 
The Master/crew-Pilot relationship has largely remained unchanged, tending to contain a 
residual level of resentment between them when working together on the ship's bridge. 
Problems arising from hierarchical relationships, varying levels of competence and different 
linguistic skills may also be causal factors in groundings and collisions. For example, the 
grounding of the Queen Elizabeth II (QE2) is partly attributed to the lack of coordination of 
watchkeeping activities between several officers and the pilot on the bridge (MAIE, 1992; 
Sager, 1995). 
The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (1995) concluded that misunderstanding 
between the pilot and master, inattention by the pilot or the OOW, or lack of 
communication between the pilot and the OOW were often attributed as a primary cause of 
the accident. The complexity of the master/pilot relationship was emphasised by frequently 
conflicting opinions given by masters, OOWs and pilots in this study. 
45.7 Communication ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore 
4.5.7.1 Universal ship borne Automatic Identification System transponders (A IS) 
A transponder is a radio or radar receiver-transmitter activated 
for transmissions by reception 
of a predetermined signal. 
The aviation industry has benefited from transponders for many 
years. Acknowledging this, the 
demand for some type of automatic identification system for 
ships has grown 
(see e. g., Donaldson, 1994). The Maritime Research Centre (1995) at the 
Southampton Institute carried out a study 
for the Marine Safety Agency (UK) which 
suggested that ship-to-ship 
transponders would enhance maritime safety (see also Atwell, 
Pourzanjani & Pearce, 1996). 
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This report is based on a survey into the expected user requirements for transponders, ship- 
to-ship and ship-to-shore. It concludes that the majority of respondents believe that 
transponders would make a valuable contribution to maritime safety and would like to see 
them become mandatory. 
The IMO has now completed a draft performance standard for transponders. The standards 
will encompass (i) definition of the operational requirements of the system, (ii) technology 
and telecommunications protocol necessary for the system and (iii) type approval test 
requirements. The 44th Session of the Navigation Subcommittee is considering 
recommending that AIS devices should become mandatory on ships subject to SOLAS 74 
from as early as July 2002 (Crothers, 1998). 
Trials have been conducted with the support from the IMO to gain experience with 
transponders in busy waters such as the English Channel (Prescott, 1995). The United States 
Coast Guard has also supplied, as part of their Ports and Waterways Safety System (PAWSS), 
approximately 50 fixed and portable transponders to mariners sailing along the lower 
Mississippi River. The PAWSS includes an automatic identification system (AIS), a radar 
subsystem, VHF marine communication to and 
from the shore-based operational centre 
(based in New Orleans), multiple operator work stations, an integrated database, and a 
synchronous record and replay system. This trial is expected to establish the effectiveness and 
safety of transponders in crowded waterways (Kinsella 1999, Ledet 1999). Such trials can 
indicate underlying problems, e. g., DGPS can provide a more accurate position than the 
underlying ECDIS charts (see also e. g., Richards, 1994). 
4.5.7.2 Ship-to-ship transponders 
A significant assumption for the application of transponders appears to be that when a 
navigating officer knows the name of the other vessel 
he can call her up on the VHF so that 
they can confer and mutually 
decide their respective actions. By identifying the other ship the 
number of VHF calls: 
'vessel on my port side' or 'vessel on my starboard side' could be 
reduced. 
Based on this assumption alone, fitting ships with transponders, is unlikely to prevent a 
collision. This 
is evident from the collision between the M. T. New World and the M. V. Ya 
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Mawlaya (Marine Department, 1994) which occurred in moderate visibility. This is a 'classic' 
two-ship encounter, where the watchkeepers detected each other by ARPA in good time 
before the collision. As the ships closed to about 4 miles apart, the watchkeeper on the Ya 
Mawlaya called up the New World. The call is recalled as "Vessel on my starboard side change 
your course to port". The 2nd officer on the M. T. New World replied "No I will not change 
my course to port. You must be the one to change to your starboard because I am stand-on 
vessel and you are a give-way vessel". Some time later the New World's officer called the Ya 
Mawlaya on channel 16 and said "Vessel on my port side, what are you doing? You have to 
change your course to starboard". 
Although the watchkeepers did not know the name, each officer was clearly aware of the 
other vessel. A transponder would therefore not have prevented the conflict and hence the 
collision, here. 
4.5.7.3 Ship-to-shore Transponders 
Vessel Traffic Services (VTS) have been defined as any service carried out by a competent 
authority designed to improve safety and efficiency of traffic and the protection of the 
environment. It may range 
from the provision of simple information messages to extensive 
management of traffic within a port or waterway. 
A VTS typically provides three types of 
services (1) General Information, e. g., 
dredging activities, damages to external navigation 
aids (e. g., buoys that 
have moved position), (2) Advice, e. g., specific ship movements within 
the area and (3) Instruction, e. g., clearance to enter the area 
(Routin & Deutsch, 1987). 
At present, many port authorities require a ship carrying a hazardous cargo to report her 
position at regular intervals. 
Such communications can be distractive, especially in areas 
where traffic density is 
high, e. g., Dover Straits. The benefit of transponders would be that, 
'tagging' ships carrying hazardous cargoes would be possible, and a possible cause for 
distraction on the bridge thereby eliminated. 
Before transponders become mandatory, human factors should be considered to ensure that 
any equipment installed 
is user-friendly and provides the optimum amount of information. 
This may vary according to ship/cargo type and trading patterns. Further, the implications of 
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only fitting some ships, e. g., only commercial ships and excluding others, e. g., naval, fishing 
or recreational vessels must be considered. 
45.8 Communication between rules and persons 
The basic intention of the COLREGS 72 is to give the watchkeeper a set of rules that advises 
him how to avoid collisions in close quarter situations. Should a collision occur the ensuing 
analysis of the events is typically from a legal perspective, i. e., (i) the sole fault of one ship, (ii) 
the fault of both ships, or (iii) as an inevitable accident, i. e., neither ship was at fault and each 
should bear its own damages (Hill, 1989). 
In terms of communication the COLREGS 72 transmits a message to the watchkeeper whose 
decision is based on the meaning he assigns to it. His assignation of a meaning may depend 
on his interpretation of the aspect or definition of the other ship(s). 
Although the intention of the rule makers is clear, i. e., to make sure that all ships are able to 
avoid collisions, the message transmitted by a specific rule can have different meanings 
attached to it. What exactly is safe speed? 
It is generally accepted that the manoeuvrability of 
a vessel decreases with the reduction in speed. 
Therefore although reducing the speed 
provides more time to make a 
decision, the vessel will respond slower. 
The wording "moderate speed" in the 1960 collision regulations was changed to "safe speed" 
with the introduction of the 1972 collision regulations. From the point of view of assigning a 
meaning the words "moderate speed" may 
have been easier to relate with speed reduction. 
Safe speed according to the rules is the speed that allows the vessel to avoid a collision in a 
close quarter situation. Each navigating officer is 
likely to attach his own meaning to the 
word safe speed depending on 
his training, experience, cultural background and type of ship. 
4.6 Documentation and manuals 
The interface between Liveware and Software in the SHELL model concerns the operator's 
interaction with operating software and their related documentation. 
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The navigating officer typically learns the operational instructions for electronic bridge aids 
by reading the manuals. The intention of the text and drawings of the manual is to provide 
the officer with sufficient and correct information to enable him to operate the equipment in 
the manner that the manufacturer intended. 
There are no common standards for the production of manuals. Navigating officers must 
frequently use more than one type of reference aid. Their ability to solve problems or answer 
technical questions depend partly on the coordinated usage of a variety of types of manuals. 
Although the intentions may be good, the outcome of the use of manuals is often not quite as 
intended. 
A study by Scerbo and Fisk (1990) concluded that a user's success was largely determined by 
the adoption of an appropriate search 'heuristic'. The use of a 'heuristic' may give the user 
some key locations in the manual to begin looking for the information. As a result the user 
can operate the equipment more efficiently. The results also suggest that the frequency of 
usage for different kinds of documentation may differ greatly from what is commonly 
expected. It suggests that important documentation such as glossaries and overviews may be 
almost neglected despite the naivety of the users. A well structured indexing system may 
affect significantly the amount the user spends looking at the table of contents. 
Carroll, Smith-Kerker, Ford & Mazur-Rimez, (1987-1988), developed a Minimal Manual to 
address difficulties equipment operators have using state-of-the-art self-instruction manuals 
for learning to use electronic devices. Their study showed that the proposed Minimal Manual 
afforded more efficient learning progress than a comparable commercially 
developed self- 
instruction manual. It was also superior in the specific areas as predicted by the design team. 
Ainsworth (1999b) suggests that written procedures can have a critical impact upon task 
performance. Changes to written procedures can 
be used to overcome deficiencies in 
hardware or software without the need for costly changes in their design. Task analysis can be 
used to optimise written procedures to examine the 
following four aspects of the procedures: 
1. The format and presentation of the procedures 
2. The level of operator support within the procedures 
3. Navigation through procedures 
4. Task-specific issues 
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4.6.1 Following Instructions 
Wright (1981) suggested that following instructions is one of the most difficult 
comprehension tasks required in daily life. Understanding and complying with instructions 
that accompany consumer goods is not always easy and indeed often people choose to ignore 
instructions completely. He concludes that instructions must be factually accurate, simple to 
understand and easy to find. Such a specification requires skilful application of a variety of 
design procedures. 
4.6.1.1 Documentation for other cultures 
The shipping industry is by its very nature a multicultural industry. Documentation on the 
ship's bridge is likely to be translated into one or more foreign languages. It may also be used 
by someone whose first language is not the language of the manufacturer. Thus in addition to 
multicultural considerations the needs and limitations of the translation process and 
interaction with the translation vendor must be considered (Coe, 1996). 
4.7 Learning processes and training 
Navigation is a learned skill and thus training and education has a significant effect on 
safety of navigation. 
4.7.1 Learning processes 
In theory people with similar qualifications will carry out identical tasks in a similar manner. 
In practice, this is rarely true because learning processes depend on cultural background and 
individual information processing capability. 
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To illustrate the effect of different cultural backgrounds figure 18 shows how a simple 
arithmetic operation can be set out in different ways. Each method provides the correct result 
and each person generally finds his own method the most comfortable. The possible dangers 
of processing information differently depending on cultural background is particularly 
important to note in the marine environment where mixed crews are increasingly common. 
Provided by a subject from former East Germany from the mid-60's 
232: 2 = 116 
2 
03 
2 
12 
12 
0 
Provided by a subject from the UK from the mid-50's 
116 
2 232 
2 
03 
2 
12 
12 
0 
Provided by the author (from Finland mid-60's) 
232? 
2 1116 
03 
2 
12 
12 
0 
Figure 18 Different ways of solving an arithmetic operation 
The learning capahlity of an individual is unique and depends to some extent on how that 
person thinks. There are ways of improving learning capability, e. g., mnemonics and 'errors 
as opportunity'. A 
danger associated with learning is the ability for humans to devise 
cx! )lanations. 
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4.7.1.1 Mnemonics 
Mnemonics are mental techniques that may help an individual to learn and remember 
specific items of information (Gregory, 1987a), e. g., port and starboard may be confusing 
and therefore a 'cue' such as 'left and port have the same number of letters' may assist in 
linking the confused items of knowledge. Mnemonics have frequently been used in the 
marine environment, e. g., during the development of the early Rules of the Road the 
following mnemonics were suggested to assist the navigating officer in avoiding a collision 
(Gray, 1867): 
"When both sidelights you see ahead 
Port your helm and show your red" 
This reflected the initial helm order and was superseded by: 
"If both lights you see ahead 
Starboard your helm and show your red" 
On a theoretical level mnemonics helps to make difficult information more meaningful and 
understandable. On a practical 
level they have both uses and limitations. 
4.7.1.2 Explaining errors 
Lewis (1986) shows that learners can devise explanations which makes the effects of even 
disastrous errors seem reasonable. As a result subjects would sometimes continue to work 
without any attempt to correct the error 
because they had explained it away. Explanations 
may be an important mediating structure 
in learning to use a system. Explanations are 
important because: 
" The process appears to play a role in the 
failure to detect errors: learners can explain 
satisfactorily to themselves events that may reflect a serious problem. 
" Some sequences of events are easier or require 
less knowledge to explain than others. 
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4.7.1.3 Errors as Opportunity 
Navigation is a cooperative task where learning on the job is inevitable. Errors will occur in 
the distributed task setting due to the need for on-the-job training. Seifert and Hutchins 
(1992) examined learning within a cooperative system. The study involved observation of 
distributed activity in the team navigation of a large naval ship. They concluded that there 
were frequent individual errors but also that successful detection and correction of errors 
occurred. 
4.7.2 Training 
Most people involved in a skilled task will at some point be involved in training others. On a 
ship the Master passes on his knowledge to others as part of the on-the-job training, so that 
over a period of time he passes his experience to junior officers. 
4.7.2.1 Maritime education and qualification 
Examination of seafarers was introduced when most ships still operated under sail, although 
steamships were slowly increasing in numbers. The shipping industry showed considerable 
resistance to the examination of navigating officers in Britain when the concept was first 
proposed during early 
last century (Anon., 1838 a/b). 
Traditionally deck officers would follow a 'time-served' training structure under which the 
trainee was selected primarily on academic criteria. The periods of training and service at sea 
were fixed and the emphasis in the examination was on the knowledge and the ability to 
apply it. Recently there has 
been a move toward 'time-independent' training which 
encompasses mandatory minimum periods of service at sea and the assessment of the trainee's 
competence. This can be established through observation of actual performance on the ship's 
bridge and/or by using a simulator. 
The most valuable part of a future officer's training is considered to be onboard a working 
ship (Brunicardi, 1990). 
The active seafaring community is concerned that substituting 
simulator training 
for actual sea-time may reduce the competence of future navigating 
officers. 
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4.7.2.2 Dual purpose of cers 
Some countries, e. g., France, Germany, Japan, The Netherlands, UK and USA have 
introduced some type of dual-purpose training of officers. This is still a lesser used route to 
obtaining a certificate. Cross (1992) suggests that the term "dual purpose" stands for some 
form of integration of deck and engine department operations. The idea is believed to have 
originated in France in the late 1960's. The main areas of application are in the industrialised 
and developed maritime countries where crew wages are higher. 
4.7.2.3 Continuing training 
There are generally few statutory requirements for additional and/or continuing training once 
the officer has achieved the certification of the highest qualification. The provision for 
additional and continuing training has 
frequently lagged behind the introduction of new 
technology, e. g., when the radar was introduced in the 1950's onboard ships there was 
inadequate provision for training how to use it (Baillie, 1990). Many other industries require 
mandatory continuing training, e. g., British Airways pilots undertake mandatory assessed 
training in a simulator every six months (McGregor, 1994). 
4.7.2.4 Effectiveness of training 
Baddeley and Longman (1978) suggest that retention of training depends on the amount of 
practice per day and the 
length of the interval between successive training periods. Their 
study shows that attempting to 
include too much training into a single session or single day 
is counterproductive. There 
is a limit to how much learning can be accomplished in one day. 
4.7.3 Ship simulators 
Most high-risk industries, especially the aviation industry, use simulators to good effect. 
Flight simulators date to the 
late 1920's (Stark, 1989). In the shipping industry simulators 
have been mainly used for radar and ship 
handling courses. The Radar Simulator course 
became mandatory in the 1960's for those requiring a certificate of competency as First Mate. 
There has been a shift in the marine environment toward carrying out much of traditional 
onboard training using onshore simulators 
(Angas, 1992). Modern type of ships simulators 
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are particularly suited for specific training such as integrated bridge systems and the Watch 
One concept (Habberley & Pourzanjani, 1992). 
Ship simulators have additionally been used for research purposes (as shown in Appendix B) 
and to provide assistance for expert witnesses in courts of law (Corlett, 1993). 
4.7.3.1 Simulator training 
The main aim of simulator training is to impart practical 'situational' knowledge to the 
student in a safe environment. A summary of a study on the effectiveness of simulator 
training concludes that simulator-based training is more cost-effective than onboard sea 
training for achieving many training objectives (Centre for Marine Simulation, 1994/95). 
However, simulator training must also be effective in terms of imparting the required skills. 
All elements of the simulator training system must be considered acknowledging that the 
instructor has the most substantial impact on the effectiveness of the training (Hammell 
et al., 1980). This is acknowledged by Carpenter (1991) emphasising that the instructor 
must have excellent practical skills and 
be good at imparting his skills to the students. 
O'Hara (1990) examined the loss of skills across a nine-month retention period following a 
simulator-based training programme. 
This was developed to enhance the watchkeeping skills 
of merchant marine cadets. The results showed that 
(1) training improved watchkeeping 
skills, (2) skills declined 
during the nine-month retention interval, and (3) refresher training 
effectively mitigated skill 
loss for some skill areas. 
Overskeid (1990) examined the effect of simulator training based on the basic competence of 
navigating officers. The study showed that the group with a 
low basic level of competence 
gained most. The group with moderate 
basic competence improved some, but the group 
with a high basic 
level of competence did not improve significantly. 
In a similar study but in a quite separate 
discipline, DeAnda & Gaba (1991) examined the 
effect of experience 
in anaesthesiology. They concluded that although responses to planned 
incidents improved on average with experience, fewer errors were made by experienced 
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individuals. The study recommends strategies to make errors more observable and strengthen 
the preparation and training of anaesthesiologists to cope whatever situations arise. 
Stark (1989) noted that human perceptual and learning processes are not understood well 
enough to predict accurately the level of information (or fidelity) required to ensure that the 
training has the desired effect. Researchers at British Airways made the assumption that data 
based on a survey following the simulation exercises would be objective. They discovered, 
however, that few students were interested in filling a questionnaire after the training session. 
The researchers therefore requested training captains to highlight after each month's 
simulator work the most common errors and reasons for them (Seaman, 1992). 
4.7.3.2 Classification of ships' simnulator 
Marine simulators can be broadly divided into complete ship handling simulators and PC- 
based simulators. Modern ship handling simulators are typically capable of all, or part of the 
tasks undertaken on the ship's bridge (shown in table 11) (Woodyard, 1997a). 
º Radar/ARPA simulation 
º Ship handling 
º High speed craft 
º Propulsion plant 
" Cargo Handling training 
º Ballast Control training 
º GMDSS and SAR training 
º Communications equipment training 
º VI'S Management training 
. Oil Spill Management training 
Table 11 Shiphandling simulator tasks (Woodyard, 1997a) 
PC-based simulators are becoming increasingly popular, usually offering individual 
components, e. g., collision avoidance and warchkeeping (Woodyard, 19971)). Testing anti 
evaluation of these types of simulators suggest that they can 
he acceptable for complying 
with the provision of simulator-based training as required 
by the STCW'95. 
The shipping industry has 
been concerned for some time that it variety of marine simulators 
are available Laut, as yet, there 
is not an internationally agreed technical specification or 
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classification of simulators (Drown, 1993). Recently a classification system similar to that 
used in the aviation industry was proposed to the IMO (Woodyard, 1997a). This 
classification system includes four categories as follows: 
Category 1. Full mission (total environment, including advanced functions) 
Category 2. Multi Task (total environment, excluding advanced functions) 
Category 3. Limited Task (environment for limited training) 
Category 4. Single Task (a specific subsystem) 
4.7.3.3 The human element and simulator training 
A marine simulator can never completely substitute seagoing experience, mainly due to the 
high number of variables affecting the working environment of the ship's bridge (referred to 
in Chapter 3). Nevertheless, simulators can be useful for training purposes and classifying 
them into the above broad categories is a significant step toward ensuring that simulator 
training in the marine environment will be effective. 
Examination of the studies referred to previously in this Chapter suggest that a simple 
framework for the evaluation of factors affecting the human element in simulator training 
can be proposed (shown in 
figure 19). 
The effectiveness of simulator training is related to the competence of the teacher and the 
course material. Furthermore, the student's level of competence/ experience and type of task 
influences the selection of the most effective simulator category. The student's level of 
competence/experience can be 
divided into three levels (1) Low, (2) Medium, and (3) High. 
Tasks can be divided into three types (a) basic/general training, (b) training aimed at learning 
a specific task, e. g., docking a new type of ship, and 
(c) a refresher course, e. g., collision 
avoidance. 
Finally, a program for assessing the student's proficiency must be developed to ensure that 
the training has been effective. 
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ASSESSMENT PROGRAM 
SIMULATOR -- - 7STUDENT CATEGORY 
COMPETENCE/'\,, Full Mission 
TASK 
EXPERIENCE Multi Task 
Limited Task Basic/General Training I 
Single Task Selected Activity 
Low/Medium/High Refresher Course 
TEACHER TRAINING COURSE MATERIAL 
Figure 19 Factors affecting the human element in simulator training 
4.8 Failure mode analysis and alarms 
Alarms and warnings may have a significant role in assisting the watchkeeper in navigating 
the ship safely in all types of conditions. As a result of an increasing number of electronic 
bridge aids some 30-40 individual alarms may be found on the ship's bridge (illustrated in 
Figure 20). Some are related directly to navigation, such as steering gear alarm or rudder 
angle indicators, others relate to the cargo (low/high temperature or pressure indicators) or 
the engine room. Depending on the type of ship there may also be other indicators, e. g., for 
water leakage detection or watertight 
door positions. 
According to IMO regulations, e. g., SOLAS 1974, and other associated rules and regulations, 
all ships must 
be fitted with specific alarms, including fire and general distress alarms which 
have important functions relating to the safety of the ship and its crew. Personal observation 
and spontaneous remarks made 
during the author's visits to ships suggest that the increasing 
number of alarms on the ship's 
bridge is distressing. 
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1. Halon Fire Extinguisher 
Alarm Monitor (Var. ) 
2. Inert Gas (N2) Panel (Var. ) 
3. Magnetic Compass for Off-Course Alarm 
4. Off Course Alarm 
S. Bow Thruster Control Panel 
Vor. - Over Load Start Failure 
-Control Start Failure 
- Hd'r Tank Low Leverl 
- Hyd. Oil Low Pressure, etc. 
6. Main Engine Control Panel (Vor. ) 
- Dead Man's Alarm 
- Pump Room Fire 
Alarm 
- Bilge Alarm 
(Vor. ) 
7. Steering Unit & Master Gyro 
Var. - Power Failure 
- Rudder Limit 
-Monitor Failure, etc. 
g. Windscreen wiper & heater unit 
9. Radar 1 (Var. ) 
10. Radar 2+ ARPA (Var. ) 
11. Direction Finder 
12. GPS 1 
13, GPS 2 
14. Doppler Log 
1$. Inmarzat'C' Phone 
19. MF/HF Radio 
20. NAVTEX 
21. Sat'C' Phone Ext. Speaker 
22. Sat 'C' Printer 
23. Sat 'C' Processor 
25. Weather Fax Recr 
26. Fax 
27. Rydex (Wan) 
28. Sat 'A' TxI Rx + Phones 
29. Modem 
30. Printer for Wan 
31., 32., 33. Handheld 2-way Distress Radios 
34. Auto alarm HF 
35. Printer 
36. Computer 
37.2 VFH's (Auto Distress Function) 
- 2182 kHz Alarm 
- '-hr watch alarm 
- Morse Code Reader 
38. Echo Sounder 
General Alarm 
Fire Detector Panel 
39. Enginer Room Alarm 
Emergency Fuel Stops 
Fire + General Service P/P alarm + start/stop 
Cargo Tank Temperature Abnormal Alarm 
Steering Motors Alarms + start/stop 
40. Lights - Navigation & Domestic 
Alarm Distribution Panel 
Earth Alarm 
41. Cargo Level High Alarm 
42. Cargo Overflow Alarm 
Figure 20 Schematic diagram of alarms found on a modern chemical tanker (based on 0 
sketch by D. G. Grewal, 1996). 
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The grounding of the Royal Majesty illustrates the importance of the functionality of alarms 
(NTSB, 1997). When the GPS switched over to DR mode, it issued a series of aural beeps for 
a total duration of 1 second. It then displayed continuously SOL (solution) and DR on a 
liquid crystal display (measuring 3" x 3.5"). This display was positioned away from the ship's 
main controls thus making it less likely that it would be noticed and acknowledged. 
A brief review of literature relating to human factors shows that research into alarms has 
been sporadic in most industries and particularly scarce in the marine environment (shown in 
Appendix Q. Research has been mainly carried out in aviation (civil and military), the 
medical field and manufacturing/ processing plants. 
Aldridge, Brooks, Moreton and Smeaton (1997) suggested that to reduce human factors' 
related incidents integrated bridge systems should acknowledge the operator's needs. The 
researchers offer a format for evaluating failure modes and alarms on ships' bridges. The 
authors suggest that alarm information and handling must consider the uniqueness of the 
working environment of the ship's bridge. The grounding of the Royal Majesty indicates that 
an appropriate alarm function alone might have prevented the accident. However, had the 
officers shown pertinent attention to good navigation practices, it is likely that they would 
have realised in time that the ship was off course. 
Alarm analysis and management should be considered as an integrated part of the resources 
on the ship's bridge. Both the literature reviewed during this work and personal observations 
confirm the important premise that alarms must support, rather than distract, the navigating 
officer. 
4.9 Health and Safety 
The working conditions of seafarers, including exposure to injury and health problems, unsafe 
procedures, fatigue, stress and 
inadequate health care are regulated by the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO) (ILO, 1998; Nilssen, 1995). 
The health and safety of the navigating officer may affect his behaviour directly, e. g., falling 
asleep due to fatigue, or indirectly, e. g., 
his attention may be reduced due to increased 
boredom. An outline of health related factors affecting safe navigation are shown in table 12. 
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Current research into the health and safety of seafarers is scarce and irregular. There is also a 
widespread lack of basic data on deaths, injuries and illnesses in the shipping industry 
(Goss, 1995). 
" Exposure to noise, up to 100 db 
" Vibration 
" Thermal stress, exposure to exceptionally high (tropical) or low (arctic) 
temperatures 
" Constantly changing atmospheric conditions during voyages 
" Changes of time zones 
" Air pollution (e. g., dust, exhaust fumes in ferries, toxic vapours or gases 
in tankers 
" Dangerous cargo 
" Work related accidents, injuries, diseases 
" Less physical work, increased mental stress 
" Psycho-social problems, high turnover of personnel 
" Barriers imposed by hierarchy 
" Less contact with other people onboard due to smaller crew 
complements 
" Fewer opportunities to go ashore in ports due to shorter turn-around- 
times 
" Security problems in foreign ports, piracy, wars, strikes, etc. 
Table 12 Health related factors affecting safe navigation are shown in table (adapted from 
Tomaszunas, 1995) 
l91 Working Hours 
Olofsson (1995) examined the changes in working conditions for Swedish seafarers. The 
study examined employing a questionnaire whether seafarers had to work wlicn fatigued thus 
showing a subjective view of 
fatigue (table 13). Most seafarers have had to work when feeling; 
very fatigued. However, the very nature of shipping is such that it attracts abnormal working 
hours. 
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Position 
Master 
Chief Officer 
Other navigating 
officers 
Very often (%) Often (%) Sometimes (%) Rarely (%) 
9 20 56 12 
12 35 39 12 
4 16 58 19 
Never (%) 
3 
3 
Table 13 Have you ever had to work when affected by fatigue (extracted from Olofsson, 
1995) 
The working hours for Swedish Chief officers are higher than for other positions onboard as 
shown in table 14 (Olofsson, 1995). There is reason to believe that this is true on most ships. 
Working hours in the marine environment are essentially unregulated although ILO has 
recently proposed regulations for maximum working hours (ILO 1998) 
Position Working Hours/Week 
Master 68.0 
Chief officer 74.3 
Other Navigating 
Officer 67.2 
Table 14 Average working hours for Swedish navigating officers (derived from 
Olofsson, 1995) 
19.2 Fatigue 
Concern for increasing fatigue and its adverse effects have long been expressed in the 
shipping industry (see e. g., 
Bland, 1990; Drahos, 1992 a/b; Gozdzik, 1992; Marriott, 1993; 
Stein & Hajarnavis, 1995; Torpmann-Hagen, 1995). The main concern is longer working 
hours brought on by decreasing numbers of crew members and shorter port-turn-around 
times. There are at present ships trading within the 
European coastal waters where the total 
crew complement may 
be as few as 5 or 6 persons. 
Fatigue is defined as the deterioration of an individual's performance with passage of time. It 
is associated with tiredness, slowing 
down and making simple errors. The most common 
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reason for fatigue is the lack or poor quality of sleep. The effects of fatigue are increased by 
adverse conditions such as cold, excessive heat, noise and vibration, isolation, lack of oxygen, 
being wet or seasick or being under the influence of alcohol and drugs (Gregory, 1987b). 
According to Kroemer and Grandjean (1997) there are six different types of fatigue: 
1. Eye fatigue: arising from overly straining the visual system 
2. General body fatigue: physical overloading of the entire body 
3. Mental fatigue: induced by mental or intellectual work 
4. Nervous fatigue: caused by overstressing one part of the psychomotor system, as in skilled, 
often repetitive work 
5. Chronic fatigue: an accumulation of long-term effects 
6. Circadian fatigue: part of the day-night rhythm and initiating a period of sleep 
4.9.2.1 Measuring Fatigue 
The extent of fatigue cannot, as yet, be measured with any precision. Tests for fatigue 
according to Kroemer and Grandjean (1997) include: 
" Quality and quantity of work performed; 
" Recording of subjective perceptions of fatigue; 
" Electroencephalography (EEG); 
" Measuring frequency of flicker-fusion of eyes; 
" Psychomotor tests, and; 
" Mental tests. 
These types of tests generally provide indicators rather than measures of fatigue. 
4.9.2.2 Time-of-Day 
Regular changes in alertness and human efficiency occur throughout the day. Studies 
examining the effect of time-of-day on vigilance are divergent. Davies el al., (1984) 
concluded that the time of day affected performance on successive- and simultaneous- 
discrimination tasks. 
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Performance on the simultaneous-discrimination tasks improved with time of day, whereas 
performance of the successive-discrimination tasks deteriorated. Successive-discrimination 
requires that a target is distinguished from a non-target reference represented in recent 
memory, e. g., detection of an increase in the brightness of a repetitively flashing light. In 
simultaneous-discrimination tasks, target and non-target features are provided within the 
same stimulus event, e. g., a disk of a paler hue in a display of several disks. 
4.9.2.3 The effect of sleep 
Studies into the subject of Total Sleep Deprivation (TSD) indicate that the major effects focus 
on the brain and behaviour. The rest of the body incurs very few real problems. At the same 
time there is no conclusive evidence showing that sleep is really restorative for the brain. The 
reason that the brain needs to sleep is that unlike the rest of the body it does not really close 
down when a person is awake. Even when lying down relaxed but awake in a sound- 
dampened and dark room, the EEG shows that the brain remains vigilant (Horne, 1992). 
Research shows that adults can successfully adapt to 1.5-2.0 hours less sleep than considered 
normal (i. e., about 8 hours) on a daily basis, i. e., to approximately 6 hours of sleep. This does 
not mean being more sleepy during daytime or 
finding it more difficult to get up in the 
morning. Such adaptation cannot be achieved overnight but must be accomplished over a few 
weeks. Findings suggest that sleep 
beyond the first six hours is "optional". This type of sleep 
is very flexible. It can be either used, or not, with little side effects. Sleep length can be 
shortened and lengthened within 
limits without adverse effect, given time for adaptation 
(Horne, 1992). 
A realistic simulation for Artillery Fire 
Direction showed that the performance of the subjects 
deteriorated markedly after one night of TSD. Eventually all teams were forced to withdraw 
by 48 hours. This was mainly because the subjects had totally lost their appreciation for the 
tactical situation. The types of tasks particularly vulnerable were those that required revisions 
of preplanned data 
based on new information and keeping updated the "situation map" as the 
scenario changed (Neville, Bisson, 
French, Boll & Storm, 1994). 
Naitoh et al. (1994) investigated the effectiveness of short naps in maintaining cognitive 
function. The results of the study suggest that a 20-minute nap taken every 6 hours, before 
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the accumulation of sleep deprivation, maintains the baseline level of cognitive functions 
necessary to maintain accuracy of performance on the 4-choice task. The naps also helped to 
reduce, but not fully prevent a slower response speed. They also failed to maintain the 
number of responses at a high baseline level. 
4.9.2.4 Lessons from the aviation industry 
The aviation industry introduced in the early 1980's aircraft fitted with sophisticated flight 
management systems and electronic displays (so-called glass cockpits) designed to be 
operated by two pilots. Grieve and Roscoe (1992) examined the relationship between 
workload and fatigue in this new type of working environment. The study was based on 
tiredness scores collected using fatigue rating forms. Predictably the highest scores were 
generally given at the end of night flights. Most of these were preceded by poor sleep. 
The aviation industry has been more progressive than the marine environment, e. g., current 
projects include the "Fatigue Countermeasures Program" carried out by NASA (Fatigue 
Countermeasures Homepage, 1998). 
There are considerable differences between the working environments in the marine and 
aviation industries. A similar program should therefore be initiated for the marine 
environment with the aim to: 
" determine how much fatigue, sleep loss and circadian disruption affects the navigating 
officer 
" determine the impact of these factors on the performance of the navigating officer 
" develop and evaluate countermeasures to mitigate adverse effects of these factors and 
maximise the performance and alertness of the navigating officer 
4.9.2.5 Visual illusions and fatigue 
The navigating officer has traditionally relied on his eyesight to verify images within his 
optical environment. 
He may at times experience visual illusions because the brain can 
misinterpret images sent 
by the eyes. Such illusions could arise in daylight when the 
navigating officer must use 
distance cues or fixed points (perhaps distorted by atmospheric 
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conditions) to identify ships and navigation aids. During the hours of darkness, in coastal 
waters, a ship or buoy can be lost in the glare of background lights, e. g., street or car lights. 
The officer must scan the horizon for other ships and obstacles and focus on any that are 
observed. In an open ocean it requires effort to focus on distant objects since the eyes tend to 
focus on a much closer point. This natural tendency to focus somewhere in the range of one 
to two metres is referred to as empty field myopia (Thom, 1994). 
The navigating officer on a modern ship's bridge increasingly relies on displays providing him 
with information, e. g., radar/ARPA, GPS, ECDIS. During the hours of darkness these may 
emit high levels of light resulting in the deterioration of his night vision. 
Visual fatigue can magnify hazards arising from visual illusions and other problems associated 
with eyesight. Megaw (1987) discusses critically the measurement and definitions of visual 
fatigue concluding that there is a need for improved recording methods and the knowledge of 
oculomotor systems. 
It is important for the marine environment to understand and acknowledge that there are 
problems associated with eyesight that may affect safe navigation. 
4.9.2.6 Boredom 
Dyer-Smith (1993) suggests that boredom and depression are related. His study suggested 
that the tolerance for performing a 
boring task differs greatly. A major problem is to define 
boring tasks of navigation, e. g., a nightly crossing of the Atlantic could be similar in terms of 
boredom to a day sailing through moderately busy but familiar route. 
4.10 Conclusion 
This Chapter has explored the human factors affecting the navigating officer within the 
working environment on the ship's 
bridge. A descriptive memory aid for human factors 
(SHELL) is outlined briefly and it is suggested that it can be utilised in the marine 
environment. 
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This research focuses on the human element on the ship's bridge and consequently only 
human factors relevant to the working environment were outlined, i. e., the design of 
hardware and related information processing, learning processes, maritime education and 
training and communication. 
Communication is a complex issue and safe communication at sea is often assumed to be a 
common natural language between crew members. This assumption was found to be too 
simplistic and consequently the term communication was explained in more detail. The 
relevant aspects of communication were reviewed. It is expected that this will provide a 
useful framework for all aspects of communication at sea. 
Health related factors may influence the behaviour of the navigating officer and increase the 
risk of a collision or grounding. Fatigue and boredom were considered to 
have the greatest 
impact and were examined in more detail. 
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5.1 Introduction 
While the working environment has changed with the introduction of technology on the 
ship's bridge, the human characteristics have remained largely the same. Research into 
human factors on the ship's bridge must therefore look at integrating the best of yesteryear 
with the best of the future, i. e., examine how to exploit human strengths while improving 
and developing technology to support his weaknesses. 
This Chapter focuses on the collection and classification of data relating to the navigating 
officer's working environment as outlined in Chapter 3. Techniques for researching human 
factors on the ship's bridge are examined briefly. The data employed in this research is 
explored and a marine human factor's classification system proposed. 
5.2 Techniques for researching human factors on the ship's bridge 
The main techniques for carrying out meaningful research into preventing collisions and 
groundings at sea are through 
(1) Personal observation of watchkeepers on the ship's bridge, 
(2) Post-accident analysis/statistical analysis of computerised accident records, (3) Analysis of 
voluntary incident reports, 
(4) Carrying out a survey/interview, (5) Designing and carrying 
out simulator experiments, 
(6) Personal logs, (7) Observation using a remote radar 
5 . 2.1 
Personal observation of watchkeepers on the ship's bridge 
Personal observation is a useful, but rarely used technique in the marine environment. It 
cannot be carried out without permission 
from both the shipowner and the Master and his 
crew. From a practical point of view ships' 
bridges are generally spacious enough to afford 
unobtrusive observation. 
Although shipowners increasingly recognise the importance of 
research into human 
factors, it can still be difficult to obtain permission to conduct research 
through personal observation. 
Nevertheless, the author's experience shows that Masters are, 
when permitted 
by the shipowner, generally supportive of inviting independent researchers 
onboard the bridge. 
The main disadvantage of personal observation is high cost due to the time-consuming 
nature of this technique. 
Ships may be delayed, or change ports unexpectedly thus making it 
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difficult to predict the time required to stay onboard the ship. To ensure maximum benefit 
the researcher must stay onboard during several port departures and arrivals. However, ships 
may spend long times in open seas thus adding research time. The main advantage of 
personal observation is that the researcher may observe common types of incidents, relating 
to the same or different ships, e. g., difficulties in finding unilluminated switches in darkness. 
5.2.2 Post-accident analysis/statistical analysis of computerised accident records 
Post accident analysis has been a favoured technique in the marine environment (see e. g., 
Bryant, De Bievre & Dyer-Smith, 1987; Wagenaar et al., 1987). The main advantage is that 
many maritime administrations offer some access to official accident reports. The usefulness 
of post accident analysis depends on the details acquired from the accident report. In collision 
cases the reports may provide specific details of only one ship (e. g., the flag ship). At present 
there appears to be few experienced human performance investigators involved in examining 
accidents at sea. Consequently information relating to human factors may be overlooked and 
omitted from the final report. The reports are generally summarised and independent 
researchers have customarily no access to the initial 'raw' data. 
5.2.3 Analysis of voluntary incident reports 
Many industries encourage voluntary incident reporting. For example, the aviation industry 
has several reporting schemes managed 
by airline operators or government agencies (e. g., 
Feedback administered by the Civil Aviation Authority in the UK). The aim of such schemes 
is to collect ongoing information on incidents that, although they 
did not result in an 
accident, had the potentiality to 
do so. The higher the level of anonymity offered to the 
reporters the more successful the scheme 
is. 
The main benefit of voluntary incident reports 
is that they provide information before an 
accident has occurred. 
This allows measures to be considered which may prevent future 
accidents. The main 
disadvantage is that they are mostly reported in free format and 
therefore may not provide as much 
information as needed. In addition to the lack of trust in 
confidentiality, the nature of shipping also makes 
it difficult to contact the reporter to obtain 
further information after the incident has been reported. Published reports can provide useful 
feedback benefiting the reporter and other parties interested in maritime safety. 
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5.2.4 Carrying out a survey/interview 
A survey can be conducted by developing a questionnaire and distributing it to a select 
number of respondents. Alternatively the researcher may conduct personal interviews. The 
main benefit of a questionnaire is its relative inexpensiveness and ease of distribution, e. g., via 
trade or professional journals, to many respondents. The main disadvantage is that the 
information collected is likely to be limited, because questionnaires are often designed with 
closed questions (yes/no) for ease of analysis using a computer program. Open-ended 
questions are structured, unlike `free format' reports and although they have limitations, they 
resemble personal interviews and thus are likely to yield more detailed information. 
A personal interview usually yields a lower number of responses and may require that the 
interviewer has some level of understanding of the study area. The main disadvantage is high 
cost which tends to result in a smaller number of responses. A major benefit is that an 
interview can lead to further informal discussions indicating other areas of concern. 
5.2 .5 
Designing and carrying out simulator experiments 
Simulators and simulator training were referred to in Chapter 4. Simulators were initially 
developed in the marine environment for training purposes, e. g., to train collision avoidance. 
A well-designed simulator experiment can provide useful 
data on human factors. The main 
advantage of a simulator experiment 
is that lifelike situations can be reproduced safely. The 
main disadvantage is 
high cost which tends to result in fewer subjects engaged in each 
experiment. 
5 . 2.6 
Personallogs 
Personal logs have been used to collect data in other industries (see e. g., Neville et al., 1994; 
Rosekind et al., 1994). These can be useful for collecting data, especially in the fields of health 
and safety. By keeping a 
detailed personal log it is possible to collect, for example, fatigue 
related data, e. g., hours of working, sleeping and recreation. 
These can then be correlated to 
the status of the ship, e. g., whether 
in port, at anchor, under way, etc. The main benefit of a 
personal log is the relative ease of collecting 
large amounts of data. However, personal logs 
are tedious to keep which can 
lead to a difficulty to ensure the integrity of the data provided. 
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5.2.7 Observation using remote radar 
Observation using a remote radar, e. g., VTS, may supply good real-time data. Analysis of 
data collected by VTS provides information relating to a specific traffic area, e. g., the English 
Channel. The data collected may include the number of 'rogue"' ships and other navigation 
incidents, number of VHF messages received/transmitted, number of collisions and so on 
(Clipsham, 1990). The main benefit of remote observation is that data can be collected 
passively over a long period. Thus, it lends itself to analysis of annual changes and other 
trends within a specific traffic area. A major disadvantage is the lack of specific ship details, 
e. g., ship/cargo type. 
5.3 Data collection 
The choice of research technique depends on the availability of financial support and the aim 
of the research. Data 
for this research was collected from the following sources: (1) Personal 
observation, (2) Official accident reports (3) 
The Marine Accident Reporting Scheme (4) 
Database - Databank 
for Sikring of Maritime Operasjoner (5) Survey using a questionnaire. 
5.3.1 Personal observation 
During this research the author was invited onboard several ships sailing in European coastal 
waters. The passages were undertaken on medium size ships and covered most visibility 
conditions, including fog, night, rain and sleet. They included ships carrying hazardous cargo 
and high windage ships, 
berth and lock approaches and inward and outward passages. They 
have included UK and foreign registered ships. 
Only limited informal discussions and interviews were conducted to ensure that no disruption 
was caused during the navigation of the ship. 
Observing the behaviour of the navigating 
officers in their natural surroundings revealed situations that are unique to their working 
environment (e. g., 
false fire alarms or total blackout). Such situations are difficult to identify 
solely through literature reviews, 
discussions with officers or analysis of accident/voluntary 
incident reports. 
LIVERPOOL JOHN MOORES UNIVERSITY 
LEARNING SERVICES 
8A 'rogue' ship is defined as any ship not complying with the requirements of the TSS rules 
(Clipsham, 1990) 
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Talking informally to navigating officers, allowing them to propose areas of interest and 
confirm general beliefs, supplemented information gained elsewhere, and thus provided 
useful background information. Sometimes comments were made spontaneously and 
sometimes prompted by referring to a specific accident/incident, e. g., poor design of a 
particular piece of bridge equipment. Such informal comments reflect the notion that many 
critical observations relate to technology and are common to navigating officers irrespective 
of their backgrounds, training or experience. 
Although research has been carried out on ships' bridges by independent observers (see e. g., 
table 9, page 51) at present there are no specific guidelines for employing this method in the 
marine environment. The main objective of conducting individual observations in this 
research was to confirm incidents documented in accident/incident reports and discussed in 
nautical journals. 
5.3.2 Official accident reports 
The accident reports that were analysed in this research are all official accident reports 
published by various different Maritime Administrations. They include both minor and major 
navigation related accidents. Only complete reports on collisions and groundings were 
included. 
The reports included in this research were provided by the Maritime Administrations of 
Australia, Canada, USA, UK, Hong Kong, Sweden and Finland. A total of 98 reports of 
collisions and groundings that occurred between 1982 and 1996 were obtained (shown in 
table 15). The data represents 58 groundings and 40 collisions involving two or more ships. 
It is difficult to ascertain how well this sample represents the worldwide population of 
groundings and collisions generally, e. g., regarding geographic, oceanographic and 
atmospheric conditions, trading patterns, crew nationalities and ship types. This is because 
there is lack of worldwide statistics on the annual rate of collisions and groundings (referred 
to in Chapter 2). 
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Source No of Reports 
The National Transportation Board of Australia 47 
I 
The National Transportation Board of Canada 24 
The National Transportation Safety Board, US 8 
Hoverikommisionen, Sweden 8 
Marine Accident Investigation Branch of the UK b 
Marine Department of Hong Kong Government 3 
Oikeusministeriö, Finland 2 
TOTAL 98 
Table 15 Breakdown of Sources of Accident Reports 
Additionally the author gained access to unofficial accounts of accident investigations 
courtesy of the North of England P&I Club. These accounts provided original data, e. g., 
copies of statements from several or all the crew members or original simulator analysis of 
events leading to a collision. A 
detailed examination of these accounts suggested that for the 
purpose of situational analysis such 
background data can provide additional valuable 
information generally not present in the final report. 
Problems associated with using data from final accident reports include: 
" They are not uniform and therefore similarity of causes may be difficult to ascertain 
" It is likely that some human factors related information is not included in the report 
" Some reports are less detailed than others 
" In collision cases more information is generally available for one ship than the other 
5.3.3 Marine Acciclent Reporting Scheme 
In 1992 an initiative was taken by The Nautical Institute (NI) to establish the Marine 
Accident Reporting Scheme (MARS). This provides a means for voluntary collection of 'near 
misses' at sea through a confidential reporting system. 
The main objective was to provide 
complete confidentiality to encourage seafarers to send 
in reports. The schema is 
administered 
by Captain R. Beedel, the only person with access to the full reports. The 
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reports include navigation related and other incidents, e. g., dangerous anchorages, problems 
with life boats, etc. (Beedel, 1992). 
The standard of a report varies depending on the detail that the individual reporter provides. 
The reports are further edited to remove any references to persons or ships and they are 
assigned a reference number to allow NI members to comment on reports through the 
correspondence column of Seaways. This could result in the removal of meaningful 
information, although is unlikely to have occurred to any great extent. 
Main disadvantages of the MARS scheme are: 
" They are based on the reporter's view only 
" They are generally composed after the event (sometimes after the reporter has left the 
ship) 
For the purpose of this research 105 navigation related reports published between October 
1992 and April 1997 were included. 
5.3.4 Database - Databank for Sikring ofMaritime Operasjoner (DANA) 
The Nordic9 countries elected to employ the same software to provide systematic collection of 
data on marine accidents. This database, Databank for Sikring of Maritime Operasjoner 
(DAMA) was developed in Norway and has been used for systematic reporting and compiling 
of data on accidents at sea since 1988 (Sjöfartsinspektionen, 1995). Each country investigates 
accidents involving ships flying their own flag and accidents that have occurred within their 
territorial waters. 
The Swedish Maritime Administration (Sveriges Sjöfartsadministration) generously provided 
selected records from their database on marine accidents. These records include collisions and 
groundings that occurred from 1988 until 1993. A total of 739 records are included in this 
study. They include 443 groundings and 296 ships involved in collisions. 
9 Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland and Iceland 
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5.3.5 Survey using a questionnaire 
Time and cost constraints, especially in view of the nature of the shipping industry makes it 
difficult to approach personally an adequate number of respondents. This encouraged the 
adoption of a questionnaire as an instrument to collect supporting data. 
The questionnaire was designed to present most questions as open to ensure freedom and 
spontaneity of the responses thus replicating an interview situation (Q1-Q8; Q12-Q14; 
Q16-Q17, Appendix D). It was accepted that such an approach would be more demanding 
for the respondents and subsequent data processing. 
The number of previous surveys relating directly to navigating officers has been limited. 
Surveys often target all crew members on ships of the same registry (see e. g., Olofsson, 
1995). When the targeted group has been restricted to include only navigating officers they 
may have attended one or a few specific nautical schools (see e. g., Dickens, 1994). 
Navigation, however, is truly international and officers from different backgrounds, on 
different types of ships, etc. 'compete' for the same, sometimes limited, domain at sea. 
Therefore, this research approached respondents in a different way, i. e., targeting only ships' 
Masters but encouraging respondents from different backgrounds. 
The survey was aimed at actively serving officers holding a Master's ticket, whether currently 
in command or serving as chief/first officers. The main advantage is that most officers holding 
a Master's ticket should 
have a certain common level of competence (i. e., STCW '95) 
notwithstanding how long, or whether they 
have been in the command of a ship. 
Thus some common level of competence can 
be assumed, including a minimum amount of 
sea experience. Additionally, 
because of their seniority, officers holding a Master's ticket are 
more likely to be aware/know of significant 
faults/errors that may have occurred on their 
ship. The role of the officer, notwithstanding 
his rank, in this survey will be considered 
primarily as that of a navigating officer. 
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5.3.6 Design of the questionnaire 
The questionnaire follows established guidelines (see e. g., Oppenheim, 1992) and comprises a 
foreword, six sections and a closing statement. The foreword includes notes to the 
respondents, return date and, because of the sensitivity of some replies, a guarantee that all 
responses will be treated in strictest confidence (Appendix D). 
When the questionnaire was prepared there was anecdotal evidence that a number of ships 
operated according to the Watch One trial guidelines although IMO discontinued the trials 
in spring 1995. It was considered useful to investigate how widespread such a custom may 
be. IMO has since changed its position and resumed the trials until December 1997 (Shuker, 
1996). It is not considered that the value of the data will change appreciably. 
It is recognised that the final sample may contain bias due to non-response. 
5.3.6.1 Distribution of the questionnaire 
Although a questionnaire can be distributed relatively easily through distribution channels 
such as trade journals or nautical schools, a worldwide 
distribution aimed at populations such 
as actively serving mariners is hampered 
by the fact that the respondents are difficult to 
reach. The survey was initially 
distributed with the IFSMA Newsletter published in March 
1996. For cost purposes the survey was sent to the various national IFSMA coordinators 
worldwide. These coordinators were then expected to 
forward copies to their local members. 
It was recognised at an early stage that this method might not 
bring in a sufficient number of 
responses. An alternative 
distribution channel was therefore agreed through the Nautical 
Institute. It has a large worldwide membership register and was able to forward the 
questionnaires directly to selected members. 
For distributing the survey through the Nautical 
Institute the section on Accident Reporting/Nautical Publications was removed to reflect the 
fact that MARS reports are published in 
Seaways which is provided to all members who are 
consequently likely to 
be aware of the scheme. 
The response rate remained 
low from both distribution channels. From comments by the 
respondents it became evident that although, 
in both cases 6 months had been allocated from 
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the date of distribution, it was not sufficient time for them to return the questionnaire. 
Therefore, any future survey must allow more than 6 months to return the questionnaire. 
This increases the research time considerably. 
Due to the low response rate alternative avenues were explored through the Internet and 
contacting nautical schools directly. The Internet provides access to people involved in the 
marine environment through the MARINE-list. This is administered by the Canadian Coast 
Guard and provides a forum for discussions on many topics in the marine environment. The 
initial response from list members was good and several offers for assistance were received. 
However, eventually only a few questionnaires were returned. Nautical schools were 
contacted at random in several countries. A few schools responded and only a few responses 
were returned. 
A total of 32 responses was obtained through all the distribution channels as shown in 
table 16. 
No of returned 
Source Questionnaires 
IFSMA 9 
NI 9 
Internet 2 
Nautical Schools 12 
TOTAL 32 
Table 16 Sources of the responses to the questionnaire 
The aim to control the responses failed in that the initial distribution channels did not 
provide enough responses. 
Therefore the responses include only 18 Masters (IFSMA and NI). 
The other distribution channels provided a mixture of qualifications. The nautical schools 
provided mainly 
2nd and 3rd officers and the Internet first officers. In addition to the short 
return time, the 
low response rate is assumed to he clue to (1) the worldwide focus of the 
survey and (2) a general 
lack of trust in the confidentiality offered by the survey. 
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The number of responses provides a useful geographical spread of nationalities thus satisfying 
one of the aims of the survey. The response rate to the open questions was acceptable, 
although not all the questions were answered. This may be because (1) the officer did not 
have any details to report, (2) the officer did not understand the question, or (3) the officer 
did not appreciate its relevance. Some respondents have reported more than one 
mistake/incident. This could be useful for collecting information on specific types of 
problems, e. g., interpreting or operating bridge equipment. At present limited public data of 
this type is available in the marine environment. It is anticipated that the data may provide a 
useful basis for further research into specific areas of human factors on the ship's bridge. 
5.4 Data Classification 
5.4 1A theory ofsafety at sea 
Goss (1989) suggests that there are four approaches to managing the theory and practice of 
safety at sea, namely: 
1. Rely on the expertise of a very talented person; 
2. Bring together a number of experienced and knowledgeable people and rely on the 
resulting consensus; 
3. Rely on the operation of market forces with appropriate modifications; 
4. Make underlying principles explicit, deduce functional relationships and carry out 
sufficient research to quantify various components in terms that allow them to be properly 
incorporated into a safety strategy. 
It is naturally hard to define a 'talented' person or a body of 'experienced and knowledgeable' 
persons and thus the two 
first methods are unlikely to be successful. Traditionally the 
shipping industry relies to a great extent on the operation of market 
forces. 
The final method requires a more scientific approach and involves identifying the effects of 
safety measures, quantifying them 
in physical terms and evaluating them in economic terms. 
It is, as yet, difficult to identify the effects of safety or evaluating them in economic terms. It 
is, nevertheless, suggested that attempting to quantify components that may affect safe 
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navigation is reasonable. Safety at sea is often considered in broad terms, i. e., accidents to all 
ships are examined. The results are likely to provide general answers, i. e., what happened. 
Knowing what happened is mostly sufficient to propose universal changes in regulations or 
technology with view to reduce the number of accidents at sea. 
5.42 Causal analysis ofaccidents and classification of `human error' 
After the event, an accident at sea is generally investigated in an attempt to try and 
understand why it happened. This usually takes the form of trying to describe a particular 
course of events and identify the causes of this particular accident. 
Rasmussen (1990) suggests that the identification of accident causes depends on the aim of 
the analysis, i. e., whether the aim is to: 
" Explain the course of the events 
" Allocate responsibility and blame 
" Identify possible system improvements 
The miscellany of terms used in grouping accidents at sea was referred to in Chapter 2 
suggesting that the lack of uniform classification of the 
data renders it difficult to compare 
studies. Table 17 (see also table 3, page 21) shows a selection of studies and their associated 
causal groupings as defined by the researchers. It is evident that different causal groupings 
have been proposed in different industries. The tables show that the causal groupings are 
generally too broad to provide sufficient 
detail for practitioners to develop accident reducing 
strategies. 
Drury (1983) suggested that causal analysis generally focus on the human element, 
equipment/technology and the environment, perhaps with 
less attention to the task. Task 
analysis is a recognised technique 
for analysing human factors identifying the interaction 
between people, machines and the environment. This technique assumes that the operator 
brings to the task certain capabilities which are affected by age, gender and other factors, 
e. g., ship type and trading patterns 
(referred to in Chapter 4). 
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5.4.3 Classification of human factors in the navigational system 
Leonard and Rajan (1995) recently suggested a classification framework for human factors' 
issues that should be addressed when developing a safety management system (shown in 
table 18). 
º COMMUNICATION 
Open Two-way Communication 
Safety Information 
Incident Reporting 
Maintenance 
º ORGANISATIONAL PRESSURES 
Operation 
Overload and Fatigue 
Selection 
Maintenance 
º PROCEDURES AND STANDARDS 
Organisation 
Design Procedures 
Incident Reporting 
Emergency and Safety 
Deck 
Engineering 
TRAINING 
Team Training 
Emergency Training 
Organisation of Training 
Training of All Personnel 
Specific Training 
º RESOURCES 
Economic 
Equipment 
Safety Equipment 
Maintenance 
º PHYSICAL WORK ENVIRONMENT 
Physical Environment 
Equipment Design 
º ALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITIES 
Organisation 
Change 
Table 18 Outline of human factors to be addressed when looking at Safety Management 
Systems in the marine environment (Leonard and Rajan, 1995) 
Existing causal groupings and classification frameworks are useful for identifying and 
categorising what happened, i. e., the origin and/or type of decision or task that led to the 
accident. From a practical point of view, to 
facilitate procedures to prevent further accidents, 
where it happened 
is considered a stepping stone to further examining why it hafpppenccl. 
Figure 21 shows how the analysis of the chain of events leading to it collisions and 
groundings at sea can 
he divided into three consecutive steps. 
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' WHAT? 
Previous 
classification 
of human error WHERE? 
Detailed 
Examination 
of the 
Navigational 
System 
WHY? 
Stop t+ Step 2 PREVENTATIVE 
Additional 
Research MEASURES 
Figure 21 Three steps to preventing groundings and collisions at sea 
This research focuses on situations on the ship's bridge WHERE problems occurred, i. e., 
situations which may have provided pathways that resulted in a grounding or collision. The 
data sources included in this research are: 
(1) Active, i. e., the origin of the underlying information has been classified before data 
collection. This allows more specific and variable data to be collected. Active sources 
include personal surveys, observations and simulator experiments, or; 
(2) Passive, i. e., the underlying information cannot be modified to conform exactly to later 
classification or categorisation of data. Passive sources include accident reports, 
confidential incident reports (MARS) and other unchangeable data collections (DAMA). 
The questionnaire used in this research was expected to act as a pilot study to learn whether: 
1. Active data can be split into modules that can be integrated into the framework of the 
working environment of the ship's bridge. This would then provide a basis for comparing 
the results of future studies. 
2. There was a willingness to participate in more comprehensive research and if it was 
possible to collect data worldwide. This would result in a more representative sample of 
worldwide shipping, i. e., including ship/cargo types and trading patterns. 
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Passive sources will be used as the primary source of data in this research. The aim is to 
collect comprehensive data to establish a classification system which focuses on human 
factors on the ship's bridge. 
Previous studies have largely focused on elements that may induce 'operator error' thus 
creating an impression that the accident is primarily caused by the operator on the ship's 
bridge. The intention here is to focus on the working environment of the ship's bridge 
acknowledging the complexity of the navigational system. 
5.4 4 Comparison of data collection techniques 
At this stage evaluating the data collection techniques employed in this research against each 
other is not possible. It is nevertheless considered useful to compare them against five criteria 
established by Gurpreet & Kirwan (1997) (table 19): 
1, Comprehensiveness 
Comprehensiveness of data includes (a) accuracy of identifying significant situations and 
problem areas, i. e., those that have most significant impact on risk, (b) the breadth of 
coverage of these factors which relate to ships/cargo types and trading patterns and (c) the 
ability to identify all possible situations and problem areas within the navigational 
system. 
2, Consistency of data collection 
The degree in which situations and problem areas can produce similar, if not identical 
results. Consistency is related to accuracy. 
3. Usefulness of results for understanding human factors on the ship's bridge 
Usefulness of determining situations and problem areas in specifying accident prevention 
measures within the navigational system. 
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4. Resource usage 
Resource demands, i. e., time, manpower and cost involved. 
5. Richness of data in meaningful terms (providing a better understanding of human factors, 
etc. ). 
Personal Observation 
Post Accident Analysis 
Statistical Analysis of 
Computerised Accident 
Records 
Analysis of Voluntary 
Incident Reports 
Survey using 
Questionnaire 
" When the same observes 
Comprehensiveness Consistenry Usefulness of results Resourres usage 
High High- Moderate High 
Moderate Moderate High Moderate 
Low Low/Moderate Moderate Low 
Low Low 
Moderate/ Moderate 
High 
Moderate 
High 
Moderate 
Moderate 
Richness of Data 
High 
High 
Low 
Moderate 
High 
Table 19 Comparison of data collection techniques (adapted from Gurpreet & Kirwan, 1997) 
Table 19 shows that Post Accident Analysis and Survey using Questionnaire can provide an 
attractive balance between Resource Usage and Richness of Data. Aclclitional sources are 
likely to increase the quality of the data. 
5.5 Organising the data 
It was expected that analysing and comparing 
data collected from four different types of 
sources would 
be difficult. At the same time it was considered that including data from more 
than one source would provide a 
better representation of specific problem areas within the 
working environment of the ship's 
bridge. 
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The DAMA data was provided on a diskette and therefore had already been classified. The 
other data sources, Accident Reports, MARS Reports and own survey were classified by the 
author. Each classification scheme is explained below. 
5.5.1 DAMA casualty codes 
The DAMA database applies a generic coding system for causes of all types of marine 
accidents. This coding system is divided into 7 main categories A-G, shown in table O. 
Main Group Definition 
A External conditions (weather, currents, etc. ) 
B Ship construction and position of onboard equipment 
C Technical faults concerning equipment onboard the ship 
D Physical environment and design of equipment 
E Loading, unloading and safeguarding cargo and bunkers 
F Communication, organisation, procedures and routines 
G Human factors 
Table 20 DAMA codes for definition of accident causes (Sjöfartsinspektionen, 1996) 
Each main group has been categorised into a number of' more detailed causes. Table 21 shows 
the breakdown of definitions 
for group G- Human Factors. 
Coding systems, such as DAMA (see also table 17) tend to provide a broader classification 
system which can 
be useful for general statistical analyses of accidents at sea. It appears that 
the DAMA 
data has not been analysed in any depth previously. However, the coding system 
was recently applied to a 
framework for developing an historic risk and validation model for 
European coastal waters (Caridis, Desypris, Panagakos, Psaraftis & Ventikos, 1997). 
Examining the studies referred to previously in this Chapter, it hecame clear that the 
Probable risk reduction measures proposed, 
e. g., improved training, do not state which 
aspects of training should 
he considered. Chapter 3 showed that there are many aspects of 
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maritime education and continuing training. More specific detail is therefore required to 
ensure that any improvements in maritime education and continuing training has the desired 
effect of reducing accidents. 
CODE DAMA definition of human factors (G) 
G02 Insufficient competence for the task 
G03 Poor planning 
G04 Insufficient acknowledgment of available alarms 
G05 Did not use alternative navigation aids 
G06 Did not use available navigation aids 
G07 Inadequate position fixing. Did not plot DR 
G08 Misjudged course/speed/intentions of other ship 
G09 Misjudged course/speed/intentions of own ship 
G10 Tried to carry out manouevre despite unfavourable conditions 
G1 1 Did not stay starboard in the fairway 
G12 Excessive speed 
G13 Special circumstances (illness, fatigue, long working hours) 
G14 Fell asleep during watch 
G15 Alcohol or other intoxicants 
G16 Other circumstances influencing human factors 
G17 Negligent/inappropriate handling 
G18 Inattentiveness 
G19 Human behaviour 
G20 Error of judgement (general) 
Table 21 Additional breakdown of causes relating to human factors (Sjöfartsinspektionen, 
1996) 
5.5.2 Develcýhment ufa marine /ýumýn factors cl issýfication scheme / asecl can 
`Catalysts' 
As previously referred to 
in Chapter 1, in the aftermath of an accident at seit, there is a 
tendency to look 
for someone to blame. This often results in focusing can specific errors, 
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perhaps overlooking the situation or problem area that may provide a pathway to the 
accident. The following summary from an accident report illustrates this point. 
The Malaysian cargo vessel the Alain Tenggiri collided with the fishing vessel the Galaxy early 
in the morning of 6 September 1996 off High Peak Island, Queensland, Australia. The Alain 
Tenggiri was overtaking the Galaxy on a similar course and had the duty to stay clear of the 
fishing vessel. The report into the collision between the Galaxy and the Alain Tenggiri shows 
that they were probably converging at an angle of about 20°(Marine Incident Investigation 
Unit, 1996). 
The report concludes that the 2nd Mate on the Alam Tenggir"i did not make full and effective 
appraisal of the situation and the risk of collision. The ship was equipped with radar, ARPA 
and a separate look-out as required by the COLREGS 72 (Rule 5). Knowing that the 2nd 
Mate did not appraise the situation and risk of collision correctly does not explain why lie 
failed to avoid the collision. The report shows that he was well aware of the other vessel 
approximately 80 minutes before impact. Based on some of the causal groupings shown in 
Table 17 (page 134) the actions of the 2nd Mate could be grouped under causes shown in 
Table 22. 
Reference Causal Groups 
(A) Rule Viol ation/IJse of equipment 
(B) Human Factors and Actions 
(C) Cognitive and Situational System 
(D) Navigational/Situational 
(A) Quinn P. T. & Scott S. M., (1982), The Human Element in Shipping Casualties, 2T 
550/551 /552, The Tavistock Institute of Human Relations, London 
(B) Tuovinen P., Kostilainen V. 
& Hamdldinen A., (1984), Studies on Ship Casualties in the Baltic 
Sea 1979-1981, Baltic Sea Environment Proceedings No 11, Helsinki Commission, 
(C) Wagenaar W. A. & Groeneweg 
J., (1987), Accidents at sea: Multiple Causes and Impossible 
Consequences, International Journal of Man-Machine Studies, 27,587-598 
(D) Wagenaar W. A., 
Groeneweg J., Hudson P. T. W. & Reason J., (1993), Promoting Safety in the 
Oil Industry, Ergonomics Society, 7.1-7.24 
Table 22 Causal groupings of 2nd Mate's actions 
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Table 22 shows that the existing causal groupings provide broad groups e. g., Human Factors 
and Actions. Thus it is not readily evident what preventive measures could be taken to 
reduce the number of such accidents in the future. Following an exhaustive review of the 
data, it is suggested that factors could be classified according to a series of `Catalysts', i. e., 
factors in a chain of events that may provide a pathway for an accident to occur. The concept 
allows one or more 'Catalysts' to be assigned to each accident. This concept is discussed and 
developed in more detail in sections 5.5.3 to 5.5.4 in this Chapter. 
5.5.3 Process of developing a marine human factors classification system 
The process of developing an alternative classification system focused initially on Accident 
Reports, followed by examining whether this system could be applied to the MARS reports. 
The examination of the Accident Reports involved four steps: 
(1) A small selection of accident reports (approximately 20) were initially examined to 
evaluate the level of detail available in these reports. The initial sample indicated that 
sufficient information was available providing detail of specific problem areas on the 
ship's bridge. 
(2) The next step focused on the situation or problem area, i. e., a 'Catalyst' that appeared to 
play a central role, whether directly causative or not, according to the report. The 
'Catalysts' provide specific examples of problem areas, thus adding a third layer of detail 
to a more general classification system as shown by the DAMA coding scheme. The 
situations and problem areas were determined by recording them carefully, rather than 
being derived directly from the conclusions of the report. 
(3) The 'Catalysts' were initially recorded under a number of 'Catalyst' Types (eventually 
16). These were assigned as and when it appeared a new 'Catalyst' Type would make the 
perception of the 'Catalysts' clearer. The resulting array of 'Catalyst' Types provides a 
rudimentary description of general human factors within the working environment of the 
ship's bridge. 
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(4) The 'Catalyst' Types were consequently grouped within five 'Catalyst' Groups to present 
a functional marine human factor's classification system. The components were finally 
coded in a three-layer system and presented in table format (shown in table 23): 
'Catalysts' were assigned a combination of e. g., (Al) Assumed other vessel's 
a letter (referring to the 'Catalyst' Group) intentions 
and a number. 
t 
'Catalyst' Types, were assigned a number 
from 1-16 
c. g., 1 Assumptions 
i 
'CATALYST' GROUPS were assigned a 
letter from A-F 
e. g., A HUMAN PERFORMANCE 
Figure 22 illustrates how the method of defining 'Catalysts' followed a 1)(>tn>m-uh process, 
i. e., examples of'Catalyst' were first extracted from the accident reports and then arranged 
under an appropriate 'Catalyst' Type. These were then arranged within 5 'Catalyst' Groups. 
Figure 22 Defining 'Catalysts' 
based on a bottom-up process 
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The process for examining the MARS reports followed the method applied to the accident 
reports. The MARS reports were, however, initially divided into three navigation related 
categories, i. e., (1) crossing, (2) overtaking and (3) communications. 'Catalysts' were 
extracted using the above method and arranged under the same 'Catalyst' Types and 
'Catalyst' Groups. As far as has been ascertained the MARS reports have not been analysed in 
this manner before. 
The previous process for developing a marine human factors classification system shows that 
problems relating to TSS were evident only in the MARS reports. The author had limited 
access and only a small number of those related to an appropriate geographic area designated 
as TSS (e. g., Dover Straits). 
5.5.4 The marine human factors classification system 
The marine human factor's classification system based on the'Catalysts' shown in table 23 is 
still subject to limitations, as are other classification schemes, e. g., the 
designation is arbitrary 
and subject to the researcher's perceptions and objectives. 
Some 'Catalysts' relate only to collisions (e. g., No collision had both ship's maintained course 
and speed (A2)), others relate specifically to groundings (e. g., Mistook position/land marks 
(A3)). At present, no discrimination is made between types of accidents. It is considered that 
they are all influenced by the working environment of the ship's bridge. 
The 'Catalysts' presented in table 23 must not be considered final. The marine human 
factor's classification system is expected to evolve as: 
" More accident and voluntary incident reports are analysed 
in the same manner 
"A sufficient number of reports are available which will allow 
focusing on specific traffic 
areas limited by physical constraints, e. g., narrow straits, or specific areas within the 
working environment such as 
integrated bridges. 
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GROUP A HUMAN PERFORMANCE GROUP D SAFE MANNING 
Type 1. Assumptions 
Al Assumed other vessel's intentions 
Type 2. Error of Judgement 
A2 No collision had both ship's maintained course and 
speed 
A3 Mistook position/land marks 
A4 Incorrect change of course/Passing too close 
A5 Failed to assess course and manoeuvre of other vessel 
A6 Did not fully assess the situation 
Type 3. TSS (MARS reports only) 
A7 Incorrect heading 
GROUP B ENGINEERING/DESIGN 
Type 4. Automatic steering/Auto pilot 
B1 Auto Pilot /Gyro Error 
B2 Autopilot response affected by external conditions 
Type 5. Bridge/Ship layout 
B3 Restricted view forward 
B4 Position of equipment - Bridge Layout 
Type 6. Manuals/Documentation 
B5 Manuals in foreign language/Poor manuals 
86 Drawings not as fitted' 
B7 Manuals only for individual components, not the 
complete system 
Type 7. Mechanical & Manoeuvring 
B8 Total Black out 
B9 Unexpected manoeuvring characteristics 
Type 8. Technology - Other 
B10 Echo sounder not in use 
Type P. User Interface 
Type 13. Bridge Manning 
Dl WI - Bridge Unmanned/No Look-out D2 Fell asleep - more than one on the bridge D3 W1 -Distraction caused by VHF D4 Long Pilotage 
GROUP E NAVIGATION CONTROL 
Type 14. No Radar Involved - Visual Look-out 
El Difficult to distinguish external navigation aids E2 Failed to see due to impaired vision forward E3 Did not see other ship 
Type 15. Position Discrepancy 
E4 Position not fixed accurately E5 Relied on radar bearings, etc. E6 Using GPS as sole position fixing method 
Type 16. Radar 
E7 No radar parallel indexing used/incorrect use of radar 
parallel indexing E8 Failed to plot course/speed of other vessel/made decisions based on initial data 
E9 Blind sector E10 Did not see other ship E11 Other radar related E12 Radar off 
GROUP F OTHER 
Fl Exhibiting inappropriate lights 
F2 Operational demands 
F3 Pilot did not act professionally (speed) F4 Master did not follow advice F5 Other 
GROUP C BRIDGE PROCEDURES 
Type 10. Bridge Resource Management 
Cl Poor communication between Bridge Team members 
C2 Did not monitor other actions of other Bridge Team 
members 
C3 Masters orders not complied with 
Type 11. Communications 
C4 Agreed manoeuvre (VHF) before near miss or collision 
C5 Did not exchange intormation with other 
vessel/Unable to contact other vessel 
C6 VHF agreement resulted in incorrect manoeuvre/not 
agreeable advice 
C7 VTS did not provide information/advised delay 
C8 Poor VHF transmission 
C9 Use of different VHF channels by different classes of 
ship 
C10 'Different language' 
C11 'Same language' 
C12 Failed to impart urgency 
C13 No sound signals 
Type 12. Charts/Passage Planning 
C14 Poor passage planning 
C15 Failure to use adequate charts/Did not appreciate 
warnings on chart 
Table 23 Proposed arrangement of 'Catalysts' grouped under 16 'Catalysts' Types. 
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5.5.5 Classifying Survey Data 
To ensure complete confidentiality the first step was to remove all information that might 
identify of the respondent, e. g., respondent's and the ship's name. The responses were then 
assigned consecutive numbers and related to the distribution channel, e. g., 01/NI. 
The classification system for the first section (Personal/Ship Details) is based on two coding 
systems: 
1. Numeric, e. g., age brackets, time on ship, number of languages, etc. 
2. Labels, e. g., mother tongue, trading area, ship types, etc. 
The other sections are based on responses that generally can be computed numerically, e. g., 
YES/NO, Yourself/Other Person answers. Additionally the responses provide useful 
information in the form of separate statements by the respondents. 
5.5.6 Evaluation of the data sources 
It was generally possible to fit the 'Catalysts' derived from both Accident and MARS reports 
within the 'Catalyst' Types and 'Catalyst' Groups shown in table 23. This permits one set of 
data to support another set of data. Additionally, a 'Catalyst' Group OTHER (F) was 
adopted to facilitate 'Catalysts' which at present do not fit any of the previous 'Catalysts' but 
are considered of sufficient value to be included. 
The DAMA data was provided on a diskette and thus already classified. Some human factors' 
definitions (see table 21, page 140) are similar to some of the 'Catalysts' or 'Catalyst' Types 
but they cannot be compared directly. Nevertheless, DAMA provides useful supporting 
data, e. g., Time of Day, Light Conditions, Human Element, Steering and Bridge Manning. 
The purpose of the questionnaire data was to provide additional information expected to be 
difficult to obtain through other sources. The questions were presented as clearly as 
practicable, combining answers 
in the same table, when deemed it would provide a clearer 
picture of a specific activity. 
The survey aimed at respondents from different backgrounds so 
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as to build up a 'profile' which would represent not only a 'typical' navigating officer, but 
also reflect different ship types, experience, language skills, flags of registries etc. 
5.6 Conclusion 
This Chapter examined techniques for carrying out practical research into human factors on 
the ship's bridge. As a result five sources of readily available information were chosen: (1) 
Personal observation; (2) Official Accident Reports; (3) MARS; (4) DAMA and (5) Own 
survey using a questionnaire. The process of developing a marine human factor's 
classification scheme from the analysis of accident reports is explained. It is based on 
combining the technique of defining causal factors and task analysis into 'Catalysts'. These 
were defined as factors in a chain of events that may provide a pathway for a collision or 
grounding. The classification of the DAMA data and questionnaire was explained. 
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6.1 Introduction 
Absolute safety in terms of no collisions or groundings occurring cannot be achieved unless 
ships opt to stay in port at all times. This is unlikely to occur and thus the question must be 
whether situations which may result in future accidents can be identified. 
Wagenaar et al., (1987) suggested that many accidents at sea appear to result from highly 
complex coincidences which could rarely be foreseen by the people involved. The previous 
chapters have shown that the unpredictability of accidents is the result of a large number of 
causes and spread of information among the participants. The nature of errors made suggests 
a lack of understanding rather than lack of motivation or inclination. 
This Chapter focuses on data processing and interpretation of the data introduced in 
Chapter 5. The data is presented in table format followed by a brief examination of the 
figures. The DAMA data is presented in section 6.3, the Accident and MARS data in section 
6.4. and the survey data is presented in section 6.5. 
6.2 Presentation of data 
The four sources presented in Chapter 5 provide comparable and supporting information. 
Accident reports and DAMA data represent factual data, i. e., they are based on documented 
accident investigations. The MARS reports represent imprecise data, i. e., the incidents have 
not been verified. These sources provide 
historical data, whereas data obtained through the 
survey represents 'current' 
data. Although this has not been verified independently, it would 
appear justified to assume that 
it contributes toward a valid representation of the mariner's 
working environment. 
The data are presented in a tabular form and are intended to be viewed as descriptive, rather 
than analytical. Until more 
data is collected, it is considered that a visual representation is 
likely to provide the most useful perspective of the role of the human element in the 
navigational system. 
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The data obtained from Accident and MARS Reports are based on the same classification 
system (referred to in Chapter 5, see also table 23, page 145) and can therefore be considered 
in parallel. 
6.3 The DAMA data 
The classification of the DAMA data was explained in Chapter 5. The main grouping of the 
DAMA data shown in table 24 suggests that human factors was attributed as the major 
cause of collisions and groundings. This was followed by external conditions. It should he 
noted that the complete DAMA database includes all accidents, but only those involving 
collisions and groundings were extracted for this research. 
Definition of Main Group 
Human factors 
External conditions (weather, currents, etc. ) 
Technical faults concerning equipment onboard the ship 
Communication, organisation, procedures and routines 
Physical environment and design of equipment 
Ship construction and position of onboard equipment 
Total 
590 
417 
58 
24 
9 
3 
Table 24 Total number of attributed factors for accidents in the DAMA Main Group 
Examining the definitions in the Main Group additional clerail of Causes attributed tu human 
factors are provided, e. g., 18 accidents involved falling asleep during watclhkeeping (table 
25). At present, combining the DAMA data with the Accident Report data is not feasible 
because they include the same period and may overlap. Thus an accident could have been 
rcCOrdc in the 
DAMA data and in the accident reports employed in this research. 
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No of DAMA Definition of Causes - Human Element Code Ships 
Other circumstances influencing human factors G16 145 
Human behaviour G19 130 
Error of judgement (general) G20 64 
Misjudged course/speed/intentions of own ship G09 43 
Inattentiveness G18 40 
Poor planning G03 22 
Misjudged course/speed/intentions of other ship G08 19 
Fell asleep during watch G14 18 
Tried. to carry out manouevre despite unfavourable G10 18 
conditions 
Excessive speed G12 17 
Did not use available navigation aids G06 15 
Negligent/inappropriate handling G17 14 
Inadequate position fixing. Did not plot DR G07 11 
Alcohol or other intoxicants G15 11 
Did not stay starboard in the fairway G1 1 8 
Special circumstances (illness, fatigue, long working hours) G13 5 
Did not use alternative navigation aids G05 4 
Insufficient acknowledgment of available alarms G04 3 
Insufficient competence for the task G02 2 
Table 25 Total number of ships for the accident causes relating to the human element 
The apparently low numl)er (11) of occurrences where the presence of alcohol or drugs had 
been determined may reflect the fact that many ships today are totally 'dry', i. e., they carry 
no alcohol onboard. This could be a result of the grounding of the Exxon V l(lez in April 1989 
(discussed further in Chapter 7) which increased the awareness in particular of alcohol 
consumption onboard ships. 
in addition it should be noted that the figures indicating obvious incompetence are relatively 
low, only 5 occurrences. The figures for 'fell asleep during watch' do not state whether it 
look-out was posted on the bridge. 
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The DAMA data in table 26 shows that many groundings occurred when the Master/Mate 
was alone on the bridge. This could reflect the impact of smaller crews. Again it also appears 
that the bridge was unmanned frequently. 
BRIDGE MANNING COL GR 
Mate/Master alone 43 130 
Mate + look-out 23 30 
Mate + helmsman 4 4 
Mate + look-out + helmsman 3 3 
Mater + Mate 8 13 
Mater + Mate + Pilot (poss. others) 18 25 
Master + Mater + one man (minimum) 12 21 
Master + Pilot or Mate + Pilot 16 16 
Bridge Unmanned 24 13 
KEY: COL = Collisions GR = Groundings 
Table 26 Number of persons on the ship's bridge when the accident occurred 
Table 27 shows that in most accidents the ship was steered manually by the helmsman. It is 
generally considered that a ship responds faster and better to manual course changes and is 
thus the preferred mode of steering in confined areas. 
STEERING COL GR 
Manually by helmsman 101 180 
Manually by Master, Mate or other single 
navigating officer 
14 40 
Manually using remote control 13 15 
Automatic steering 35 44 
KEY: COL = Collisions GR = Groundings 
Table 27 Type of steering when the accident occurred 
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6.4 The accident report and MARS data 
The collection and classification of the data obtained from Accident and MARS reports was 
explained in Chapter 5. 
Applying the concept of 'Catalysts', this data will be examined in three stages: 
(1) the total number of 'Catalysts' within the 'Catalyst' Groups, 
(2) the total number of 'Catalysts' within each 'Catalyst' Type, and; 
(3) breakdown of 'Catalysts' within each 'Catalyst' Group. 
6.4.1 Total number of `C talysts' within `Catalyst' Graues 
The five 'Catalyst' Groups provide a framework for human factors on the ship's l)ridge. Tahle 
28 shows the total number of'Catalysts' extracted from Accident and MARS Reports in 
descending order within the main groups. 'Catalyst' Types may occur only once within each 
data set, or only within one data set. The Group OTHER (F) was set part from the main 
groups. 
CATALYST' GROUP 
Total No of'Catolysts' 
Accident & MARS Reports 
BRIDGE PROCEDURES 134 
HUMAN PERFORMANCE 91 
NAVIGATION CONTROL 63 
ENGINEERING/DESIGN 50 
SAFE MANNING 15 
TOTAL 353 
OTHER 29 
Table 28 Total number of 'Catalysts' extracted from Accident and MARS Reports 
Table 28 shows the uppermost layer of the marine human factors classification system 
suggesting that organising the 
data into broad groups is not especially informative on its 
own. It was, nevertheless, 
deemed useful to group the 'Catalysts' into such broad sets to 
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make it easier to appreciate major problem areas on the ship's bridge. This is because humans 
have a limited capacity for the amount of short-term information that they can receive, 
process and remember (Miller, 1956). These particular 'Catalyst' Groups were adopted to 
show the characteristics of human factors on the ship's bridge. 
The 'Catalyst' Groups can be superimposed onto figure 8 (page 44) illustrating the major 
factors influencing the human element on the ship's bridge. Figure 23 illustrates the 
combined figure. 
IMO 
FLAG STATES 
COLREGS 
STCW 
SOLAS 
COMPETITION 
TRADITIONS 
CUSTOMS 
HUMAN FACTORS FRAMEWORK 
Human Performance (GROUP A) 
Engineering/Design (GROUP B) 
Bridge Procedures (GROUP C) 
Safe Manning (GROUP D) 
Navigation Control (GROUP E) 
INSURANCE 
P&I CLUBS 
MEDIA 
ATMOSPHERIC & 
OCEANOGRAPHIC 
CONDITIONS 
Figure 23 'Catalyst' Groups shown as an integrated part of the working environment of the 
ship's bridge 
(ß. s¬2 Total number of `Catalyst' Types 
'Catalyst' Types were designated broadly to illustrate more precisely the working 
environment of the ship's 
bridge. Table 29 shows a breakdown of 'Catalyst' Types indicating 
the second layer of the marine 
human factors classification system. 
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'CATALYST TYPE' No of AR No of MR TOTAL 
Communications 22 59 81 
Error of Judgement 23 50 73 
Bridge Resource Management 36 1 37 
Radar 33 2 35 
Other 19 10 29 
User Interface 15 3 18 
Charts/Passage Planning 14 2 16 
No Radar - Visual Lookout 11 4 15 
Bridge Manning 12 3 15 
Position discrepancy 12 1 13 
Assumptions 9 3 12 
Bridge/Ship Layout 9 1 10 
Automatic Steering/Auto Pilot 7 7 
Manuals/Documentation 4 2 6 
TSS 6 6 
Technology - Other 5 5 
Mechanical & Manoeuvring 4 4 
Key: AR = Accident Reports MR = MARS Reports 
Table 29 Total number of 'Catalyst' Types 
As expected major prul)Icm areas include Communication, Error of Jud ement and Bridge 
Resource Management. Here it should he acknowledged that MARS reports arc based on 
incidents which did not lead to an accident. 
Details relating directly to problem areas such as the Radar/ARPA or automatic steering have 
not been isolated to this extent previously. This table shows that such data was 
predominantly collected 
from accident reports and thus can he considered factual. The 
categories 'Radar' and 
No radar' should be considered simultaneously. The Radar/ARPA can 
be used to confirm a ship or landmark which has already been observed visually. 
Correspondingly, a ship or landmark which has been observed by radar can often l)e 
confirmed visually. 
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6.4-4 Breakdown of `Catalysts' within `Catalyst' Groups 
Examining table 29 it becomes clear that a detailed breakdown into different 'Catalyst' Types 
still does not provide sufficient information to fully define situations or problem areas on the 
ship's bridge. To show the third layer in the marine human factors classification system 
'Catalysts' were further isolated within the 'Catalyst' Groups' as shown in tables 30 to 34. 
6.4.3.1 Hutgran Performance 
The 'Catalysts' within the Human Performance Group (shown in table 30) relate 
predominantly to the interaction between human behaviour and 'ordinary practice of 
seamanship', e. g., changing course incorrectly/passing too close (A4). 
According to Kalaranta (1992) there appears to be no concise definition of ordinary practice 
of seamanship but lie suggests that it is an abstract term which encompasses the theory and 
experience of all shipboard activities. This term is also included in the COLREGS 72 Rule 2 
(a). It is generally considered either from a practical/ traditional or a legal point of view. 
'Catalysts' AR MR TOTAL 
A5 Failed to assess course and manoeuvre of other vessel 1 37 38 
A4 Incorrect change of course/Passing too close 8 13 21 
Al Assumed other vessel's intentions 9 3 12 
A3 Mistook position/land marks 11 1 12 
A6 Did not fully assess the situation 7 7 
A7 Incorrect heading in TSS 5 5 
A2 No collision had both ship's maintained course and 4 4 
speed 
Key: AR = Accident Reports MR = MARS Reports 
Table 30 Number of 'Catalysts' related to Human Performance 
The most common 'Catalyst' "Failed to assess course and manouevre of other vessel" (A5) 
suggests that collisions can 
he, and are avoided, when the navigating officer on the other ship 
takes evasive action as permitted under 
Rule 2 of the COLREGS 72. 
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Assumptions are often based on insufficient data which may be a result of not knowing or 
appreciating the limitations of navigation aids or not cross-referencing data. "Assuming the 
other vessel's intentions" (Al) or "assuming a position/landmark" (A3) may lead to a collision 
or grounding. Once an incorrect assumption has been made, the risk that all future decisions 
are incorrect is much higher. The longer the chain of incorrect assumptions the more difficult 
it may be to recover the situation. These areas of concern must therefore be emphasised 
throughout an officer's training. 
Although not a unique observation, it should be noted that there are situations where a 
collision would not have occurred had both ships maintained course and speed (A2). A well- 
known example is the collision between the Stockholm and the Andrea Doria in 1956. It was 
concluded that the main cause of this collision was that both officers accepted an inadequate 
passing distance in open waters (Cahill, 1983). 
6.4.3.2 Engineering/design 
Unlike in the aviation industry, ships are rarely designed or built according to a unique type 
or class. Even ships built as a series at the same shipyard for the same owner may differ 
considerably (Anon., 1998b). Ships rarely remain the same during their full working life. 
They are often remodelled to reflect changes in trading patterns, e. g., a ship may be built to 
operate as a passenger ro-ro ferry for a particular route and later remodelled to become a 
cruise ship. Such alterations, and regular equipment upgrades, may result in a great variety of 
electronic bridge aids fitted on ships' bridges. 
Such changes may result in 'Catalysts' becoming linked, e. g., the officer may have to read and 
understand how the navigation aids operate perhaps 
during a total black out (especially if this 
occurs during the hours of darkness when reading a manual 
by flashlight is not recommended 
- personal observation). 
Poor manuals and 'drawings not as fitted' are likely to increase the 
risk of error during such occurrences. 
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'Catalysts" within the Engineering/Design Group are shown in table 31. 
'Catalysts' AR MR TOTAL 
B4 Position of equipment - Bridge Layout 7 18 
B5 Manuals in foreign language/Poor manuals 4 26 
B3 Restricted view forward 4 4 
B1 Auto Pilot /Gyro Error 4 4 
B8 Total Black out 4 4 
B2 Autopilot response affected by external conditions 3 3 
B10 Echo sounder not in use 3 3 
B6 Drawings not'as fitted' 2 2 
B9 Unexpected manoeuvring characteristics 1 1 
B7 Manuals only for individual components, not the 1 1 
complete system 
Key: AR = Accident Reports MR = MARS Reports 
Table 31 'Catalysts' related to Engineering/Design 
An operating manual on its own neither causes, nor prevents, accidents lit sea. Nevertheless, 
if an officer is unhilAe to use the equipment as intended, he may unintentionally place the ship 
at risk. The quality of manuals 
has not peen examined in any detail and as yet, there are no 
human factors' standards available. Manuals may be poorly designed and suffer from poor 
translations which could exacerbate any developing situation. Although modern bridge 
systems are fitted as integrated systems, individual components are often designed anti 
available as separate units. As a result manuals may he provided for each individual 
component, hut lack an overview of the Cal)aI)ilitics of the integrated system. 
Designing a ship's l)ridgc that would he perfectly suited for all navigating olliccrs would [)C 
impossil)lc ("Position of equipment/Bridge layout" (Bi)). This is because each person thinks 
differently and has different anthropornctric characteristics. The increasing mixture of officers 
from Western and Eastern countries may, however, increase the risk of error clue to 
anthropomctric diffcrcnccs among populations of the world. 
Kennedy (1972) suggested that it was customary toi design fier the central 90 percent of the 
f)ohulation in the IJnitecl States Air force, i. e., from the 5th percentile to the 95 pen cu tile. 
For stature this means a range 
from 167.3 cm to 187.7 cm. The same figures for the 
Vietnamese Population range from approximately 15 1.5 cm to a )pru, xiInarcly 169.5 can. IIis 
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research suggests that bridge equipment designed for a Western population may obscure the 
vision of an Asian officer (or other shorter person), and vice versa. 
Good all-round visibility on the ship's bridge is essential for safe navigation. Aircraft are 
generally designed for a specific population, e. g., American citizens, whereas ships' bridges 
increasingly have to fit a mix of populations. The human body can adjust to an inadequately 
designed system. However, poor position of bridge equipment or restricted view forward can 
increase the risk of collisions and groundings (see e. g., 'Catalysts' B3 and B4). 
6.4.3.3 Bridge Procedures 
Table 32 shows 'Catalysts' related to Bridge Procedures. The Master of a ship is in the 
unenviable position of being responsible for the actions of other crew members without 
necessarily being able to ensure his instructions are complied with. Ships may have a high 
turnover of officers and the Master rarely has control of the standards of the training of the 
officers. When an officer arrives on the ship, he may have to familiarise himself with the ship 
and bridge layout while carrying out his normal duties. 
A key to safe navigation is planning the passage from berth to berth (C14) and using the 
correct charts (C15). Ships may have to make sudden port changes and as a result may not 
carry adequate or correct charts. Until recently ships have traditionally carried paper charts, 
which must be corrected regularly. Electronic charts were developed to offer a less time- 
consuming method to correct them and provide assistance for passage planning. These types 
of charts are based on traditional paper charts, e. g., published by the UK Hydrographit 
Office. The benefit of reproducing existing paper charts in electronic format is that they are 
familiar to the officer. As a result the officer can, when needed, more easily change from a 
paper to electronic format. Nevertheless, for a successful transition from paper to electronic 
charts the navigating officer must understand the basic concept of chart work. 
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Idopq 
'Catalysts' AR MR TOTAL 
C5 Did not exchange information with other vessel/Unable to 2 28 30 contact other vessel 
C1 Poor communication between Bridge Team members 22 1 23 
C7 VTS did not provide information/advised delay 8 7 15 
C2 Did not monitor other actions of other Bridge Team 12 12 
members 
C4 Agreed manoeuvre (VHF) before near miss or collision 5 6 11 
C15 Failure to use adequate charts/Did not appreciate 9 2 11 
warnings on chart 
C10 Different language 4 6 10 
C6 VHF agreement resulted in incorrect manoeuvre/not 9 
agreeable advice 
9 
C14 Poor passage planning 7 2 9 
C3 Master's orders not complied with 3 3 
Cl 1 Some language 3 3 
C13 No sound signals 2 2 
C8 Poor VHF transmission 1 1 2 
C9 Use of different VHF channels by different classes of 1 
ship 
1 
Key: AR = Accident Reports MR = MARS Reports 
Table 32 'Catalysts' related to Bridge Procedures 
Electronic Chart Display and Information System (ECDIS) defines it system which is 
acceptable as it primary navigation aid. An ECDIS system should provide full cal)al)ility titr 
chart work, route planning and monitoring (Smcaton, Dinely & Tucker, 199,1). Assuming 
that the officer is familiar with basic chart work and passage planning, using ECDIS systems 
is likely to reduce his workload. However, unless the officer understands the basic concept of 
charts and passage planning, ECDIS will not provide the intended additional safety feattºre. 
Because the ship is displayed on the chart in real time, an officer may l)eceýme complacent 
and neglect to verify the position of the ship using other available means. Ships fitted with 
electronic charts as their primary means of passage planning and position fixing are presently 
undergoing trials approved by interested maritime administrations (Anon., 19971)). 
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A chart also provides information that can assist monitoring the actions of other bridge team 
members. Communication between bridge team members (Cl) and monitoring the actions of 
other Bridge Team members (C2) was referred to in Chapter 4. It appears that traditionally 
each member of the bridge team focuses mainly on his own actions. When a pilot arrives 
onboard there is generally inadequate communication between the bridge team members and 
the pilot. 
Most ships experience delays at some point during their voyages, e. g., the pilot is not 
available when expected. Personal observation by the author suggests that a sudden delay 
raises the navigating officer's stress level, perhaps partly, because the risk of the ship reaching 
a point of'no return' increases rapidly. 
Assuming that being able to contact another ship by VHF would automatically increase 
safety at sea is natural. This assumption has, in part, 
led to the development of transponders 
(referred to in Chapter 4). The 'Catalysts' in the MARS reports in particular (C5 and C6) 
show that contact by VHF may not always provide an agreeable resolution to a developing 
situation. In fact, several near misses and collisions have occurred despite an agreement of a 
manouevre by VHF (C4). 
6.4.3.4 Safe Manning 
Table 33 shows 'Catalysts' related to safe manning (referred to in Chapter 3). Some 
arguments for employing a traditional lookout have been that: (1) the presence of the 
lookout will prevent the officer from falling asleep, and (2) the lookout can wake up the 
officer if he does fall asleep. It should 
be noted that there were four occurrences of 'Catalyst' 
"Fell asleep-more than one person on the bridge" (D2). This suggests that the previous 
arguments for employing the lookout may not 
be as valid as assumed. 
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'Catalysts' AR MR TOTAL 
Dl Wl - No Look-out/Bridge Unmanned 5611 
D4 Long Pilotage 55 
D2 Fell asleep - more than one on the bridge 44 
D3 Wl - Distraction caused by VHF 11 
KEY: AR = Accident Reports MR = MARS Reports 
Table 33 'Catalysts' related to Safe Manning 
6.4.3.5 Navigation Control 
Table 34 shows 'Catalysts' related to Navigation Control. A risk of collision is ... "deemed to 
exist if the compass bearing of an approaching vessel does not appreciable change" (Rule 7 (d) 
of COLREGS 72). Occasionally the officer fails to see the other ship either visually or, by 
radar. It could be assumed that this is mostly due to failing to keep it proper look-out laut, it 
could also be due to "Blind sector on the radar" (E9) or "Failed to sec due to impaired vision 
forward" (E2). 
'Catalysts' AR MR TOTAL 
E4 Position not fixed accurately 12 12 
E8 Failed to plot course/speed of other vessel/made 11 1 12 decisions based on initial data 
El 1 Other radar related 9 9 
E7 No radar parallel indexing used/incorrect use of raclar 8 8 
parallel indexing 
E3 Did not see other ship - no radar 6 17 
E10 Did not see other ship - radar 6 6 
El Difficult to distinguish external navigation aids 2 35 
E12 Radaroff 2 13 
E2 Failed to see due to impaired vision forward 3 3 
E5 Relied on radar bearings, etc. 2 2 
E9 Blind sector on Radar 2 2 
E6 Using GPS as sole position fixing method 11 
Table 34 'Catalysts' related to Navigation Control 
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6.5 The survey data 
The questionnaire and the coding of the data were explained in Chapter 5. The number of 
responses (32 in total) does not allow for conclusive statistical analysis. The aim of the survey 
was to provide additional data and, to this end, the richness of the detail is regarded as 
valuable. The figures have been cross-tabulated when considered constructive to provide a 
better representation of the working environment of the ship's bridge (see e. g., table 59, 
page 175). 
The figures obtained through the survey are presented in tables 35 to 68. 
6.5.1 Personal & Ship Details 
Age Masters First Officers 2nd Officers 3`d Officers 
25-30 143 
31-40 423 
41-45 51 
46-50 4 
>50 5 
Table 35 Age of Respondents 
Table 36 shows that most Masters had more than 10 years of experience, reflecting the age 
figures in table 35. 
Years 
<5 6- 10 11 -15 20 - 25 26 - 30 31 - 35 Certituate 
Master 3 
1st Officer 1 
2nd Officer 35 
Table 36 Watchkeeping experience in years 
3715 
1 
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Mother Tongue No of responses 
English 12 
Bilingual 4 
Other 16 
Table 37 Mother Tongue 
Bearing in mind that the questionnaire was conducted in English it is not surprising that 
most respondents would know English (table 38) although several officers knew more than 
one language. This table also suggests that most of the people who speak English as their 
mother tongue do not speak any other language. 
Mother Tongue Number of other languages No of responses 
English None 10 
English 1 other language 2 
Other Mother 1 other language & English 131 
Tongue 1 other language & other 
Other Mother 2 other languages 4 Tongue 
Other Mother >2 other languages 2 Tongue 
Table 38 Number of other languages known by respondents 
The spread of nationalities in table 39 shows 11 Nationalities of which ? were dual citizens. 
This suggests that it is possible to reach officers from many different countries fier research 
purposes. The number of Korean responses reflects the distribution channel of nautical 
schools. 
NATIONALITY 
Number of NATIONALITY Number of 
responses responses 
KOR 9 CRO 
USA 6 SWI 1 
UK 5 SYR 1 
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Table 39 Nationality of respondents 
Figures for the Certification/Rank ratio in table 40 for the lower ranks suggest that officers 
may have a different (lower) certification than their rank, e. g., 3rd officer employed as 2nd 
officer. This may reflect a linguistic problem, i. e., the respondent did not understand the 
difference between the words. Alternatively, it may validate research which suggests that 
there is an increasing shortage of qualified officers worldwide compelling shipowners to 
employ unqualified officers (Grey, 1997). These figures should also be considered in 
conjunction with figures reported by the annual report of Paris Memorandum of 
Understanding on Port State Control showing that in 1996 a total number of 699 deficient 
certificates of competency were found (MOU, 1996). 
CERTIFICATION RANK 
Number of 
responses 
1st Officer 2nd Officer 2 
2nd Officer 2nd Officer 3 
3rd Officer 2nd Officer 3 
2nd Officer 3rd Officer 1 
2nd Officer 1st Officer 4 
Master 1st Officer 1 
Master Master 18 
Table 40 Certification/Rank ratio 
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The figures in table 41 suggest that on more than half of the ships crew members use at least 
two languages. 
NUMBER OF CREW MEMBERS ON THE SHIP 
Number of < 10 11-15 16-20 21-25 26-30 > 31 > 100 TOTAL languages 
1133119 
21441 10 
3121116 
4112 
>5 1113 
Table 41 Number of different languages spoken/Number of crew members on the ship 
It appears from table 42 that most of the officers have spent less than 12 months on their 
current ship. There is a risk that the officers may not he sufficiently familiar with the ship 
should a critical situation occur. This is particularly important should there be a serious 
incident which requires team work from the whole crew, e. g., a fire. 
Number of TIME ON SHIP responses 
<6 Months 11 
6-12 months 7 
1-5 years 8 
>5 years 4 
Table 42 Period on present ship 
Coastal trading is characterised by short voyages and short port-turn-around times. This 
creates a very intensive work schedule and could increase fatigue. Deep-sea trading may offer 
some relief during voyages crossing 
large bodies of water, e. g., the Atlantic. Although 
navigation duties may 
be less demanding 
, there 
is an increased risk of boredom. Arriving 
into an area of high density traffic, e. g., the English Channel, will also require a mental 
readjustment to cope with 
increased traffic Increasing (lie risk of error. 
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TRADING AREA 
Coastal 
Deep Sea 
Deep Sea/Coastal 
Table 43 Trading Area 
Table 44 includes 14 different ship types, including a pipe laying vessel, tug and utility 
vessel. These ship types reflect, among others, the physical environments of the trading areas, 
e. g., port specialisation and vessel manoeuvrability. 
SHIP TYPE Number of SHIP TYPE Number of responses responses 
Oil tanker 7 Forest Product 1 
Container 6 Car Carrier 1 
Bulk Carrier 5 LPG Carrier 1 
Passenger 2 Chemical Tanker 1 
Ro-Ro 2 Pipe laying 1 
Semi-Submersible 1 Container/Ro-Ro 1 
Tug 1 Utility Vessel 1 
Table 44 Ship types 
Table 45 suggests that the flag of registry does not necessarily indicate the standard of the 
crew members. It should also not be assumed that all officers from non-traditional maritime 
countries are poorly trained, or indeed trained in their country of origin. 
RESPONDENT REGISTRY OF SHIP Number of NATIONALITY ships 
Non Traditional FOC 12 Maritime Country 
Traditional Maritime FOC 7 Country 
Non Traditional Traditional Maritime 
Maritime Country Country 1 
Traditional Maritime Traditional Maritime 19 Country Country 
Table 45 Nationality of officer versus flag of ship 
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6.5.2 Man-machine interface and Equij-)ment Failure/manuals 
The first two questions in the section covering Man-machine interface were modelled on 
research carried out by the Engineering Division of the United States Air Force in 1947 (Fitts 
& Jones 1947 a/b). Fitts and Jones suggested that it would be possible to eliminate many so 
called "pilot-error" accidents by designing equipment according to human requirements. 
A careful literature review indicated that such studies in the shipping industry are not 
available to the public. It was therefore considered that the questionnaire should include 
these two questions. Considering the nature of shipping, e. g., the lack of uniform design of 
ships' bridges and navigation aids, it was not expected that sufficient data could be collected 
through this survey, to make firm conclusions. Nevertheless, based on this research, a future 
larger scale study is likely to yield the required information. Such data could provide the basis 
for improved, user-centred guidelines for the design of controls, displays and alarms of 
electronic bridge aids. 
The third question examined the number of mistakes caused by language difficulties. This 
was included to reflect the common assumption that the lack of a common native language 
may result in mistakes. 
6.5.2.1 Ql Any mistakes reading or inte, jreting bridge equipment 
Any mistakes reading or No of Total No of 
interpreting bridge equipment responses responses 
NO 14 14 
Both 2 
Other 13 18 
YES Person 
Yourself 3 
Table 46 Mistakes in reading or interpreting equipment 
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Table 47 shows that mistakes are generally made only once or twice, suggesting perhaps that 
the operator 'learned' from his mistake. 
Number of times mistake No of 
was reported responses 
1-2 8 
3-5 4 
Many 2 
Table 47 Number of reported mistakes in reading or interpreting bridge equipment 
Table 48 suggests that navigating officers frequently make mistakes, particularly when 
reading or interpreting the radar/ARPA. 
TYPE OF EQUIPMENT Number of responses 
RADAR/ARPA 12 
OTHER TECHNOLOGY 5 
Table 48 Type of Bridge Equipment 
6.5.2.2 Q2Any mistakes rrý oJe; /1irrýýnry Griýl{e eynr/ýýiie»t 
Any mistakes in operating any No of Total No of 
bridge equipment? responses responses 
NO 13 13 
Both 
Other 
YES Person 
Yourself 
2 
13 18 
3 
Table 49 Mistakes in operating bridge equipment 
Table 5(1 suggests that Radar/ARPA and GPS appear to attract most prOl)lems when 
operating 
bridge equipment. (iPS has increased in I)opularity and is now common on many 
commercial ships. 
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TYPE OF EQUIPMENT Number of 
responses 
Rad a r/ARPA 7 
GPS 6 
OTHER TECHNOLOGY 6 
Table 50 Type of Bridge Equipment 
How many times did it No of 
occur? responses 
1-2 9 
3-5 4 
>6 4 
Table 51 Number of times of making mistakes in operating bridge equipment 
6.5.2.3 Q, i Number (if miii. rtake. r <<uirrr/ by di/firnltic"i 
Mistakes caused by misinterpretation were reported by approximately 50% of the 
respondents (table 52). To determine who made the mistake is not necessarily simple, i. e., it 
is a matter of interpretation. For example, a situation may develop where person A aSSUI11eS 
that person B has done as expected and acts accordingly. 
Number of mistakes caused by No of Total No of 
language difficulties responses responses 
NO 14 14 
Both 3 
YES Other 
15 
Person 12 
Table 52 Mistakes caused by language difficulties 
Languages involved: 
7 responses of 2 
Languages involved, of which one English 
1 response of two 
languages involved, neither English 
3 responses of three languages involved 
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Obviously the more languages are involved the greater the likelihood that even simple 
instructions may be misunderstood. 
6.5.2.4 Q4 Failure of any bridge equipment 
Failure of any bridge 
equipment? 
NO 
YES 
No of 
responses 
6 
26 
Table 53 Failure of bridge equipment 
Table 54 shows the type of equipment that failed. In comparison, the figures for Haapio's 
study (1991) presented in table 55 shows the responses to the question whether the pilot had 
experienced equipment failure that greatly affected the manoeuvrability of the vessel. This 
study focused on the training requirements for Finnish marine pilots. 
Number of 
Failures as % 
TYPE OF EQUIPMENT responses 
TYPE OF EQUIPMENT number of 
responses 
Radar/ARPA 13 Radar/ARPA 51% 
GPS 7 Rudder 40% 
Gyro 4 Gyro 44% 
OTHER TECHNOLOGY Main Engine 59% 
These figures do not add up to 100%) os more thus 
one type of equipment was recorded in many cases. 
Table 54 Bridge aid failure types Table 55 Bridge aid failure types from 
Haapio's study (1991) 
Not surprisingly equipment cannot always 
he repaired cluring the voyage as shown in 
table 56. This could 
be, e. g., because: (1) the crew members are unable to diagnose the 
problem, (2) the ship may not carry spare harts, e. g., chip or moýrherl)o>ards or 
(3) the ship 
sloes not carry crew members proficient 
in repairing the equipment. 
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Was it repaired during No of 
the voyage? responses 
NO 18 
YES 14 
Table 56 Experience of bridge aid repair 
Table 57 suggests that basic seamanship and manual navigation skills are still required on 
modern ships. Traditional navigation is more labour intensive and the possibility of 
equipment failure should be considered when approving the safe manning certificate. It 
should also be noted that initial navigation skills acquired through basic training can 
deteriorate quickly unless practised regularly. 
Reversion mode used 
No of 
responses 
Other Radar 4 
Other ARPA 3 
Magnetic compass 2 
Manual Entry 2 
Other methods 6 
Table 57 Reversion mode for bridge aid failures 
6.5.2.5 Q5- Q7Manualr 
Table 58 shows that most of the respondents consider that they have sufficient information to 
operate the equipment. The respondents who have had to consult manuals tu operate 
equipment mostly found that these may be difficult to use or understand. The quality and 
case of understanding manuals is perhaps more important at sea where there may be no mit 
to ask for clarification. 
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UNDERSTANDING MANUALS NO YES 
Do you have sufficient information to operate all bridge 4 28 
equipment? 
Do you fully understand the manuals? 9 23 
Have you consulted manuals? 8 24 
Were the manuals easy to use? 10 11 
Table 58 Understanding manuals 
6.5.2.6 Q 8Meino; y Anly 
Most people use some type of memory aids, e. g., post-it notes, in their daily lives to remind 
them of what to do, or perhaps not to do. On ships' bridges such memory aids may be 
regular instructions, e. g., Master's Standing Orders. Alternatively, memory aids can he used 
to assist in operating equipment, c. g., check lists. 
Personal observations by the author during ship visits suggest that officers may also create 
lists and diagrams on laminated boards that can be wiped clean and reused repeatedly. On 
one ship the crew kept a continuous record of ship movements provided by the VTS. On 
another ship the crew had laminated a diagram of the 31 shipping forecast zones around the 
British Isles. They recorded onto it tape the shipping forecast broadcast by the 1313(. Finally 
they marked visually the wind speed and direction using arrows (and letters) and numbers (in 
knots). This provided the next watchkecpcr with it quick visual reference of the weather 
forecast. 
An example of a memory aid to the Master's Standing Orders is shown in Figure -)-I. It was 
displaye, Iona car carrier with a Japanese Master and Filipino crew. It is corn hlctcIy 
understandable to any navigating officer despite not being; grammatically correct English. Its 
'comic' content and being displayed prominently can the ship's bridge is likely to be more 
effective than just the written 
Standing Orders. 
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Don't hesitate to call Captain 
whenever you feel danger, any 
doubt & uneasiness, also when 
happened any trouble. 
1. A sharp look-out. 
Signal to attract attention. 
Signal to attract attention 
Bumper catch 
-- __ _ 
Bbööö! !- 
nýY 
, Oh, so many Y. 
fishing boats! 
2. Call Captain at once. 
(1) Poor visibility. 
(2) Look at many fishing boats. 
Increase wind waves. (3) 
(4) Danger, Any doubt & Uneasiness. 
`. 
\b 
\4 Oi 7tt I : r. ; ', " ý"O 
Q c< 
vas 
_- 
r 
fl 
cam: --- 
Any trouble. 
Figure 24 Example of a memory aid (provided by Captain W. J. Corbett, 1998) 
17i 
6.5.3 Accident reporting 
Incident reporting is presently attracting increasing attention in the shipping industry, e. g., 
the IJSCG is currently developing a national Incident Reporting System (Docket 
Management Facility, 1998). MARS is the only international voluntary reporting scheme at 
present. Many IFSMA members are also members of the Nautical Institute and therefore are 
expected to be familiar with the scheme. The consensus of the respondents is that officers 
should be encouraged to send in voluntary incident reports (table 59). 
Should officers be 
Have you heard of MARS? Have you sent in a report? encouraged to send in 
reports? 
SOURCE YES NO YES NO YES NO 
IFSMA 81179 
Internet 111 
Nautical 
Schools 8516 10 
Table 59 Knowledge of MARS 
6.5.4 Simulator Training 
6.5.4.1 Q12 Have you undertaken simulator training? 
Have you undertaken No of 
simulator training? responses 
NO 4 
YES 28 
Table 60 Previous simulator training 
3 
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TYPE OF COURSE Number of 
responses 
ARPA/Radar 17 
Collision Avoidance 
Ship handling 5 
Other courses 4 
Table 61 Simulator course types 
TYPE OF COURSES Number of SIMULATORS ARE BEST 
USED FOR responses 
BRM/Ship handling 8 
Radar/ARPA -4 Collision Avoidance 
Other courses 3 
Table 62 Principal applications for simulators 
6.5.5 Ql5 How often . rl_iotrltl refi"e. ilhei" . rimrrtrl itor e oui e. i 
iii i oI/n. rion avoidance be inn/ertýrkeu 
Table 63 suggests that refresher courses should be undertaken every 3 to 4 years. This differs 
somewhat from Haapio's study (1991) suggesting that ship handling anuses should be 
arranged for pilots every 2-3 years. 
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How often should refresher 
simulator courses in 
collision avoidance be Number of 
undertaken? responses 
Once a year 5 
Every 2 years 1 
Every 3 years 7 
Every 4 years 7 
Every 5years 4 
No need 3 
Other 3 
Table 63 Interval between collision avoidance refresher courses 
6.5.5.1 Q15 How Long should it be 
Table 64 suggests that the length of the simulator course should he approximately 2--3 days. 
This is slightly shorter than Haapiu's study (1991) suggested for steil) handling courses. Ship 
handling and collision avoidance require similar, but not identical, training. 
Most important, however, respondents generally agreed on the necessity for refresher courses 
in Radar/ARPA and collision avoidance. 
How long should it be? 
Number of 
responses 
l day 1 
2 days 8 
3 days 10 
>_ 5 days 8 
None 2 
Other 1 
Table 64 Length of simulator course 
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65.6 Radar/ARPA 
6.5.6.1 Q16 Which radar/ARPA rotmr: re heading do ), oiI prefer? 
The basic features of the radar/ARPA are course heading (orientation) and mode 
(stabilization). Figure 25 shows that the radar/ARPA screen provides a different image to the 
human eye depending on the selected course heading and mode. The significant feature for 
the eye is whether the screen corresponds with the wheelhouse window view or the chart. The 
selection Of a course heading is generally based on personal preference which may be based on 
initial training. 
Ship's head up True north up (unstobilized) (stobilized) 
000 000 
ýP 
270 0"0 2/0 
L 
090 
180 180 
Course up 
(stabilized) 
000 
I_ Nonh rnurkar 
270 
180 
090 
ORIENTATION 
Ship's hrorl up, True noa h up, Course up, Feature 
uns/abilizod stabilized slobilizod 
Blurring when observing vessel 
Yes: can produce very None None 
yaws or alters course 
serious masking 
Measurement of bearings Awkward and slow Straightforward Straightforward 
Compatibility with reflection 
Very limited Straightforward Straightforward 
plottter i 
Ang ular disruption of target 
Yes: can be dangerously None None 
trails when observing vessel misleading 
yaws o alters course 
ds with wheelhouse Corresponds 
Virtually perfect . -pt after Not Obvous large course change 
window view 
corresponds with chart Not obvious Perfect Not obvious 
Figure 25 Comparison of radar course headings (derived from Role et al., 1992) 
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Vessel a 
Heading: 135° (T) 
Speed: Stopped in 
water 
Vessel b 
Heading: 255° (T) 
Speed: 15 knots 
Island c 
Tide 
Set: 135 ° (T) 
Rate: 5 knots 
Observing vessel 
Heading: 045° (T) 
Speed: 15 knots 
000 
090 270 
True Motion, sea stabilized presentation 
KEY FACTS 
The echo of a stationary target in the water 
remains stationary on the screen 
The echo of a moving target through the 
water will move across the screen in a 
direction and rate which corresponds with its 
motion through the water 
The echo of a land target or a target at anchor 
will move across the sceen in a direction 
reciprocal to that of the tide, at a rate equal to 
the tide 
000 
090 
True Motion, ground stabilized presentation 
KEY FACTS 
The echo of a stationary target in the water will 
move across the screen in a direction and at a rate 
corresponding of that of the tide 
The echo of a moving target through the water will 
move across the screen in a direction and rate which 
corresponds with its movement over the ground. 
The echo of a land target or a target at anchor, will 
remain stationary on the screen 
Figure 26 Comparison of sea and ground stabilized presentation (derived from Bole et at., 
1992) 
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Which course heading do you No of 
prefer? responses 
Course Up 2 
Ship's Head Up 3 
True North 26 
Table 65 Radar course orientation 
6.5.6.2 Q17 ll'ýhiclýranla//3 RPl1 ii ro cle do on prefer 
The radar/ARPA picture presents the movement of echoes with respect to a chosen reference. 
The amount of information that can be obtained by viewing such echo movement as 
indicated by the afterglow trails is limited. To fully appreciate an encounter with other 
vessels, systematic observation of detected echoes is essential. However, picture presentation 
can assist by providing an image that the human eye can appreciate correctly immediately. 
The significant difference between ground and sea stabilization is that a ground stabilized 
presentation does not display the headings of moving targets. This is illustrated in figure 26 
and it should be noted that in a ground stabilized presentation the echo movement will not 
indicate the heading of a moving target. This is an essential information required to apply the 
COLREGS 72 correctly (Bole et al., 1992). 
The possibility of superimposing ECDIS and radar/ARPA pictures has resulted in discussions 
on whether ground stabilization, the natural presentation mode for ECDIS or sea 
stabilization, the natural radar/ARPA mode for collision avoidance decision making should be 
employed (see e. g., Deutsche Gesellschaft für Ortung und Navigation, 1993; Smeaton it al., 
1994). Nevertheless, it has generally been accepted that a sea stabilized presentation reduces 
the risk of collision. The survey shows that the preferred mode of presentation is sea 
stal)ilized (table 66). Accident reports do not generally include infirrmation on what mode the 
radar/ARPA displayed and it is thus not possible at present to assess to what extent the in(xle 
of presentation may have induced a collision or grounding. 
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Which mode do you prefer to No of responses 
use? 
Both 3 
Ground Stabilized 5 
Sea Stabilized 16 
Table 66 Preferred mode 
6.5.7 Watch One 
Although IMO has so far only approved trials for the evaluation of the Watch One concept, 
it should he noted that classification societies continue to approve Watch One ships (DNV, 
1998). It is expected that the numher of approved Watch One ships will increase in the 
future and it is thus appropriate to continue to explore the safety of the Watch One concept. 
Is the ship 
designed/classified as Is it operated as W1? 
WI? 
NO 27 25 
YES 
Don't know 
Table 67 Classification of ship 
45 
Table 33 (page 162) suggests that a dedicated look-()Lit does not necessarily increase tltc 
safety of the ship, 
i. e., prevent the accident. During normal navigation duties can aWI hrid, ie 
the workload of the navigating officer may be too low to fully occupy an additional person. 
The increasing complexity of modern navigation aids, together with new or additional duties, 
e. g., GMDSS, may on the other 
hand, at times increase the workload sul)stantially. 'I'lius 
there may not 
be a demand for a dedicated look-out but for supplementary navigation 
assistance available when needed. 
For instance, during a black out orte person is needed to 
concentrate on the navigation of the ship and another person (e. g., the Master) to examine 
the situation and 
determine subsequent actions. 
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How often is it operated as 
W1? Number of responses 
Never 1 
Occasionally 5 
Regularly 3 
Table 68 Typical operation of ship 
6.6 Conclusion 
The data presented in this Chapter should he viewed as cogwheels interacting within a 
complex and imperfect system. Thus any changes, e. g., the introduction of new rules will 
affect other areas of the system, e. g., training, design Of user-interfaces and manuals. 
The DAMA data confirmed the need for exploring an alternative classification system in the 
marine environment which focuses on human factors. The data was presented in table format 
followed by a brief examination of the figures. The data from the Accident and MARS reports 
were considered as primary data and in parallel and the DAMA and questionnaire data was 
considered supporting data. Each set of data provides a uniciue insight into the various 
components of the working environment of the ship's bridge. 
It was concluded that organising the primary data only into broad groups or categories would 
provide limited practical value. Consequently, the 'Catalysts' from the Accident and MARS 
reports were broken 
down within the main groups (tables 30 to 3l) providing the basis l>r a 
three-layer classification system. This data is intended to be viewed as descriptive rather than 
analytical. 
Since it was established that the questionnaire would provide primarily supporting data the 
figures were shown in a tabular firm. It is suggested that the data provides an improved 
representation of the working environment on the ships 
bridge. 
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7.1 Human Factors and Safety at Sea 
The employment of seafarers is increasingly transient, for example, the navigating officer 
employed on Ship A today may be employed on Ship B tomorrow bringing his training, skills 
and experience with him. The role of human factors on the ship's bridge is expected 
increasingly to affect the shipping industry worldwide. 
The data presented in Chapter 6 was largely considered in isolation within the proposed 
marine human factors' framework, i. e., Human Performance, Engineering/Design, Bridge 
Procedures, Safe Manning and Navigation Control. The main objective was to examine 
whether meaningful information in form of 'Catalysts' could be isolated from a combination 
of data sources. However, contemplating the results within the broader context of the 
working environment of the ship's bridge seems appropriate. 
In this exploratory study, a summary of typical 'Catalysts' is expected to provide an improved 
indication of the most relevant problem areas within the working environment of the ship's 
bridge. These 'Catalysts' will continue to develop and may be modified following any changes 
in the working environment, e. g., High Speed Ships (HSS) or changes in the COLREGS 72. 
The aim is to develop awareness of the 'Catalysts' and how they affect the navigating officer. 
The objective, at this stage, is to encourage further research thus ensuring that the human 
element does not invalidate the intended effect of remedial proposals (e. g., introducing new 
technology or rules/regulations). 
The focus of this research is to develop a marine human factors classification system which 
will improve future analysis of collisions and groundings. It is expected that the increased 
knowledge provided by the detail of human factors in form of 'Catalysts' can additionally, for 
example, be applied to examine 'human error' on the ship's bridge and improve the IMO rule 
making process (e. g., re-examining the Watch One concept). 
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7.2 Applying the Marine Human Factors Classification System to the analysis 
of collisions and groundings 
The 'Catalysts' (referred to in table 23, page 145) form the basis of the marine human factors 
classification system proposed in this research. The 'Catalyst' concept focuses on situations 
and problem areas on the ship's bridge and provides a method for collecting human factors 
data systematically from accident reports. Although the resulting marine human factors 
classification system would be specific to the working environment of the ship's bridge it 
would be expected that the principle could be employed for the examination of other types of 
accidents. 
The 'Catalysts' grouped within specific 'Catalyst' Types were derived through isolating the 
immediate chain of events culminating in the accident. 'Catalysts' are not considered a 
feature of an isolated event but arise from the context of the working environment. 
The classification system provides a recording technique that describes human factors in a 
more functional manner. 
To illustrate the advantages of the Marine Human Factors Classification system the 
groundings of the Exxon Valdez and the Sea Empress are examined as case studies. A significant 
characteristic of both groundings is that the period from the moment of 'no return' to the 
impact is very short, only approximately 20-25 minutes. 
Case Study: The Exxon Valdez 
The grounding of the Exxon Valdez (NTSB, 1990) attracted worldwide attention from the 
media, much of which focused on the master of the ship. The fully laden U. S. oil tanker the 
Exxon Valdez grounded on Bligh Reef in Prince William Sound, Alaska on March 24,1989 
resulting in the largest oil spill in U. S. history. The official report published 
by the National 
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) argued, among other things, that the intoxication of the 
master was a major factor in causing the accident. This notion was based essentially on the 
results of speech analysis. The report and the ensuing media attention are likely to have 
ensured that in the public mind the blame remains with the master (Faith, 1998). 
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It is not intended here to argue the merits of the technique of speech analysis for the 
determination of possible intoxication, nor to criticise a very comprehensive and thorough 
report, but to examine factors affecting the human element that perhaps received less 
attention. There is, for example, another possible explanation to the master's speech patterns, 
i. e., that it resulted from a deep emotional shock caused by the grounding itself, particularly 
as the master was not onboard the bridge at the time immediately before the grounding. 
Consequently, his performance is likely to have had a lesser, direct effect, on the outcome of 
the events. This fact does not exonerate his behaviour, but draws attention to other factors 
which may also be relevant, e. g., why did he feel sufficiently confident to leave the third mate 
in charge? It should be noted that the third mate had served 6 trips on the Exxon Valdez with 
this master and one trip with a relief master. He had also served previously about two years 
as third mate on five other Exxon vessels. 
Other data extracted from the Exxon Valdez report shows that the Vessel Traffic Centre 
(VTC) agreed to the diversion from the traffic lanes to avoid ice which eventually led to the 
grounding on Bligh Reef. This was an accepted practice as evidenced by the tankers, the Arco 
Juneau and the Brooklyn, which deviated around the ice, the evening before and the same 
morning, respectively. 
Examination of the interaction of the human element and the steering control system of the 
ship is considered essential from a human factor's point of view. The Exxon Valdez was 
equipped with a centralised multi-computer integrated steering control system. Four steering 
modes were available: (1) Helm, or hand steering (2) Gyro, or automatic pilot (3) NAV mode 
and (4) Rate-of-turn mode. 
The main events leading to the grounding are summarised in Table 69. The summary shows 
that the total time from when the master left the bridge until the grounding was only 
approximately 20-25 minutes. 
A simple human factors' analysis of the summary indicates that there are at least two possible 
reasons for the third mate's inability to bring the vessel safely around the ice: (1) he began the 
swing to starboard too 
late, or (2) that the autopilot was still engaged and therefore the 
helmsman's application of the helm did not engage the rudder. 
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Comments 
The master asked the helmsman to steer 1800 and engage the 
automatic pilot. The helmsman pressed the gyro button to 
engage the automatic pilot. 
Why did he leave it on 
automatic? How long did he 
intend to steer it on automatic? 
Time 23.39 
2 
3 
4 
When the helmsman was relieved he advised the third mate that 
the vessel was steering on automatic pilot. 
The third mate acknowledged this but did not expect this as the 
vessel was not normally operated in automatic mode when 
navigating in traffic lanes. He did not discuss this with the master. 
Time 23.50 
The third mate decided not to call the second mate as scheduled Was 3M over confident? Was it 
but he decided to remain on watch until the vessel was clear of typical? 
ice. 
The master asked the mate whether he felt 'comfortable' to 
continue on his own to which the mate replied that he did. 
5 The third mate then went to the steering stand and pushed the 
hand steering button. The helmsman claims he observed the 
indicator illuminated showing it was engaged. 
The helmsman offered two different versions (1) he was unable to 
recall whether it was in automatic when he arrived on the bridge 
and (2) that it was in gyro mode and when he was going to push 
the hand steering button the third made pushed the button as 
well. 
Why didn't 3M query the 
decision to operate the vessel 
on automatic? 
Master accepted 3M's response. 
Conflicting information on 
whether the manual helm was 
engaged. When in auto mode 
the steering wheel is electrically disconnected and may be turned 
without affecting the steering or 
causing any alarms to sound! 
Time 23.55 
6 Thy third mate ordered the helmsman to put the rudder to right 3M did not confirm visually the 
10 - he did not recall watching the rudder angle indicator to rudder angle 
ensure that the rudder was actually applied. 
7 He phoned the master to inform he had started to turn the vessel. 3M was unable to confirm 
He was standing with his back to the rudder indicator. The visually the rudder angle. 
master asked whether the second mate had arrived on the 
bridge. He was informed that the second mate had not been 
called. 
8 The third mate then went to the port radar to check ranges and 
noticed that the vessel had not moved to the right and the 
heading had not changed. 
9 The third mate then ordered rudder increase to right 20* and 
then hard right rudder. 
10 He then called the master and said 'I think we are in serious 
trouble'. Time 00.05 
Table 69 Summary of the events leading to the grounding of the Exxon Valdez 
The NTSB report states that carrying out the proposed manoeuvre involved careful 
navigation and frequent position 
fixing. The Master had made more than 100 trips through 
the Prince William Sound which may 
have resulted in a certain degree of complacency and 
over confidence. He may not 
have realised that the third mate did not have sufficient 
experience to carry out the proposed manoeuvre on his own. On the other hand, the master 
also expected the third mate to 
hand over the watch to the second mate. It should also be 
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noted that according to Exxon company regulations, the master or chief mate should have 
been in charge of the watch, when the vessel was navigating through confined or busy 
waters. 
Examining the above scenario from a human factor's point of view, the following should be 
considered: 
(1) Design of User interface - the course recorder suggests that the steering may have 
remained in gyro mode. The steering could easily be switched between gyro and helm 
without providing appropriate feedback (e. g., sound or light). The report does not state 
clearly the extent of sleep deprivation, but it is accepted that fatigue can result in 
substantial decline in performance (Neville et al., 1994). Thus if the third mate was 
fatigued, he was more likely to make a mistake, i. e., not note consciously whether the 
autopilot had switched to manual helm as intended. 
(2) Manning - the Exxon Valdez operated with a reduced crew complement approved by the 
Coast Guard. The minimum crew requirements had been established for the Valdez- 
Panamanian trade but the vessel was now operating regularly between Valdez and ports 
in California. This trade may have been more demanding due to more frequent port 
calls, and it is possible that re-evaluation of the manning requirements would have been 
useful in reducing the risk of fatigue. 
(3) Onboard supervision and management - traditionally training has focused mainly on 
navigation and other shipboard skills and to a lesser 
degree on formal training in 
managing people, understanding human factors, fatigue management, evaluating other 
crew members' experience/skills or managing reduced crew complements. 
Applying the marine human factors classification scheme to the grounding of the Exxon 
Valdez suggested two main 'Catalysts' (shown in table 70): 
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Problem/Situational Area 
It was possible to turn the wheel when in auto mode with 
no effect on steering and no alarm 
The master left 3rd Mate alone in charge of the watch 
'Catalyst, 
User 1'171erface 
Did not fully assess the situation 
Table 70 'Catalysts' extracted from the Exxon Valdez Report 
The accident report of the l::, xon Vi//ez does not suggest directly that the interaction of the 
human element and the steering control system may have been a problem area. Further 
examination of all the accident reports examined in this research show that there were 5 
other incidents where the design of the user-interface of the steering control system had been 
it problem area 
(e. g., the autopilot changeover could be operated by the helmsman without 
knowledge of the pilot or the autopilot did not sound an alarm when the turn was not carried 
out when operated in NAV mode). 
These findings do not detract from the official report. Rather, they extend the possible 
conclusions in a subtle manner and extract additional useful information. This brief analysis 
also shows how a move away 
from 'blame seeking' to an attempt to identify underlying 
causes can stimulate 
future progress in general and detailed design of bridge equipment and 
management procedures. 
A letter interface with adequate aUdio and/or visual warnings would have reduced the risk of 
making such a mistake. 
Case Study: Sea Empress 
The Sea Empress grounded off the Middle Channel Rocks in the al)l)rºtrlies to Milford I Laven 
º, n 15 February 
1996 (MAIB 1997). A pilot was on board when the vessel was entering the 
Haven via the West Channel. The Sea Empress was manned with it total crew of 27, all 
Russian nationals. She was delivered in 1993 and the master had been in command cif the 
vessel since she was new. 
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Applying a similar human factor's analysis referred to previously in this Chapter, a summary 
of the accident scenario for the grounding of the Sea Empress indicates that (1) the pilot was 
unable to bring her around to follow the leading lights and (2) the bridge team did not 
appreciate the danger of the developing situation (shown in table 71) . 
Comments 
1 End of sea passage, steering 0220. Engine from bridge control. 
2 Course altered to 0120 towards boarding area requested by the 
Pilot 
3 Pilot boarded. The Sea Empress was heading 010°. Main engine 
dead slow ahead. 
4 The master, chief officer and helmsman were on the bridge. 
5 The pilot ordered full ahead, turn to starboard to course approx. 
060 (hard-a-starboard) 
The pilot ordered progressive chap35ge%to port by about 50 at a 
time until the vessel was heading 0. Speed ca. 10 kts. The 
pilot was satisfied with the helmsman. 
Time 19.05 
Time 19.10 
Master and Pilot did not discuss 
passage plan. 
Time 19.40 
Time 19.44 
The pilot did not realise the 
effect of the tide. Gave small 
course orders, rather than Jelm 
order of at least 10 or 15 . 
Why did the master not query t pilot's course orders of only 
Time 19.55 
6 When the Sea Empress was 2-3 cables from the Channel 
Entrance the pilot saw from the changing aspects of the Outer 
Leading lights that there was a set to the east and ordered course 
change of 5 to port. 
7 The pilot saw the Outer Leading lights close and then open to 
the east. 
The Chief Officer assumed that 
the pilot was faking a 
compromise shorter course to 
the entrance to save time. 
Thepilot realises that the vessel 
is on course 
8 The helmsman reported that the vessel was not steering. Time 20.07 
Table 71 Summary of the events leading to the grounding of the Sea Empress 
It should be noted that the crew 
had prepared a detailed passage plan to follow the leading 
lights at 022°. This was based on a previous visit by the master in a large tanker to Milford 
Haven, and all other available information. It could be speculated that had the vessel 
followed the prepared passage plan the vessel may not have grounded. 
Examining the above scenario from a human factor's point of view the following should be 
considered: 
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(1) Master/Pilot relationship - it appears that there is a tendency for pilots and crew 
members not to communicate the intended passage. This is true even when the crew 
have prepared a berth-to-berth passage plan. 
(2) Navigational supervision - the Sea Empress had a fully qualified/trained crew laut it 
appears that neither the chief officer nor the master had the necessary skills to monitor 
and observe other crew members' or pilot's actions with the view to take control before 
the point of'no return'. 
(3) Pilot training regarding specific geographic areas and local conditions (e. g., tides, 
currents) is not within the scope of this research and therefore not considered in any 
detail here. 
Applying the marine human factors classification scheme to the grounding of the Seei Empress 
suggested two principal 'Catalysts' (shown in Table 72): 
Problem/Situational Area 'Catalyst' 
Did not agree a passage plan, assumed pilot's Poor communication between Bridge 
intentions Team members 
Pilot ordered course to steer, rather than helm order 'Same Language' 
Table 72 'Catalyst' Types extracted from the Sea Empress Report 
The preferred latest time to embark the pilot was 1930 hours to ensure that the Seer laýi/ýre. r. r 
would be alongside the Texaco Refinery jetty 
ley the predicted low water time of 21 iO (hours. 
The pilot slid not hoard until 1940 hours and according to Port records the Seit Enipre 
entered the West Channel about 15 minutes 
later than any previous tanker of that size. This 
fact was unknown to the pilot at the time. This delay was not considered it critical factor as 
extra time was provided by the period of slack water off the jetty before the tide turned. 
The analysis of the accident report of the Sea Em/press shows that the interaction I)etwcen the 
pilot and the crew members may he a problem area. A further examination of the available 
data shows that, within the category of Bridge Resource iManagcmcnt, there were 5 
l ýtdciitional accidents 
directly involving poor interaction between the ý, iý>r and crew. 
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The role of a common language in accidents at sea has attracted much attention from the 
shipping community. Although the crew members and the pilot were of a different 
nationality, verbal communication appears not to have been a problem. The problem area 
was therefore assigned to 'same language' allowing a more detailed examination of the 
meaning of the words used. When the pilot gave course change orders, the amount of helm 
applied and rate of turn to the new course were left to the helmsman's discretion. The 
helmsman's priority may have been to avoid an excessive swing. Giving a larger helm order 
(10-15') may have brought the vessel around to the required course more precisely. It 
appears that course and helm orders can have different messages which may give rise to 
erroneous assignments of meanings. 
7.2.1 General observations on the case studies 
After the accident, the first priority, is generally to develop measures that will ensure that a 
similar accident cannot occur again. To this end the accident is generally viewed singularly, 
i. e., what recommendations for system improvements can be proposed based on the 
investigation of a single accident such as the grounding of Exxon Valdez. 
Research is needed to provide information to improve management of the theory and practice 
of safety at sea. Accidents grouped together provide a broader base for analysing common 
denominators and perhaps trends and the effectiveness of preventive measures over a period 
of time. The more detailed investigation, the more useful 
data it can provide. The type of 
information available from a singular accident was outlined in the above example. 
Analysis of accident groups is generally based on the final reports which may have several 
disadvantages: 
" The report is edited and relevant 
data may not be included 
" Data may be missing perhaps 
because its importance was not realised during the 
investigation 
" Lack of consistency, e. g., time of accident, number of people onboard the bridge, etc. may 
not have been recorded in each individual report 
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7.3 The Marine Human Factors Classification System and 'Human Error' 
The SHELL concept was discussed briefly in Chapter 4 examining the scope of human factors 
in aviation safety. It was suggested that is be applicable to the marine environment. The 
'Catalysts' extracted from the two case studies show that Liveware, i. e., the navigating officer, 
is central in a marine safety system (Table 73) 
'Catalyst' SHELL 
User Interface L-H 
Did not fully assess the situation L-L 
Poor communication between the Bridge Team L-L 
members 
'Same Language' L-L 
Table 73 'Catalysts' extracted from the case studies and their corresponding SHELL label 
It is expected that all the 'Catalysts' fit within the SI JELL model thus verifying that it 
provides a useful mental representation of human factors in the marine environment. 
Reason (1990a) suggests that latent failures in complex technological systems are analogous 
to resident pathogens in the 
human body. This analogy stresses the importance of causal 
factors present in the system before an accident sequence actually begins. At any one time, 
each complex system will 
have within it a certain number of latent failures, whose effects are 
not immediately apparent 
but that can serve to promote loth unsafe acts and to weaken its 
defence mechanisms (sec also figure 4, page 9). 
For the pathogen metaphor to have any value, it is necessary to demonstrate clear causal 
connections between 
indicators relating to the seriousness of the system and accident Iial)ility 
across a wide range of complex systems and 
in a variety of accident conditions. Accidents 
bout multiple causes and the occurrence of an accident is not simply determined by the slicer 
number of causal 
factors in the system. Their adverse effects have to find a window of 
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opportunity to pass through the various levels of the system and, most particularly through 
the defences themselves. There are a large number of random variables involved. 
The case studies of the Exxon Valdez and the Sea Empress presented here, show that 'Catalysts' 
provide specific detail relating to the working environment of the ship's bridge, e. g., the 
design of user-interface of autopilots or monitoring bridge team members. Consequently the 
marine human factors classification system provides additional information which is expected 
to improve the analysis of accidents when adopting accepted human factors research 
techniques and 'human error' classification systems. 
7.4 The IMO rule making process 
The IMO provides the framework for safety at sea and it is increasingly recognising the 
significance of the role of human 
factors in accidents. To support the rule making process 
IMO has recently adopted interim guidelines for the application of a Human Element 
Analysis Process (HEAP) (IMO, 1998). The HEAP is a practical tool designed to address the 
role of the human element in maritime safety. A flowchart listing a series of questions that 
should be considered to address appropriately the 
human element in the regulatory 
development process has been introduced (Figure 27). 
The modified HEAP chart applies only to the working environment of the ship's bridge and 
the affected areas (Technical, Manning, Training, Management and Work Environment) in 
the original flowchart have therefore been substituted to include the five 'Catalyst' Groups 
referred to in Chapter 5. The flowchart is expected to assist in focusing on the most 
appropriate human factors when 
developing new rules or guidelines. 
For example, the number of crew members has increasingly become an important focal point 
in shipping safety. As a measure to drive down costs, the Watch One concept was introduced 
and has been discussed and 
debated during the last decade in both the IMO and the nautical 
press (referred to in Chapter 3). The main argument regarding the safety of the concept is 
that it is safe if the bridge is designed according to strict guidelines. The counter argument 
is 
that it is an unsafe practice under any circumstances. 
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Maritime Safety 
or Environmental 
Protection Issue 
Yes 
Return issue to Does the 
originator for re- No 
issue pass IMO Resolutions A. 500 
definition or re- d A. 777 Filte 
consideration 
Yes 
Review all 
affected areas 
Yes 
No 
TECHNICAL // MANNING // TRAINING 
1.11 DEVELOP SOLUTION 
'es the issue need Amendment, revision or new 
to be re-defined 
IMO instrument as appropriate 
Does the 
No solution take into account 
the human element 
rinciples? 
Yes 
Does the solutions 
No address safeguards to avoid 
single person errors? 
Yes or n/a 
solution 
No address slips, lapses, 
mistakes & minimise 
violationsi 
Yes or n/a 
Does the 
solution address loten 
-No 
No 
No 
Yes or n/a 
Monmachine 
terface is simple, easy to 
understand and 
operate? 
Yes or, n/a 
! ve the 
consequences and riss 
of human failures now 
acceptable? 
Yes 
Implement new or 
revised IMO 
instrument 
MANAGEMENT 
Figure 27 Flowchart 
for analysing the human element (IMO, 1998) 
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The introduction of the concept of'Catalysts' as components of a marine human factors 
classification system presents additional detail and would thus improve the proposed HEAP 
model. Figure 28 shows a modified flowchart incorporating the concept of 'Catalysts'. The 
two flowcharts complement each other. 
Maritime Safety or 
Eneironmentol 
Protection Issue 
Yes 
Does the issue 
Remro issue to originator for re 4 No - po sýs IMO Resolut 
delinüion of retumideration 
SOO and A. 777 Filter? 
Yes 
Define (oneept 
-- º Realer all affected 
areas 
HUMAN PERFORMANCE 
END 
SIGBG/ 
//"BRIDGE 
PROCEDURES MANNING NAVIGATION 
CONTROL 
No 
No 
ý Einmine the role of 
Human Faoors bused on 
the Marine Human 
Factors Clossifiralion 
Splem 
DEVELOP SOI U TION 
Amendment, enn un of new IMO 
ima uneil as appropriate 
Does the solution address 
all human factors affecting 
, 
the working environment of the 
ship's bridge? 
Yes 
Implement new or 
revised IMO 
instrument 
1 
4 VERIFICATION 
o"Ahmr nbnd ro the hump # /. Mm hm 
hen romMmd rnro e vng4 ramponenr for nie 
oI-'(epnan 
Figure 28 Modified HEAP Flowchart applied to the 
IMO Rule-Making Process relating to 
safety of navigation 
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The safety aspect of the Watch One concept has been considered in several recent reports 
(Hansen & Pedersen, 1998; Wikman, 1997; Schraagen, Breda van & Rasker, 1997). 
Advocates for the concept generally assume that the bridge can be designed so that a solitary 
watchkeeper has the same amount of time to look out, as a dedicated look-out on a 
conventional bridge. This is partly based on the assumption that the navigating officer 
primarily uses the radar/ARPA to look out during the hours of darkness. 
Personal observation, however, suggests that the prudent navigating officer performs his 
look-out duties using all available means, for example, using binoculars to scan the 
surrounding area. The research presented here further suggests that the radar may have a 
blind sector (table 34/'Catalyst' E9) and unless the officer is fully aware of it, he may not 
detect another ship by radar alone. 
The integrated bridge design has many labour-saving features and may be considered safe as 
long as all other factors are assumed to remain unchanged. However, ships operate in a 
dynamic environment and safety is influenced by the interaction of the navigating officer 
within his working environment. 
Trials have been approved for ships using electronic charts as part of their main navigation 
system for the evaluation of integrated 
bridge systems and the Watch One concept (Anon., 
1997b). It is therefore appropriate to continue to explore the safety of this concept. 
The examination of human factors as defined by the individual 'Catalyst' provides an 
improved basis for developing safer solutions. For example, the 'Catalysts' D1& D2 shown in 
table 33 indicate that 
falling asleep on the bridge is a problem, but an additional person does 
not necessarily prevent the accident. 
This suggests that the safety of the Watch One concept 
is affected by a combination of 
factors, some which can be managed through regulation (e. g., 
design of user interfaces or manuals) and others which demand other solutions, e. g., training 
in fatigue management. A simple procedure for examining the concept of individual or 
groups of catalysts' 
is suggested in Figure 29. 
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Example 
DETERMINE STRATEGY 
FOR IMPROVEMENT 
Improve basis for W1 
concept 
4, 
Influence of other EXAMINE person on the bridge, 
'CATALYSTS' User Interface, 
Poor manuals 
W 
RESEARCH APPLICABLE Design of user Interfaces, 
HUMAN FACTORS fatigue & boredom 
Propose opppropriate 
DEVELOP STRATEGY guidelines for WI 
operations 
examine possible 
VALIDATE STRATEGY catalysts'ns with other 
design & cony out 
systematic trials 
Introduce improved 
IMPLEMENT STRATEGY guidelines for WI 
operations 
Figure 29 Suggested procedure for examining the concept of Individual or groups of 
'Catalysts' 
Safe navigation under all operational conditions must be the starting point for the evaluation 
of the safety of the Watch One concept. Labour-saving 
features of the bridge design should 
be encouraged, but this must not be at the expense of introducing other possible 'error 
inducing' features, e. g., insufficient training or poor user interfaces. This leads to the 
conclusion that the safety of the 
Watch One concept in particular would benefit from an 
introduction of some form of a human factors validation of bridge design. 
7.5 The concept of `catalysts' and organisational errors 
Analysis of collisions and groundings has traditionally focused on the 'sharp end' on the ship's 
bridge, i. e., the navigating officers. Chapter 1, however, shows how human failures on ships' 
bridges may result from decisions made by top-level decision makers (see further figure 4 
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and page 9 to 10). Such organisational errors can result in an increased likelihood of operator 
error through an active or latent failure pathway. On the ship's bridge an active failure 
pathway originates in top-level decisions and proceeds via error-producing and/or violation- 
promoting conditions to unsafe acts committed by the bridge team. A latent failure pathway 
leads directly from the organisational processes to deficiencies in the defences of the system 
(Reason, 1995). 
These are illustrated in figure 30 stressing the differences between the active and latent 
failure pathways in accidents (see also figure 11, page 65). 
Organisation Ships Bridge Bridge Team Defences Outcome 
Management Error- and violation Unsafe ads 
decisions and producing conditions 
organisational 
processes 
Active Failure Pathway ACCIDENTS 
ý 11111 ýý 
Latent Failure Pathway I 
Figure 30 Stressing the differences between active and latent failure pathways as 
applicable to the ship's bridge (derived from Reason, 1995) 
As an example of organisational errors, the report into the near- miss Iýctwcý"n lie 
(a ferry) and the Tussle (a tug) showed a numher of latent and active failures (see further pagc 
10). This report showed how the accident sequence began with failures at an organisational 
level (e. g., the lack of a policy for minimum operating standards for navigation equipment 
fitted on the organisation's 
ferries). Such management and operational dIccisions are often 
influenced l)y financial, economic and/ear political factors. Latent failures created by 
management 
decisions or organisational processes may he then transmitted along an active 
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failure pathway to create local conditions increasing the probability of unsafe acts (e. g., failure 
by the navigating officers to report to the Vessel Traffic Services before leaving the port). 
Reason (1995) suggests that technological advances, particularly in regard to engineered 
safety features, have made many hazardous systems largely safe against single human or 
mechanical failures. As a result, breaching the 'defences in-depth' requires an unlikely 
combination of several contributing factors. Each factor is necessary to cause the accident. 
Additionally, increased automation provides greater opportunities for the accumulation of 
latent failures within the system as a whole. 
For illustration, figure 30 shows how the navigating officer on the ship's bridge is the 
inheritor, rather than the instigator of an accident sequence. However, the aim is not to shift 
the blame from one part of the system to another. It must be acknowledged that designs and 
decisions are nearly always a compromise which may have a negative effect on safety in some 
part of the system. 
The concept of 'catalysts' attempts to move away from a blame seeking strategy by focusing 
on problem areas which may contribute to unsafe acts. These may be considered either on a 
micro-level, e. g., an active failure by the navigating officer or on a macro-level, e. g., a latent 
failure made by top-level decision makers. For example, the analysis of the report into the 
grounding of the Exxon Valdez showed that when the autopilot was engaged the steering 
wheel was electrically disconnected and could be turned without affecting the steering or 
causing any alarms to sound (see table 69, page 187). The poor design of the user-interface of 
the autopilot (which did not indicate whether or not the autopilot was engaged) may have 
acted as a local trigger and increased the likelihood of an unsafe mode error by the navigating 
officer. 
The analysis of the report into the grounding of the Sea Empress suggests that the systems' 
defences were breached through the latent failure pathway (see table 71, page 190). In this 
case management decisions and the organisational framework must bear responsibility for not 
providing sufficient human factors training for bridge team members. 
The reduction of accidents at sea requires the identification of local triggers (i. e., error and 
violation producing conditions) and latent failures (i. e., inadequate defences) that may 
increase the risk of a collision or grounding. The detail provided by the 'catalyst' approach 
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should assist in examining the potential for active and latent failures specifically on the ship's 
bridge. Safety management should make use of such knowledge of problem areas to improve 
factors such as design, hardware, training, operating procedures, etc. 
7.6 Conclusion 
This Chapter examined the benefits of applying the marine human factors classification 
system to analysing collisions and groundings. A brief examination of the groundings of the 
Exxon Valdez and the Sea Empress demonstrated that a non blame seeking approach can 
provide additional information through the extraction of 'Catalysts'. 
It was concluded that the 'Catalysts' extracted from the two groundings examined as case 
studies would fit the mental representation provided by SHELL (referred to in Chapter 3). It 
is expected that all the 'Catalysts' would fit within this model. 
The additional information provided by the 'Catalysts' is expected to improve the analysis of 
collisions and groundings. They can also assist in examining the potential for active and 
latent failures specifically on the ship's bridge. However, the time period between the 
accident and the publication of the final report can be several years and therefore the benefits 
of the extracted information may be less constructive in developing practical preventive 
measures. 
Management of safety at sea is embodied in the organisational framework provided by the 
IMO. Human factors have been recognised through the application of HEAP. This Chapter 
discussed the application, proposed a modified HEAP flowchart and examined the Watch 
One concept. It was concluded that it can be used to improve the safety of the concept by 
taking into account factors affecting human element through future training requirements 
and design requirements. 
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8.1 The role of human factors in managing safety at sea 
Progress in safety at sea has been marred, to some extent, by a historic reluctance within the 
shipping community to accept change. For example, when lighthouses were first developed in 
the 1780's in Scotland as aids to navigation, the engineers found themselves challenging the 
prejudices of the mariners, whom those lights were supposed to save (Bathurst, 1999). 
Frequently shipowners have objected to proposed legislation, e. g., Plimsoll Lines, because 
they considered the measures uneconomic. Many a time, progress in safety at sea has resulted 
from a major accident, e. g., SOLAS was introduced in the aftermath of the sinking of the 
Titanic. 
A brief review of safety at sea (see Chapter 1) showed that collisions and groundings 
inevitably result in an economic loss. Figure 3 (page 7) suggests that some costs may be 
hidden, viz. pollution liability (e. g., the Exxon Valdez). It has recently been estimated that the 
annual cost of mutual claims arising from collisions and groundings resulting from 
navigational errors totals around US$500 million (Anderson, 1999). The lack of worldwide 
annual statistics on collisions and groundings, and readily available sources for detailed costs, 
add to the difficulties in determining trends and assessing the effectiveness of preventive 
measures. 
Human behaviour can have a significant effect on whether preventative measures will have 
the intended effect . An increased awareness of 
human factors on the ship's bridge can thus 
assist in developing strategies for managing safety at sea with the aim of reducing the 
number of navigation related accidents. 
8.2 Human factors on the ship's bridge 
The existing literature was examined (see Chapter 2) and it was suggested that it does not 
provide an acceptable procedure for determining the impact of human factors on the ship's 
bridge (see also Appendix B). Nevertheless, substantial research into human factors is 
available, particularly in the aviation, nuclear and automobile industries. This limited 
availability of human factors' research specifically related to the ship's bridge played a 
significant role in determining the course of this research. It was also suggested that the 
specific characteristics of the marine environment must be considered before applying any 
results directly to the human element on the ship's bridge. 
CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION 203 
'Human error' was discussed briefly in Chapter 2 and the examination of a recent study of 
shipping accidents (Merenkulkulaitos 1997) reinforces the current belief that 'human error' is 
a major cause of accidents at sea. However, it does not suggest specific measures that could 
be adopted to reduce future accidents. It was concluded that the available HEI techniques, 
when used in isolation, have at present, limited practical value for exploring 'human error' on 
the ship's bridge. It was suggested that there was a need to obtain a better understanding of 
the working environment to improve the effect of current and future research techniques. 
Every working environment is different, defined by factors such as the 
organisational/regulatory framework and the physical environment. Consequently a review of 
(1) the organisational framework and (2) the navigational system, as part of an integrated 
working environment was outlined. This showed that the organisational framework is based 
primarily on Conventions and Resolutions adopted by the IMO. It is generally accepted that 
although the IMO has no enforcing powers it plays an important role as the overall guardian 
of safety at sea. This review concluded that the navigating officer has little direct influence on 
the working environment of the ship's bridge (see Chapter 3). 
Collision avoidance is considered an inevitable part of safe navigation. The influence of the 
original the Rules of the Road at Sea on the COLREGS 72 was discussed. It was suggested 
that the early rules focused on legal aspects, perhaps lessening their practical value as a tool 
for avoiding collisions. This historical review concluded that this legacy may have affected the 
current COLREGS 72, potentially resulting in navigating officers interpreting the rules 
differently during the time leading to a collision. 
The Watch One concept has attracted much attention in the past few decades. A brief review 
of the concept concluded that, at present, the available studies provide inconclusive evidence 
of the safety of the Watch One concept. 
Based on the outline of the working environment of the ship's bridge a descriptive memory 
aid for human factors (SHELL) was examined and it was suggested that it could be adapted 
for use in the marine environment. To this end, it showed how the organisational framework 
is divided into two parts (a) the Physical environment of the Ship's Bridge and (b) the 
Navigational System of the Ship's Bridge (figure 16, page 84). It is suggested that this 
modified SHELL 
diagram illustrates better the role of the human element in the working 
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environment, thus providing an improved model for future studies into human factors on the 
ship's bridge. 
Human factors relevant to the working environment were then outlined in Chapter 4, i. e., 
the design of hardware and related information processing, learning processes, maritime 
education and training and communication. 
Communication is a complex issue and safe communication at sea is often assumed to be 
primarily by using the same mother tongue between crew members. This assumption was 
considered too simplistic and consequently the term communication was explained in more 
detail. It is expected that this will provide a useful framework for all aspects of 
communication at sea. 
Health related factors may influence the behaviour of the navigating officer and increase the 
risk of a collision or grounding. Fatigue and boredom were considered to have the greatest 
impact and were examined in more detail in Chapter 4. 
8.3 The development of the marine human factors classification system 
Navigation is human voluntary activity and thus subject to 'human error'. It is not assumed 
that all 'human errors' can be eliminated but that, by moving away from a blame seeking 
strategy, additional detail from readily available data sources can be obtained. 
Consequently a pre-classified database, DAMA, was analysed and this analysis suggested that 
the broad coding scheme provided only limited information on specific human factors on the 
ship's bridge (referred to in Chapter 5). Nevertheless, the figures show that the human 
element has been attributed as a cause in the majority of the accidents. Factors such as 
fatigue or long working hours (see table 21, G13- Special circumstances) may be difficult to 
recognise and the figures may thus not have been appropriately categorised. This is likely to 
add to the difficulty examining the pre-classified database. 
Accident reports were expected to provide more detailed information on collisions and 
groundings. Official accident reports were obtained from several different countries (see table 
15, page 127) to afford a better representation of worldwide shipping e. g., trading patterns 
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and ship/cargo types. The analysis of the reports concluded that they provided a balanced 
collection of a variety of geographic conditions, e. g., restricted waters. 
The important concept to emerge from this research is the three-layer classification system, 
i. e., the human factors classification system using the 'Catalyst' concept, as opposed to the 
broader classification systems generally used previously (see e. g., table 17, page 134). The 
third layer has the potential to reveal more information from existing data sources, thus 
providing more detail on accident and incident analysis. This was confirmed by applying the 
system to two brief cases studies, the groundings of the Exxon Valdez and the Sea Empress. 
It is anticipated that the increased knowledge offered by the marine human factors 
classification system presented in this study, will assist people, individually or collectively, in 
assuming their responsibility in managing safety at sea. In addition this research provides a 
basis for increasing human factors awareness among those affected by accidents at sea, 
including seafarers, designers, engineers, legislators, accountants, ship managers, the public 
and media. 
The proposed marine human factor's classification system is based on designating problem 
areas on the ship's bridge as 'Catalysts'. These were 
defined as factors in chains of events that 
may provide a pathway for a collision or grounding. The process of developing this system 
from accident reports was explained in Chapter 5. The 'Catalysts' were initially grouped 
within 16 'Catalyst' Types. These were then grouped within five 'Catalyst' Groups forming a 
simple framework for human factors on the ship's 
bridge (table 23, page 145 and figure 23, 
page 154). It is expected that this marine 
human factors' classification system can be used in 
the analysis of: 
1. A broad worldwide sample of accident or voluntary Incident Reports (e. g., as in this 
research), and; 
2. A specific sample limited by a geographic area or restricted by a specific time limit, e. g., 
accidents investigated by a specific organisation; 
3. To classify voluntary incident reports (MARS reports). This would provide the following: 
CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION 206 
a) An alternative and additional human factors data source that can be used to compare 
and contrast with data collected from other sources; 
b) It assures the active navigating officer that he makes a valuable contribution to human 
factors research thus affording him an incentive to continue doing so. 
The data was presented in a tabular form and intended to be viewed as descriptive, rather 
than analytical, i. e., to show patterns of 'Catalysts' (see Chapter 6). Until more data is 
available, it is considered that a visual representation is likely to provide a more useful 
perspective of the role of the human element in the navigational system. 
A questionnaire was developed to improve the understanding of the working environment of 
the ship's bridge. The number of returned survey results was not sufficient to provide a 
representative sample of navigating officers and ship/cargo types engaged in worldwide trade. 
The results as shown in tabular form, nevertheless, provide additional background 
information to offer an improved representation of the working environment on the ship's 
bridge. For example, in view of expected future changes in the marine environment, e. g., 
increasing number of High Speed Ships, it is particularly important that ship/cargo types and 
trading patterns are considered 
during the development stage of the projects. 
To this end it is suggested that the sections from the questionnaire requesting Personal and 
Ship details can be used as a format for standardising future studies (see Appendix D). A 
combination of, for example Type of Ship/Type of Cargo/Trading area would allow future 
studies to be compared and possible trends noted. In addition, the ability to cross reference 
with details such as linguistic proficiency and time spent on the ship may allow studies to be 
analysed in a more effective manner. 
The four data sources discussed previously were examined individually using a non blame 
seeking strategy. It is suggested that this strategy provided an 
improved basis for collecting 
additional human 
factors information from readily available data sources. In addition, the 
accident and MARS reports were coded using a similar approach. 
Tables 30 to 34 show that 
this was a sound choice, e. g., 'Catalyst' 
C6 in table 32 confirms that agreeing a manoeuvre by 
VHF may not have the intended result. It demonstrates that the MARS data when coded 
appropriately can provide additional information. 
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Although the marine human factors classification system proposed here has not been verified 
independently, it would appear justified to assume that, together with the DAMA and 
questionnaire data, it could contribute toward a valid representation of the mariner's working 
environment. 
8.4 Practical value of the Marine Human Factors Classification System 
The detail provided by the 'Catalysts' is expected to encourage those responsible for safety at 
sea to employ foresight rather than wait for the accident to occur. Reason (1990a) noted that 
when an accident occurs human involvement is evident on many other levels, including 
during the design and manufacture of bridge equipment, training, inspections and the 
development of rules and regulations (see figure 4, page 9). The role of human factors in safe 
navigation is thus as much the concern of the organisational framework, as it is an individual 
responsibility. 
It is expected that each decision making level will benefit from the detail provided by the 
proposed marine human factors' classification system. For example, on the highest level of 
decision making, the awareness of an increased risk of 'human error' due to poor user- 
interfaces and manuals would allow IMO to develop, in addition to technical standards, 
human factors standards for user-interfaces and manuals. On the lowest level, the navigating 
officer could be advised of common unsafe acts which increase the risk of collision or 
grounding, e. g., if the radar 
has a blind sector and the officer may not see the other vessel in 
time (E9); failing to plot course/speed of the other vessel could result in a collision (E8) etc. 
(table 34, page 162) 
By adopting a similar systematic approach to examining accident reports, the principle of the 
marine human factors' classification system could 
be used to analyse accidents in other 
working environments, e. g., personal 
injury on the ship. 
It must be recognised that there 
is more than one definitive strategy to preventing collisions 
and groundings at sea. 
There is not expected to be a single best recommendation, nor a 
single dominant 
dimension on which to focus. The key to preventing collisions and 
groundings is to understand the theory and 
limitations of the individual components and 
how they interact within the entire navigational system on the ship's bridge. 
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8.5 The future of human factors in the marine environment 
International shipping is characterised by the notion of the freedom of the high seas and a 
regulatory framework based primarily on Conventions and Resolutions adopted by the IMO. 
Since IMO has no enforcing powers, implementation and administration is through national 
legislation introduced by the Member States. In essence, this means that a ship can operate 
legally to a different standard depending on where she is registered. The organisational 
framework thus creates a critical financial climate through fierce competition. However, a 
sound financial basis is essential to improve safety at sea. 
The Member States can play a significant part in administering a safe environment for ships, 
e. g., funding provided by the governments is important. For example, the National 
Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) provides the data for accurate and 
up-to-date information on US waters but their funding has decreased in recent years 
(American Association of Port Authorities, 1999). On the other hand, the USCG is expected 
to introduce new regulations that would provide tangible benefits, e. g., reduced Port State 
inspections to ships expected to have few defects (Shuker, 1999). Such a policy would provide 
actual economic benefits to quality owners and would reduce costs by reducing the number of 
inspections on ships that pose little threat to U. S. waters. 
The importance of human factors has been recognised in the marine environment but has not 
attracted the widespread attention that it has in other industries, particularly in aviation. 
Research and accident investigations in the marine environment often result in exclusive and 
restricted reports with limited or no access for the public. 
At present the sharing of knowledge and information is limited within the operational 
shipping community. Nevertheless, several maritime administrations, notably Australia, 
Canada and the United States of America, already provide public access to information (e. g., 
complete accident reports) through their web sites. The use of the Internet is expected to 
increase, and eventually other maritime administrations and organisations may provide 
similar services to the shipping community worldwide. It is also expected that the navigating 
officer, when not at sea, will gradually have better access to the Internet (e. g., through public 
libraries, etc. ). This would provide him with a tool that would allow him to obtain up-to-date 
information (e. g., voluntary incident reports or changes in rules and regulations). 
CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION 209 
It is anticipated that this research will provide a stimulus for the industry to focus on human 
factors on the ship's bridge. However, to achieve this, the entire community, i. e., the private 
and the public sectors, must accept responsibility and encourage open access to information 
relating to human factors. 
8.6 Recommendations for further work 
Human factors' research into accidents at sea has something of a'Cinderellä status. In the 
same way 'Cinderella' did not get a new gown for the ball, funds have predominantly been 
granted for research into engineering/design and organisational/regulatory aspects of safety at 
sea (e. g., Estonia, Herald of Free Enterpris). Funding has been lacking perhaps because the 
results of human factors' research generally benefit the maritime community at large, rather 
than a particular company or organisation. 
The present lack of a standard human factor's terminology in the marine environment limits 
the possibility of comparing different studies (e. g., analysis of accident investigations). It is 
concluded that limited progress in understanding human factors will be made until the 
shipping community: 
" Focuses on standardisation and harmonisation of human factors/error terminology. 
Makes an effort to coordinate human factors research within the international research 
community. The added benefit is a reduction of duplication and cost of studies. 
The research presented in this thesis provides a framework for standardising elements of 
human factors research. This would ensure that future research can be effectively compared. 
It is expected that further research will improve the framework presented here. The following 
suggestions are offered as topics for further research, but are deemed beyond the scope of the 
current investigation: 
(1) Following from current research based on the questionnaire, investigate further problems 
associated with user-interfaces on ships' bridges (i. e., questions 1-3, Appendix D). 
Additionally officers should be encouraged to notify specific details on poor design 
through the Internet. This could be modelled on the web site for "Bad Human Factors 
Designs" (http: //www. baddesigns. com/). This site provides specific examples of poor 
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designs which can assist equipment manufacturers to develop better user-centered 
interfaces. 
(2) It is apparent that most ships carry the required manuals of various bridge aids that are 
installed onboard the ship's bridge. This research confirms that poorly designed manuals 
may (a) increase the risk of accidents because the officer did not know how to use the 
equipment correctly, and (b) lessen the officer's ability to recover from a known situation 
thus increasing the risk of collision or grounding. It is suggested that task analysis could 
provide a basis for developing a basic model for operating manuals, separating them from 
service, technical and functional operations manuals. 
(3) Although Radar/ARPA and collision avoidance have attracted research (see Appendix B) 
there has been limited focus on the role of the navigating officer. The Radar/ARPA can be 
operated in three course headings and three modes resulting in different images on the 
radar screen (see Chapter 6, see also figures 25, page 178 and 26, page 179). It is 
suggested that additional research be carried out to establish how the navigating officer's 
interpretation is influenced by the different settings of the equipment. The background of 
the officer is considered important as his preference may depend on his initial training, 
e. g., if he learned to use North Up then 
he is more likely to continue doing so. It is also 
important to include Personal and Ship details, as referred to previously, so that cross 
referring may be carried out if necessary. 
(4) Following from the research presented here, it would appear logical to develop a model 
for validating ships' bridges (traditional and Watch One) using appropriate human 
factors' research techniques to reduce risk of accident resulting from poor bridge 
layout 
and user-interfaces. 
(5) The role of alarms and failure mode analysis was determined primarily through personal 
observation during ship visits. These were later confirmed through informal discussions. 
As a result a brief review of existing literature on alarm research was conducted 
(Appendix Q. It shows that, as yet, no general research has been carried out on alarths on 
the ship's bridge unlike in the aviation, medical and other industries. It is suggested 
that 
accident investigators should attempt to note the possible role of alarms in inJividuaLl 
accidents. During analysis of the accident, alarm related 'Catalysts' could be 11eladecl 
within the alternative classification system under Engineering/Design by provider 
g 4' Rew 
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heading. Additionally it is recommended that the following research is carried out 
without delay: 
Determine the minimum number of alarms on ships' bridges. This is expected to vary 
depending on ship/cargo type and type of bridge. 
" Determine the function, i. e., emergency, primary or secondary, of alarms on ships' 
bridges. 
Determine the effectiveness of each alarm type on board ships' bridges, e. g., does the 
operator detect the warning, does he interpret the warning correctly, and does he 
take appropriate action. 
8.7 Contribution to the marine environment 
This research focused on collisions and groundings at sea, examining existing literature on 
human factors, safety at sea and accident and incident reports. This resulted in the 
development of a marine human factors classification system that provides a third layer of 
detail as opposed to conventional classification systems. A combination of different 
techniques, including analysis of accident and voluntary incident reports, a pre-classified data 
base, a questionnaire and personal observation provided the basis for developing this system. 
The primary contribution of this research was to: 
(1) Provide the shipping industry with a marine human factors classification system for the 
analysis of accident and voluntary incident reports (e. g., MARS). By standardising the 
classification of human factors on the ship's bridge it is expected that future studies could 
be more easily compared and, ultimately, the effectiveness of preventive measures 
evaluated. 
(2) Establish individual 'Catalysts' which show detailed information of problem areas on the 
ship's bridge. These would provide a basis for developing specific research strategies for 
determining preventative measures. 
(3) Provide a framework for the standardisation of collecting Personal/Ship details. This 
would assist in the comparison of future studies. 
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Additionally this research provides a convenient practical guide to (a) the working 
environment of the ship's bridge, and (b) different aspects of communication in the marine 
environment. This is expected to assist in future human factors' research. 
The overall contribution of this research is to increase the awareness of specific human factors 
on the ship's bridge. 
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APPENDIX A 
A GENERAL CLASSIFICATION SCHEME OR TAXONOMY OF DIFFERENT 
HUMAN FACTORS' METHODOLOGIES (Wilson and Corlett, 1990). 
This table provides a frame of reference for all the methods used in the evaluation of research 
into human factors. 
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General taxonomy of different human factors' methodologies (Wilson & Corlett 1990) 
Method 
Approach 
Collection of information 
from/about people 
Group 
Direct observation 
(laboratory or field) 
Indirect Observation 
(laboratory or field 
Perceptual/Cognitive 
performance 
Knowledge Acquisition 
Subgroup 
Unobtrusive, participative, or 
visible 
Psychometrics/scaling 
Ability testing 
Psychophysics 
Knowledge elicitation (from 
expert) 
Technique 
Human recording: checklists, 
rating, ranking, critical 
incident technique, charts 
(time, spatial, sequence, link) 
Hardware recording: video, 
film, tape, event recorder, 
position/movement 
recording, computer real 
time recording 
Surveys, questionnaires, 
rating, ranking, scaling, 
diaries, critical incidents, yes- 
no checklists, group 
discussions, interviews 
Mental or cognitive tests 
(e. g., general aptitude test 
battery) perceptual tests 
Method of limits, method of 
average error, method of 
constant stimuli, e. g , 
aesthesiometer, hearing loss 
audiometry 
Interviews (structured, 
unstructured) protocol 
analysis (verbal, shadowing, 
behavioural), conceptual 
mapping, goal 
decomposition, automatic 
techniques 
Measure/Outcome 
Event frequency, sequence, 
Times, errors, accuracy, 
Overload, underload 
Descriptive, evaluative, 
diagnostic, measures of 
performance 
Attitudes, feelings; perceived 
effort, difficulties, 
advantages, disadvantages, 
preferences 
Prediction of performance 
Thresholds and levels of 
perception, sensitivity 
'Rules', reasoning, 
explanation 
Continued 
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General taxonomy of different human factors' methodologies (Wilson & Corlett 1990) 
Method 
Approach Group Subgroup Technique Measure/Outcome 
Other Interpretation of records, 
standards, guidelines, criteria 
Physical measurement Anthropometry (static or Anthropometry, wall charts, Dimensions, percentiles, 
dynamic) video, photography, CODA, other descriptive statistics 
fitting trials, computer 
modelling 
Collection of information Physical measurement bio mechanics Dynamometer, strength Values, descriptive statistics 
from/about people gauges, goniometer 
Performance Eye movements, acuity 
Physiological measurements ECG, EEG, EMG, ERP, 07 
Uptake, GSR pupil diameter, 
etc. 
Models Computer, mechanical, 
conceptual, mathematical 
Evaluation of human-machine Task 
Analysis (TA) Hierarchal TA, tabular TA, Consequence of task, task 
system- performance or 
ability requirements analysis, sequences, times, probable 
consequence (actual or 
TA for knowledge error rotes 
potential) 
description, link analysis, 
cognitive TA, formal 
mappings (e. g., TAG), job 
analysis charts 
Archives, databases, Production, activity, quality Output, times, quality, etc. 
published information control or personnel records, Absenteeism, labour 
standards, guidelines, etc. turnover, health data 
interface evaluation User trials Techniques of direct and Time, reaction times 
indirect observation, and Accuracy, errors 
physical performance Opinions, attitudes, 
measurement-individual or responses 
groups physical fit 
Workload, stress 
Continued 
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General taxonomy of different human factors' methodologies (Wilson & Corlett 1990) 
Method 
Aooroach Group Subgroup Technique Measure/Outcome 
User models, formal GUMS, CLG, TAG, etc. 
mapping 
Expert analysis Walkthrough, checklists 
Prototyping Rapid prototyping, story 
boarding 
Introspection Techniques for protocol 
analysis 
Evaluation environment CAFE OF EVE 
Evaluation of human-machine Electronic monitoring 
On-line (performance) 
system- performance or record, gripe 
button 
consequence (a(tual or 
potential) 
Work system analysis All 
Text Analysis Readability formulae Normative scores. ratings 
(Gunning, Fog, Flesh, etc. ), 
cloze procedures; 
judgements (rate/rank, et(. ), 
protocol analysis; scan/read 
tests 
Models Task network (SAINT, Siegel- Performance predictions 
Wolf, et(. ), control theoretic, 
micro process (HOS, etc), 
cognitive (GOMS, etc. ) 
Simulation 
Human Reliability Analysis 
Statistical Analysis 
Mathematical, computer, 
including CAD (e. g., 
SAMMIE), Physical mock-up, 
walkthrough 
Error Analysis 
Representation 
Quantification 
SHERPA, GEMS, PHECA, etc., Errors, type, causes, 
Fault tree, action trees, etc., Descriptive and predictive 
THERP, HEART, SLIM, etc. charts, Human error 
probabilities 
Signal Detection Theory Performance measure 
Continued 
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General taxonomy of different human factors' methodologies (Wilson & Corlett 1990) 
Method 
Approach Group Subgroup Technique 
Method Study Graphical analysis, charts, 
filming, micro motion, etc. 
Accident Reporting and Archive records, reporting 
analyses system, in-depth follow up 
interviews, site analysis, 
statistical analysis 
Work measurement Time study, activity analysis, 
synthetic analysis, electronic 
monitoring 
Evaluation of human-machine Cost-benefit analysis Investment returns, 
system- performance or productivity-life cost, revenue 
consequence (actual or calculation; 
health and safety 
potential) valuations 
Measure/Outcome 
Incidence, severity, 
epidemiology and aetiology 
Times, standards, task 
sequence and simultaneity 
Financial return 
Textual analysis Parsing, etc 
Self recording Gripe button, diary, event Problems, incidents 
recorder 
Analysis of work activity 
Introspection (+ protocol Concurrent and retrospective Hardware recording, Explicit content, implicit 
demand analysis) debriefing, written record, content, behaviour 
diary, critical incidents, transitions, rules, knowledge 
shadowing 
Expert Analysis Checklist; walkthrough, 
Delphi, etc. method study 
techniques, expert systems 
Archives, data base Medical records, accident Incidence, severity, risk 
records factors 
Continued 
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General taxonomy of different human factors' methodologies (Wilson & Corlett 1990) 
Method 
Approach Group Subgroup Technique Measure/Outcome 
Physical workload Indirect observation, e. g., Subjective ratings 
Borg scale, Performance Performance decrement, etc. 
records, secondary or 
alternative tasks of 
psychomotor performance, 
physical changes (e. g., 
shrinkometer) 
Posture analysis Biomechonical 'Postures' to compare with 
(mathematical) models; criteria 
optical methods ((ODA, Opinions of discomfort, etc. 
Selspot); paper and pencil 
(posture target, body part 
discomfort) 
Physiological Measurement of fatigue, HR, HR variability, 0, Objective data, to be 
stress, function, etc. uptake, air analysis, GSR, interpreted against norms, 
ECG, EMG, EEG, ERP criteria 
Mental workload Primary, secondary, 'Performance' decrement, 
measurement alternative task, Subjective Load (subjective or objective) 
assessment (e. g., SWAT), 
physiological response 
Analysis of work activity Stress assessment 
GSR, etc., indirect 
demand observation techniques 
(SACL, GWBQ, et(. ) 
Job and work attitude Techniques of indirect Satisfaction, needs, 
measurement observation, especially rating important job characteristics 
scales, e. g., JDS, WLAS, etc.; 
informal group or individual 
interviews 
Physical environment Measurement 
by light (illumination, glare, measurements versus norms, 
assessment 
instrumentation etc. ), climate (temperature, comparisons 
humidity, air space, eft. ), 
noise (sound intensity- 
weighted), vibration, 
workplace dimensions Continued 
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General taxonomy of different human factors' methodologies (Wilson & Corlett 1990) 
Method 
Approach Group Subgroup Technique Measure/Outcome 
Subjective assessment Psychophysical techniques, Comfort, annoyance, 
scaling, rating, surveys, etc. acceptability 
Performance measures Speech intelligigility index, 'Scores' 
work-rate, standard 
psychomotor and mental 
tests, etc. 
Modelling and simulation Computer (e. g., SAMMIE), 
mechanical (manikins), 
mathematical 
Response measures Sweat rate, body Measurements versus norms 
temperature, heart rate, etc., Comparisons 
hearing loss, etc.; visual 
acuity, contrast sensitivity, 
etc.; sensation loss 
(vibration), shrinkometer 
Archives, medical and Sickness, absence, injuries 
accident records 
Organisational environment Organisational analysis 
assessment 
Indirect observation Rating, ranking, etc.; group Attitudes, opinions, etc., 
participative methods 'Improvements' 
Design and implementation 
User tests Direct and indirect 
observation 
Expert analysis Walkthroughs, audit 
Creative techniques Brainstorming, decision 
groups, focus groups 
Participative methods Design and follow-up groups, 
user representation 
involvement; ' education' in 
ergonomics Continued 
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General taxonomy of different human factors' methodologies (Wilson & Corlett 1990) 
Method 
Approach Group Subgroup Technique Measure/Outcome 
Evaluation environment CAFE OF EVE 
Process promotion and 'Literature' 
dissemination 
Participative methods Ergonomic working groups, 
etc.; training 
Cost-benefit analysis Investment returns, health 
and safety valuations 
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APPENDIX B 
STUDIES, ETC ON HUMAN FACTORS WHICH MAY BE 
APPLICABLE TO THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT 
Appendix B shows a summary of available literature in table format (referred to in Chapter 2). Entries 
refer in one direction to the aim of the study and in the other direction to the methods used. The numbers 
in the cells refer to the list of references which have been divided roughly into three categories: (1) 
Research carried out predominantly in the shipping industry (shown in bold), (2) Research into human 
factors in the aviation industry (shown in italics) and (3) General research into human factors (shown in 
normal font). 
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ALARM STUDIES 
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ALARM STUDIES 
This Appendix provides a brief literature review relating to existing alarm studies (referred toi in 
Chapter 4). These studies refer only to this table and are grouped according to their main subject 
area. 
MAIN SUBJECT AREA STUDY 
Auditory Warning 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13 
Voice Warning 1 4,15 
Text Warning 16 
Urgency Scaling 8,1 7,18 
Alarm information/Handling 
1 9,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27, 
28,29,30,31,32,33 
Alarm Systems 34,35,36,37,38,39 
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Survey into Human Factors Relating to Navigation 
ALL RESPONSES WILL BE TREATED IN STRICTEST CONFIDENCE 
NOTES TO RESPONDENTS 
" Please try to answer all questions as clearly as possible. 
" Please give as complete details as possible, including name of ship and other 
details which assist in distinguishing one incident from another. Please include 
any sketches and/or photographs which may be helpful to illustrate the problem. 
f It is always difficult to estimate the space needed to answer some of the 
questions and therefore there may be at times too little space allocated. Please 
feel free to continue using additional sheets referring to the Question Number to 
enable you to give as complete details as possible. 
******** 
PERSONAL DETAILS 
Name Age 
Rank Watchkeeping Years - Months Experience 
Nationality Mother Tongue(s) 
Which other languages do you speak fluently 
At which nautical colleage(s) did you undertake your main training (name and country) 
319IFSMA. NOT APPENDIX D 236 
DETAILS OF YOUR CURRENT SHIP 
Name of Current Ship Port of Registry 
Type of Ship Type of Cargo 
LOA -- m/feet 
Beam rn/feet Gross Tonnage GRT 
Trading Area/Route 
How long have you been on your present ship? Years Months 
Total number of crew 
Number of Navigating Officers, excluding the Master 
What languages do the crew members speak as their mother tongues? 
No of Crew Members Language 
MAN-MACHINE INTERFACE 
Q1 Would you please describe in detail any error that you have made on any ship in the 
previous 12 months in reading or interpreting any bridge equipment (GPS, Radar, 
ARPA, etc, ) or describe such an error made by another navigating officer whom you 
were watching at the time. 
Type of equipment 
Was the error made by YOURSELF Q 
OTHER PERSON Q 
Approximate number of times this particular error has been observed times 
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Further details 
Q2 Would you please describe in detail any error that you have made on any ship in the 
previous 12 months operating any bridge equipment (GPS, Radar, ARPA, etc. ) or 
describe such an error made by another person whom you were watching at the time. 
Type of equipment 
Was the error made by YOURSELF 
Q 
OTHER PERSON Q 
Approximate number of times this particular error has been observed times 
Further details 
Q3 Would you please describe in detail any error that was made by yourself on any ship 
in the previous 12 months which was caused by any language difficulties. 
Language(s) involved 
Was the error made by YOURSELF Q 
OTHER PERSON Q 
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Further details 
EQUIPMENT FAILURE/MANUALS 
Q4 Would you please describe in detail a failure of any bridge equipment (GPS, Radar, 
ARPA, etc. ) on any ship in the previous 12 months 
Type of equipment? 
How did it fail? 
Was it repaired during the voyage? YES 
Q 
NO Q 
What reversion mode did you use? 
Q5 Do you have sufficient information on your present ship detailing the operation of all 
bridge equipment? 
YES Q 
NO Q 
If NO, what other information would you like to have? 
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Ad 
Q6 Do you fully understand the manuals relating to the bridge equipment on your 
present ship? 
YES Q 
NO Q 
If NO, please describe any problems it may have caused? 
Q7 Have you had to consult any manual(s) to enable you to operate any of the bridge 
equipment on your present ship? 
YES Q 
NO Q 
If YES, name the equipment (type/manufacturer/model) 
If YES, did you find the manuals easy to use? YES Q 
NO Q 
N/A Q 
If NO in what way do you think that they could be made easier to use? 
Q8 Have you, or any other crew member, made up specific memory aids in response to an 
error which occurred on the bridge (i. e. written notes, check lists, etc. ) 
YES Q 
NO Q 
If YES, please give details 
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ACCIDENT REPORTING/NAUTICAL PUBLICATIONS 
Q9 Have you heard about the Marine Accident Reporting System (MARS - published in 
Seaways)? 
YES Q 
NO Q 
If YES, have you ever sent a report to MARS? 
YES D 
NO Q 
Q 10 Do you think navigating officers should be encouraged to send in confidential 
reports of near-misses and other problems? 
YES Q 
NO Q 
Q 11 Which nautical publication(s) do you have regular access to 
Journal Country of publication 
TRAINING 
Q 12 Have you undertaken any training using a simulator? YES Q 
NO Q 
If NO, would you like to undertake training using a simulator? YES Q 
NO Q 
If YES please give details (type of course, where and when) 
How well do you think that elements of the simulator course transferred to a real world 
situation 
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Q 13 Which aspects of navigation training do you believe a simulator can be best used for? 
Q 14 Which aspects of navigation training do you believe cannot be substituted using a 
simulator? 
Q 15 How often do you think that a simulator refresher course in collision avoidance should 
be undertaken? 
Once a year Q 
Every 2 years O 
Every 3 years O 
Every 4 years Q 
Other Q 
No need Q 
How long should such a course be? 2 days 
Q 
3 days Q 
4 days Q 
5 days Q 
Other 
RADAR/ARPA 
Q 16 In which course heading do you prefer to use the Radar/ARPA? 
True North Up Q 
Course Up Q 
Ship's Head Up Q 
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Why do you prefer this particular heading? 
Q 17 In which mode do you normally use the Radar/ARPA? 
Sea Stabilized mode Q 
Ground Stabilized mode Q 
Why do you prefer this particular mode? 
WATCH ONE/OMBO 
Since IMO granted dispensation to conduct trials during which the Officer of the 
Navigational Watch Acts as the Sole Look-Out During Periods of Darkness in July 1991 
many ships' bridges were designed or adapted to conform to the guidelines specified by the 
IMO. Since then IMO has terminated the trials but there is sufficient evidence that some ships 
still operate according to the trial guidelines. 
It is an issue which has caused a lot of controversy in the shipping industry with views both 
for and against. To enable more research to be carried out into the safety aspects of this 
concept it is essential to find out how common the practice is at present. 
**** 
Is your present ship designed as/classified for Watch One/OMBO (allowing the navigating 
officer to act as the sole look-out in periods of darkness)? 
YES Q 
NO Q 
Is it operated as Watch One/OMBO? 
If YES, how often? 
YES Q 
NO Q 
DO NOT WANT TO ANSWER Q 
Regularly Q 
Occasonally Q 
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Finally, please feel free to make any other comments which may be of relevance to any 
aspects of the prevention of collisions, groundings or near-misses. 
Many thanks for your assistance with completing the questionnaire. 
Would you please return the completed questionnaire, including any additional sheets, 
sketches, photographs to: 
PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL 
M-B Moreton 
Centre for Maritime and Offshore Operations 
Liverpool John Moores University 
Byrom Street 
Liverpool L3 3AF 
United Kingdom 
319IFSMA"NOT APPENDIX D 244 
GLOSSARY 
of more frequently used acronyms, abbreviations and terminology 
Abaft the beam Any bearing or direction between the beam of a ship and her stern 
Able Seaman A man able to perform all the duties of a seaman on board a ship 
AIS Automatic Identification System Transponder 
Allision Contact with a stationary object, e. g., a bridge 
ARPA Automatic Radar Plotting Aid 
BRM Bridge Resource Management 
Cable About one-tenth of a nautical mile 
Classification Society Organisation authorised to determine the seaworthiness of a ship by a survey based on 
her construction and the size (scantlings) of the materials used in her building. 
COLREGS 72 International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 1972 
CRM Cockpit Resource Management 
DAMA Databank for Sikring of Maritime Operasj}oner is a database developed in Norway for 
the reporting and compiling data on accidents at sea jointly with the other Nordic 
countries 
DECCA Medium frequency continuous-wave radio navigation system used for precise 
positioning within short range of transmitters 
DGPS Differential Global Positioning System 
DNV Det Norske Veritas 
DR Dead Reckoning, a position obtained by applying courses and distances made through 
the water from the last observed position 
ECDIS Electronic Chart Display Information System 
EPIRB Emergency Position Indicating Radio Beacon 
ETA Estimated Time of Arrival 
ETD Estimated Time of Departure 
FOC Flag of Convenience 
GEMS Generic Error Modelling System 
GLONASS Global Navigation Satellite System 
GMDSS Global Maritime Distress and Safety System 
GPS Global Positioning System 
GRT Gross Registered Tonnes is the total of all the enclosed spaces within a ship, expressed in tons each of which is the equivalent of one hundred cubic feet 
GT Gross Tonnage, adopted by the International Tonnage Convention (1969), is the total 
of all internal spaces of a ship measured in cubic metres 
HEI Human Error Identification Technique 
JACS International Association of Classification Societies 
IBS Integrated Bridge System 
GLOSSARY 245 
IFSMA International Federation of Ships Masters Association 
ILO International Labour Organisation 
IMO International Maritime Organization 
Inmarsat International Marine Satellite Organisation 
ISM Code International Safety Management Code 
ITF International Transport Workers Federation 
Leading Lights Lights set up on shore which, when brought into line with one another leads the ship 
along a marked channel 
MARS International Marine Accident Reporting Scheme 
MOU Memorandum of Understanding (often referred to as PSC) 
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NI Nautical Institute 
NIS Norwegian International Shipping Registry 
NOAA National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration 
NRT Net Registered Tonnage is the total of all enclosed spaces within a ship available for 
cargo, expressed in tons each of which is equivalent to one hundred cubic feet 
NT Net Tonnage, adopted by the International Tonnage Convention (1969), is the total of 
all cargo compartments measured in cubic metres 
NTSB National Transportation Safety Board US 
OMBO One-Man-On-Bridge Opearation, a. k. a., Watch One 
OOW Officer of Watch 
P&I Club Protection and Indemnity Club 
Plimsoll Line A mark painted on the side of the ship indicating the draught levels to which the ship 
may be loaded for varying conditions of season and location. These were made 
compulsory in Britain under the conditions of the Merchant Shipping Act 1876 passed 
after a decade of parliamentary struggle conducted by Samuel Plimsoll. 
Point A division of the circumference of the compass card which is divided into 32 points, 
each of 11 V4 degrees of arc. 2 points are 22 s degrees. 
PSC Port State Control 
SAR Search and Rescue 
SHELL Software, Hardware, Environment and Liveware represents the components with which 
human factors on the flight deck can be addressed 
Sister Ship Two or more vessels which are under the same beneficial ownership, therefore not 
necessarily identical (Hill 1989) 
SOLAS International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 
STCW International Convention for Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping 
TSD Total Sleep Deprivation 
TSS Traffic Separation Scheme 
USCG United States Coast Guard 
VHF Very High Frequency radio 
VLCC Very Large Crude Carrier 
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VTC/VTS Vessel Traffic Centre/Service/System 
Watch One/W 1 Denotes an officer of watch acting as sole lookout during the hours of darkness (see IMO Circ. 566) 
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Federal Aviation Administration, U. S. = http: //www. hf. faa. gov/ 
Human Factors and Ergonomics Society = http: //hfes. org/ 
International Maritime Organization (IMO), UK = http: //www. imo. org 
Marine Incident Investigation Unit (MIIU), Australia = http: //www. miiu. gov. au 
Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) =' http: //www. open. gov. uk/moib/moibhome. htm 
Maritime Links on the Net = htip: //w3. ime. net/---drwebb/maritime. html 
Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA), UK = http: //www. mcagency. org. uk/defoult. htm 
NASA Ames Research Center's, U. S. = http: //human-factors. orc. noso. gov/ 
National Maritime Safety Reporting System (NMSIRS), US = http: //www. marad. dot. gov/information/nmsirs 
Royal Aeronautical Society UK = http: //ourworld. compuserve. com/homepages/loftwork/menu. htm 
System Concepts - Ergonomics in Practice = http: //www. system-concepts. (om/ 
The Ergonomics Society of the United Kingdom = http: //www. ergonomics. org. uk/ 
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), US = http: //www. ntsb. gov 
The Nautical Institute (NI), UK = http: //www. noutinst. org/ 
The Royal Institute of Naval Architects (RINA), UK = http: //www. rino. org. uk 
Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB), Canada = http: //bst-tsb. gc. ca/ 
U. S. Coast Guard R&DCenter, U. S. = http: //www. rdc. uscg. mil/rdcpages/human_factors. html 
U. S. Coast Guard, Prevention Through People (PTP), US = http: //www. uscg. mil/hq/g-m/nmc/ptp 
VETA (Non-profit Traffic Safety Organisation), Sweden = http: //www. veta. se/ 
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